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 The large quantity of invective deployed by aristocrats in Roman criminal cases 
and political arguments of the late Republic has led scholars to argue that Romans 
considered character of great probative value. This dissertation examines the surprising 
fact that in such an environment, where reputation was one of the most important assets 
of an aristocrat, some individuals began to respond to criticism of their character in a 
manner that had not been seen in the earlier Republic – nearly admitting to certain 
character flaws.   
 The foremost practitioner of this strategy was Cicero.  Herein I trace how he often 
responded to criticism by avoiding denial and instead responded with misleading 
admissions that shifted the meanings of accusations to grounds on which he had an 
advantage.   I also provide anecdotal evidence for such a practice in Caesar and Catullus, 
as well as Quintilian’s positive assessment of it.  
 I argue that contemporary sociolinguistic studies of such strategies indicate that 
the individuals who are most likely to learn such strategies often come from “macho” 
cultures in times of political upheaval who have challenged the dominant ethos of that 
culture.  In other words, the more an individual is criticized by others, the more that 
individual learns that the best response to criticism is often one that minimizes its 
seriousness or dismisses it altogether.  Such was the case with Cicero and Catullus, 
whose pursuit of distinction did not follow the traditional military path, and to some 
extent with Caesar, whose political ambitions threatened the senatorial dominance of 
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 In Suetonius’s Life of Caesar, an unusual exchange in the senate is reported by 
the biographer.  It involves Caesar boasting about his acquisition of the province of 
(transalpine) Gaul despite the law of Vatinius, passed as an attempt by the senate to 
assign him the less desirable Cisapline Gaul and Illyricum.  Suetonius says:  
Quo gaudio elatus non temperauit, quin paucos post dies frequenti curia iactaret, 
inuitis et gementibus aduersaris adeptum se quae concupisset, proinde ex eo 
insultaturum omnium capitibus; ac negante quodam per contumeliam facile hoc 
ulli feminae fore, responderit quasi adludens: in Suria quoque regnasse 
Sameramin magnamque Asiae partem Amazonas tenuisse quondam.1 
 
Elated with such joy he could not hold himself back from boasting a few days 
later in the crowded Curia that he, having taken what he had desired despite his 
opponents resisting and groaning, was forthwith going to jump upon the heads of 
all of them; but when someone, as an harsh insult, stated that this would be no 
easy thing for a woman, he responded as though he were merely kidding: “in 
Syria Semiramis too had reigned and that the Amazons controlled a sizable part of 
Asia at one time.”2 
 
Caesar compares himself to a woman.  This is not a comparison we would expect from a 
politician, especially a Roman politician.  What possible reason could Caesar have had 
for likening his power to that of a woman, “the weaker sex?”  He does of course compare 
himself to a uniquely powerful woman.  But one might ask why he does not deny that he 
is a woman altogether.  Why does he not respond by challenging the suggestion?  Why 
not respond by threateningly stating “I’ll show you who is the woman?”  By comparing 
himself to a woman, was he attempting to “own” a trait he had been accused of before?  
For Suetonius famously described Caesar as “every woman’s man and every man’s 
                                                
1 Suet. Caes. 22.2.1 - 22.2.8 
2 All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 
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woman;” and according to Plutarch Cicero expressed bewilderment that a man who 
picked his hair with one finger could take over the republic.3  Or, was he trying to 
humiliate his challenger and the senate by asking what it meant for them that they were 
bested by an effeminate?  Could the wit of his retort have affected the senate’s perception 
of him? 
This dissertation is an attempt to explain such witty but unusual retorts.  As such, 
it touches upon some of the same questions raised in Andrew Riggsby’s important article 
“Did the Romans Believe in Their Verdicts?” Therein, Riggsby considers why Roman 
defendants did not respond to accusations by denying their guilt and offering alternative 
explanations, and instead engaged in “flamboyant use of certain rhetorical figures, self-
reference, and invoking the ambiance of the arena or the comic theater.”4  Riggsby argues 
that there are two ways for scholars to explain this rhetorical excess: to conclude that 
Roman courts were not concerned with guilt and that we are imposing our own concepts 
of justice on them,5 or to conclude, as he does, that we have a “tendency to underestimate 
drastically the ‘relevance to the case’ of many of Cicero’s arguments.”6  Riggsby 
contends that the reason we see so much invective is not that Romans didn’t care about 
guilt and innocence, but that they viewed character as relevant to this question.  His 
implication is, therefore, that Romans believed character to be evidence of guilt or 
innocence to a greater degree than we do in the modern era, where forensic evidence and 
testimony are given more weight than character or motive.  Furthermore, Riggsby 
                                                
3 Plut Caes. 5.9: “ἀλλ' ὅταν” ἔφη “τὴν κόµην οὕτω διακειµένην περιττῶς ἴδω, κἀκεῖνον ἑνὶ δακτύλῳ 
κνώµενον, οὔ µοι δοκεῖ πάλιν οὗτος ἅνθρωπος εἰς νοῦν ἂν ἐµβαλέσθαι τηλικοῦτον κακόν, ἀναίρεσιν τῆς 
Ῥωµαίων πολιτείας. 
4 Riggsby 1997: 235.  
5 He correctly notes (236) that this conclusion would require some degree of collusion between the various 
elements of the courts. 
6 Ibid 237. 
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collects a convincing number of examples of Roman discourse involving the courts 
where truth and guilt seem clearly to be the end goal.7  He does of course allow the 
possibility that orators viewed the courts differently than the jurors, with the former 
regarding the latter as manipulatable.  This possibility is significant and something that 
we shall be returning to in future chapters.  However, in regard to Riggsby’s original 
question as to whether Romans believed in their verdicts, it is my contention that there is 
a third explanation for the excessive rhetoric that gives rise to the question: the clever 
orator avoided denial whenever possible because, for Roman audiences, being accused of 
something was almost the same as being proven guilty of it.  What’s more, Roman 
audiences saw humor as a positive character attribute, and orators won favor by 
demonstrating it—something that is hard to do while denying a charge.  Thus, one reason 
we see so much insult and abuse and so little discussion of evidence and witnesses is that 
the defense in a Roman court case had an interest in ignoring these things.  The more the 
defense sought to challenge the assertions of the prosecution or plaintiff, the more it 
would get bogged down in a discussion that merely reinforces an impression of guilt 
among judges, jurors, and audiences.  By shifting the discussion to the matter of 
character, the defense is able to avoid this pitfall, and the other side has no choice but to 
go along; this is particularly true when the charges a defendant faced were severe. 
 The avoidance of denial entails a turn to character.  The defense refuses to answer 
the question “did he do it?” and instead shifts the question to “why would he do this?”  
The result is an argument about reputation rather than one about what we could consider 
guilt and innocence.  To return once more to Riggsby’s analysis, he is right to some 
                                                
7 See p. 238 for the range of sources cited.  Of most importance are the occasions where jurors swear to 
judge by the laws, for which he mentions Inv. 1.70, 2.131-33; Verr. 1.46; Clu. 164; and especially Verr. 
1.3; cf. Cael. 21; Rosc. 152; Clu. 27.  
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extent that the reason for the excessive rhetoric in Roman oratory is that Romans 
considered character to be of greater relevance than we do.8  However, another reason is 
that the defense had a vested interest in shift to character.  Even if a prosecution were to 
ignore character and stick strictly to evidence and motive, the defense would be likely to 
reply to that evidence and motive with a claim that the accused couldn’t be guilty because 
of his good character and arguments would arise that were particularly conducive to 
humor.  Proclamation of innocence due to character leads to countercharges about 
character.  Barbs begin to be traded back and forth by both sides and humor inevitably 
ends up playing a role.  Before going further, however, let’s turn back and briefly and 
consider Greek oratory. 
 
1.2 Why isn’t Greek Oratory as Funny as Roman? 
 Humor wasn’t lacking among the Greeks, particularly relating to character.  They 
had a long history of laughing at the expense of others, using humor to reinforce and 
challenge reputations.  We can see this in book two of the Iliad when Thersites, an 
individual reviled by the rest of the Achaeans, exhorts them to return home and Odysseus 
beats him for his words: 
ὣς ἄρ᾽ ἔφη, σκήπτρῳ δὲ µετάφρενον ἠδὲ καὶ ὤµω 
πλῆξεν: ὃ δ᾽ ἰδνώθη, θαλερὸν δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε δάκρυ: 
σµῶδιξ δ᾽ αἱµατόεσσα µεταφρένου ἐξυπανέστη 
σκήπτρου ὕπο χρυσέου: ὃ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἕζετο τάρβησέν τε, 
ἀλγήσας δ᾽ ἀχρεῖον ἰδὼν ἀποµόρξατο δάκρυ. 
οἳ δὲ καὶ ἀχνύµενοί περ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν.9 
                                                
8 By excessive rhetoric, we mean the amount of personal invective involved in matters that related to 
criminal activity.  Thus, it is not enough for Cicero to accuse Catiline of taking up arms against the 
Republic.  He also accuses him of enabling patricide and the sexual corruption of young men (Cat. 2.8), of 
leading men lusting for slaughter, fire, and robbery, who drank, gambled, belched, and feasted with 
despoiled women (2.10).  




On this he beat him with his staff about the back and shoulders  
till he dropped and fell a-weeping. The golden sceptre raised  
a bloody weal on his back, so he sat down frightened and  
in pain, looking foolish as he wiped the tears from his eyes.  
The people were sorry for him, yet they laughed heartily.10 
  
Further, the fifth century Greek philosopher Democritus was so well-known for his 
acerbic wit that he was nicknamed Gelasinos, “Laugher,”11 and Greek comedy certainly 
has no shortage of disparaging humor, obviously thought funny by Romans, given their 
comedic debt to New Comedy. 
 What is remarkable, however, is the relative lack of jests in Greek oratory when 
compared to its Roman counterpart.  Indeed, in one of the first attempts to collect 
instances of wit in Greek oratory, Robert Bonner stated, “A survey of the remains of 
Attic forensic oratory and other appropriate sources yields so little in the way of stories, 
jests, and humor that the material is easily assembled.”12  In contrast to Roman oratory, 
many instances of humor in Greek oratory are not directed at any individual in particular.  
There are, however, a few exceptions.  As related in Plutarch’s biography, when 
reproached by a thief for working late by candlelight, Demosthenes replied “I know that I 
annoy you by lighting my lamp” (οἶδα ὅτι σε λυπῶ λύχνον καίων).13  Even in the war of 
words between Demosthenes and Aeschines there are few examples of the kind of wit we 
shall see in Cicero.14  Rather than appearing to admit to accusations and shift the 
                                                
10 Translation by Samuel Butler 
11 Aelian VH 4.20. 
12 Bonner 1922. Furthermore, many of the passages referenced by Bonner, such as Lysias’s defense of the 
cripple, are only questionably funny, by any measure. 
13 Plut. Dem. 11.5. 
14 There is one clear exception to this and that is in Demosthenes’ reactions to insults regarding his mouth. 
Aeschines refers to him as a βάταλος, stammerer in 2.99, which Aeschines links to effeminacy, perhaps 
through the association of not being able to talk with infants, thereby taking on a meaning similar to 
“mamma’s boy.”  Plutarch, however, links this word to one of three things: his weak physique, the fact that 
there was an effeminate flute-player by that name, or that it was the name of a decadent poet (Dem. 4.5-6).  
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argument to advantageous ground, most Greek oratory involves trading insults, often 
related to style.  Thus, for example, given that Attic orators were supposed to keep their 
right hands within their robes,15 Demosthenes upbraided Aeschines by saying “we don’t 
need to speak with a hand held within, Aeschines, but to be diplomatic with a hand held 
within.  For there [Macedonia] with your hands stretched out and upturned you shamed 
yourself” (οὐ λέγειν εἴσω τὴν χεῖρ᾽ ἔχοντ᾽, Αἰσχίνη, δεῖ, οὔ, ἀλλὰ πρεσβεύειν εἴσω τὴν 
χεῖρ᾽ ἔχοντα.  σὺ δ᾽ ἐκεῖ προτείνας καὶ ὑποσχὼν καὶ καταισχύνας τούτους).16  Lysias, 
speaking against Aeschines the Socratic, whom he had lent money for a perfume 
business, stated that the defendant was such an odious person that even his neighbors 
moved away.  Later, in the same fragment, Lysias describes Aeschines’s relationship 
with a woman who had fewer teeth than fingers.17  However, outside of these instances, 
most of the humor in Attic orators is for no other purpose than to elicit laughter.18 
 Bonner offers a few explanations for this dearth of humor in Athenian courts.  
The chief reason he cites is the lack of opportunities for retort in cross-examination.19  
The only opportunities for comebacks occur in the interrogation of litigants.  However, in 
                                                                                                                                            
This is in keeping with Aeshines’ overall criticism of Demosthenes’ style and much similar to the role of 
the os in the In Vatinium; the debate between the two Attic operates on two related registers: the mouth as a 
organ of speech on the one hand and as a potential source of sexual misdeeds on the other.  See Worman 
2004. Aeschines further calls Demosthenes a κίναιδος in 2.88 and 3.167.  Demosthenes’ response to all of 
this at the beginning of De Corona is to say “If you know me to be such as he accuses (for I have never 
lived anywhere other than among you) then do not endure my voice).”  De Cor.: εἰ µὲν ἴστε µε τοιοῦτον 
οἷον οὗτος ᾐτιᾶτο (οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοθί που βεβίωκ' ἢ παρ' ὑµῖν), µηδὲ φωνὴν ἀνάσχησθε.  Thank you to Joshua 
Smith for this citation. 
15 Aeschin 1.25: ὥστε ὃ νυνὶ πάντες ἐν ἔθει πράττοµεν, τὸ τὴν χεῖρα ἔξω ἔχοντες λέγειν, τότε τοῦτο θρασύ 
τι ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ εὐλαβοῦντο αὐτὸ πράττειν. 
16 Dem. 19 255. 
17 Lys. Fragment 1 Against Aeschines. 
18 The one exception is an account from the Scholiast to Vesp. 191 in which Demosthenes tells a story that 
ends abruptly with no explanation, evoking protests from the jury - the orator was simply trying to keep 
their attention. 
19 Bonner 1922: 101. 
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the recorded instances of such interrogations,20 we find no humor.  Another possible 
reason cited by Bonner for this dearth of humor is the crucial fact that we cannot assume 
that published speeches reflected the entirety of what was said and done in court.21  It’s 
entirely possible that jokes were more common than our literary sources suggest, perhaps 
added extemporaneously as the situation arose.  Yet if this were the case, we would 
expect at the very least to hear of examples in historical or epistolary sources; we do not.  
We are thus left with this question: were fifth and fourth century Athenian orators simply 
less funny than late Republican Roman orators? 
 This question is difficult to answer because the foremost Republican orator was 
renowned for his trenchant wit.  It is possible that Roman oratory appears more funny 
than Greek because it is overwhelmingly Ciceronian.  Perhaps if we had more of Crassus 
the Agelast, grandfather of Marcus Licinius Crassus, who, as his name suggests, was 
thought to have no sense of humor, we might have a different impression.22  Or, if we 
simply had more contemporaries of Cicero we might think of humor as playing a less 
crucial role — whatever that role may be — in Roman oratory.  There is, however, a 
more interesting explanation. 
  
1.3 Humor and Character 
 Bonner suggests that Lysias was the most humorous Attic orator because he was 
particularly concerned with the character of his clients and opponents.23  He does not 
                                                
20 As an example of which Bonner cites Socrates’ examination of Meletus in the Apology - p. 101. 
21 Ibid. p. 103. 
22 Plin Nat. 7.79-80.  That a man would have a name that indicated he lacked a sense of humor is in itself 
evidence of the importance place about wit and humor.  Were such qualities not valued, there were be no 
need to remark on the absence of them in others. 
23 Bonner 1922: p. 102. 
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elaborate on this statement, yet it certainly requires explanation.  What is it about 
discussions of character that would give rise to laughs?  We cannot appeal to 
evolutionary or physiological explanations, since none of these have proven 
satisfactory.24  The most agreed upon, and most non-specific, explanation for humor 
offered by biologists and psychologists is that it is some kind of adaptive coping 
strategy.25  Yet we can still ask why some contexts give rise to laughs more than others.  
When considering character we are dealing with a fair amount of subjectivity, something 
required for jokes since there is little room for laughter when dealing with the 
indisputable.  
 Given that humor is not about fact but about perception, and that there is no 
greater source for a multitude of perceptions than the human mind and individual 
psyches, we should expect humor and character to be linked.  Furthermore, given that we 
are social animals, it is natural that one of our primary topics of conversation (and thus 
humor) should be each other.  The subjectivity of character helps.  And what’s more, 
regardless of the manner in which humor is interpreted, everyone can agree that it is 
related to affect – emotions that influence behavior.  Whether affect gives rise to humor, 
allows its reception, or both, it plays a central role, uncertain though that role may be.  
Lastly, discussions of character usually involve communal standards – whether one is 
exceeding or failing to live up to them.  Humor has been demonstrated to have a 
regulatory aspect, both on a communal and a psychological scale.  On the communal 
                                                
24 Mary Beard provides a recent Classicist’s view on the matter, contrasting what she sees as the superior 
Freudian interpretation of humor as the escape of the ego from the superego with Bakhtin’s view of humor 
as related to the carnival side of life.  See Beard 2014: 59-69. 
25 Samson and Gross 2012: 375-376. 
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level, humor is reflective of a society’s character and mood.26  On the individual level, 
different kinds of humor have greater or lesser impacts on our degree of optimism and 
happiness.27  In other words, our character or personalities affect our senses of humor and 
are therefore linked to them. 
 The judicial world may, paradoxically, be the ideal place to find laughs.  Judicial 
systems, whether formal or informal, exist in order to assign blame and mete out 
punishment, financial or penal.  Even in Western systems, which are concerned with 
abstract notions of truth and justice, humor plays a significant role, not only as a result of 
adversarial exchanges but also individual inclinations, such as in judicial opinions.28  
Perhaps, then, Cicero is the rule and Greek orators the exceptions.  However, in one area 
the Roman courts stand out as unusual: their almost singular obsession with character. 
 Analyses of Roman humor underscore this preoccupation with character, 
demonstrating that humor was always directed against someone.  Tacitus remarks, with 
surprise, that the Germans don’t laugh at vices (nemo vitia ridet),29 meaning of course 
that in his view laughing at personal shortcomings was normal.  This was in stark contrast 
                                                
26 In the case of the United States, see Rourke 2004: p. 186-236. 
27 Samson and Gross 2012: 378-379.  The authors differentiate between positive humor wherein there is no 
target and negative humor where there is.  They find, unsurprisingly, that positive humor leads to positive 
emotions far greater than negative humor. 
28 See Hori 2012.  One notable example he provides involves humor in the form of wordplay for no other 
reason than amusement.  In a suit regarding the labeling of detergents, John Brown of the Fifth Circuit had 
the following paragraph (328) in Chem. Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Clark, 482 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1973): 
“Clearly, the decision represents a Gamble since we risk a Cascade of criticism from an increasing Tide of 
ecology-minded citizens. Yet, contrary decision would most likely have precipitated a Niagara of 
complaints from an industry which justifiably seeks uniformity in the laws with which it must comply. 
Inspired by the legendary valor of Ajax, who withstood Hector’s lance, we have Boldly chosen the course 
of uniformity in reversing the lower Court’s decision upholding Dade County’s local labeling laws.”  
Likewise, when issuing a decision involving the rapper Eminem, who was being charged with libel, 
Michigan Judge Deborah Servitto rapped.  (Deangelo Bailey vs Marhall Bruce Mathers III, a/k/a Eminem 
Slim Shady).  Humor is even more evident in daytime courtroom dramas, as summed up well in the title of 
Judge Judy Sheindlin’s 1996 book “Don’t Pee on My Leg and Tell Me It’s Raining.”  Among televised 
courtroom dramas the reason for humor is twofold: the attorney wants to ingratiate himself with the jury 
and the show itself wants to entertain, and thus retain, viewers at home. 
29 Tac. Germ 19. 
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to the Greek tradition.30  Moreover, Quintilian largely defines humor as having its base in 
insult.31  He argues that character debates naturally lead to invective, and invective, in the 
Roman mind, is largely associated with humor.  As a result, humor becomes an essential 
part of Roman argumentation.  I contend that this argument can be taken a step further: a 
contest over character through humor could be eclipsed by the humor itself.  Verbal one-
upmanship can take center stage, and in such a situation the more successful orator is the 
more humorous one.   
There is evidence for the intrinsic power of humor in one telling example of 
American judicature.  In 2009 Davis Andre Davis was accused by the state of California 
of possessing and transporting methamphetamine.  While exiting a restroom stall during a 
short recess Davis noticed a juror from his case at the urinal.  While passing the juror 
Davis remarked with a smile and a laugh “vote for me.”  Although the juror, upon 
informing the judge of the interaction, stated that he believed the defendant to be joking, 
the defendant was charged with jury tampering.  The defense argued that there was no 
intent to corrupt the process by the defendant, that it was merely a bad joke.  And indeed, 
the law did require the intent to corrupt in order to be found guilty of influencing the 
jury.32  Nevertheless, the jury found him to be guilty and the following conclusion was 
drawn: 
Even if Juror L. thought [the] defendant was trying to be funny, that perception as 
evidence of defendant's intent, even if believed by the jury, did not foreclose the 
jury from concluding that defendant simultaneously intended for Juror L. to acquit 
                                                
30 See pages 36-7 below for a discussion of Greek humor. 
31 6.3.8: Habet enim, ut Cicero dicit, sedem in deformitate aliqua et turpitudine: quae cum in aliis 
demonstrantur, urbanitas, cum in ipsos dicentis reccidunt, stultitia uocatur. 
32 In fact CA code 116.5, under all its provisions lists the conveyance of “payment or benefit,” to a juror or 
his agent as necessary for a conviction.  In this case, unless the court considered the joke, assuming it was a 
joke, a benefit to the juror, clearly no such exchange took place. 
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him. The jury concluded such was defendant's intent, and substantial evidence 
supports that determination.33 
 
The defendant, the jury reckoned, even if he was just trying to be funny, was intending to 
influence the juror.  In other words, the jury found that humor itself could be an 
influence. 
 The successful orator – and it is worth mentioning that the corpus of Latin 
orations that has survived has done so largely because they were considered somehow 
successful – focused on insulting the character of his opponent in as humorous a way as 
possible.  As Riggsby has argued, this is not to say that Roman audiences had no fixed 
standards.  When Caesar responded to the accusation that he was effeminate by 
mentioning Semiramis, his senatorial audience (a setting that, though not judicial, was 
clearly argumentative) most likely had a very fixed view on gender and masculinity.  It 
has been argued by many since 1983 when Amy Richlin first systematically looked into 
ideas of masculinity in the Roman world, and in particular by Erik Gunderson, that the 
standards for how an aristocratic Roman man should behave were highly specific and 
inflexible.34  The performance of masculinity, at least in regard to practicing rhetoric, was 
indeed likened to a tightrope by Lucian.35  One slip and the game is up.  In such a world, 
we might expect Caesar to be ridiculed for his response, and for his political career to 
suffer.  Yet, the fact that he does not appear to have suffered does not mean that his 
words about Semiramis changed the minds of any senators present about what it means to 
be a Roman man.  If anything changed, it was their views of Caesar.  Given that 
                                                
33 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVIS ANDRE DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant. Court of 
Appeals of California, Third Appellate District, Yolo.  2009. 
34 Gunderson 2000, Williams 1999, Richlin 1997 and 1983, Fantham, Skinner, Ancona, R. & Greene, E. 
2005, Butrica, 2005. 
35 As translated by Gunderson.  The actual words of Lucian at Rh. Pr. 9 are εἰ κατὰ τούτων ὁδεύσειας 
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν κάλων βαίνοντες.  
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Suetonius reports the exchange as a mild witticism, quasi adludens, he likely viewed the 
remark as a successful comeback.  If he had not viewed it as such, one would expect him 
to relate the exchange with surprise, disbelief, or disapproval that Caesar would have said 
such a thing.  Further, the fact that Suetonius jumps from his narration of this altercation 
to the end of Caesar’s consulship implies that the Senate’s response was not noteworthy.  
For Suetonius to depict Caesar as joking and then immediately switch topics suggests that 
it was unlikely there was an uproar in response.  It is possible, if not probable, that some 
senators walked away thinking less of Caesar, but there is no reason to think that there 
were so many such senators that his career suffered.  We are thus left with two possible 
reactions, between which the truth must lie.  At one end the individual views of senators 
towards Caesar mattered little in comparison to the military might he had.  And at the 
other end, although their views about masculine behavior didn’t change, their views 
towards Caesar did.  
 No one would deny that the support Caesar enjoyed among the legions was the 
basis of his power.  But the second option cannot be discounted.  For one, Caesar’s 
response, by avoiding denial and artfully referencing a counterpoint, changed the subject.  
The issue shifts from whether he was effeminate to whether he was an Assyrian empress, 
something so outrageous as to be dismissed outright.  Almost as important, and little 
discussed, is the likelihood that some senators found new respect for Caesar based on his 
quick wit and, furthermore, that quick wit was highly esteemed – so highly esteemed that 
demonstrating it could override a great deal of criticism, including the charge of 
effeminacy.   
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 It might seem obvious that quick wit is something an electorate would respect.  It 
is natural to want one’s politicians to be able to think quickly under pressure.  What 
needs to be acknowledged, however, is the precedence given to this quality over others.  
This is true both of Roman republican politics and contemporary politics.  In the second 
1984 presidential debate Ronald Reagan gave a very Caesarian example of this.  After 
slipping up several times and admitting to being confused, he was asked by Henry 
Trewhitt of the Baltimore Sun whether he was too old for the presidency, a question the 
Mondale campaign had repeatedly brought up in the past.  Reagan’s response was met 
with enormous laughter, including that of Mondale, and applause:  
Not at all, Mr. Trewhitt, and I want you to know that I will not make age an issue 
in this campaign.  I am not going to exploit for political purposes my opponent’s 
youth and inexperience…[applause and laughter]…If I still have time, I might 
add, Mr. Trewhitt, I might add that it was Seneca or it was Cicero -- I don't know 
which -- that said, “If it was not for the elders correcting the mistakes of the 
young, there would be no state.”36 
 
Walter Mondale later said that he knew he had lost the debate at that moment.  Why 
would this be?  There were serious concerns about Reagan’s mental health and he was 
the oldest president in history at seventy-three.  These concerns remained despite his 
response, and the president’s mental state was a serious source of distress.  He had 
recently demonstrated a lack of knowledge of Soviet nuclear retaliatory capabilities and 
appeared to misunderstand the nature of the weapons systems of American nuclear 
submarines as well.  Not only did his response fail by any logic to change the perception 
of his understanding of these matters, but it could well have been taken as evidence of his 
mental decline in itself as neither Seneca nor Cicero said any such thing – although the 
supposed quote is certainly not out of keeping with either’s views on age and the state.  
                                                
36 Presidential Debate.  October 21st 1984.  Kansas City, Missouri. 
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We can only conclude that, in the end, a quick response that shifted the debate was more 
meaningful to the audience and voters that night than the potential mishandling of nuclear 
weapons in a struggle against an heavily armed and imperfectly understood adversary.  
One might argue that Reagan’s response was proof that he had his wits about him.  But, 
of course, he was likely anticipating questions from the panel or remarks by Mondale 
about his age and thus probably had this response pre-prepared, ready to be stated should 
the need arise, as indeed Caesar likely anticipated insults about his manhood.  
Furthermore, there are many more requirements to understanding and managing a cold 
war than quick wit.  It is thus an inescapable conclusion that the ability to make one’s 
audience laugh is a powerful tool for a politician.37  This dissertation is an exploration of 
this phenomenon in Roman republican politics.  
  
1.4 Previous Scholarship  
 The idea that humor might influence argument has been broadly neglected not 
only by Classicists but also by Social Scientists.  Of the latter, I know of only one study, 
one that nevertheless yielded interesting results.38  Four groups of thirty-two male 
undergraduates at the University of Nebraska were assigned to four different lectures 
over four subsequent days (32 students in 16 lectures with 4 each day for the 4 groups).  
                                                
37 Meyer (1990: 76-80) has systematically studied Reagan’s use of humor in 22 of his speeches and found 
that he uses it for three things: relaxing tension around an item of controversy, contrasting view points or 
offering new ones, and criticizing the opposition / ingratiating the audience. 
38 Gruner 1967: 228.  Most modern studies of humor and argument focus on the instructional benefits of 
using humor upon students in primary and secondary education.  As we shall see, this is not far from 
Quintilian’s assessment of the use of humor on Roman oratory - see chapter four.   An exception is a pair of 
studies by Patrick Stewart, investigating both the humor of candidates in general (2008: 233) and self-
deprecating humor (2011: 201-222).  I am aware of just one investigation of the role of humor in 
contemporary political campaigns—a study concerned with the impact of third party comedians 




The speakers alternated between serious and humorous lectures and they were evaluated 
by the students for authoritativeness, interest, information retention, character, and 
seriousness.  Contrary to what we might expect, interest and information retention varied 
little between serious and humorous lectures.  Authoritativeness dropped slightly for 
humorous lectures and the perception of the seriousness of the lecturer showed the most 
disparity – literally dropping in half.  However, the second greatest disparity, or f-ratio 
was the perception of the lecturer’s character, the mean of which increased a statistically 
significant amount.39  The indication is thus that humor caused the students to develop 
some degree of affection for the speakers who employed it.  
 Classical scholarship on humor’s role in argumentation is also quite scarce, 
though not for lack of ancient source material.  Cicero’s abusive language has been 
documented since his slave Tiro put together three volumes of his jokes after his death.  
Quintilian and Tacitus both demonstrated a significant interest in the subject of humor 
and argumentation in their rhetorical works.  However, in the modern world, the study of 
Ciceronian humor is largely a mid to late 20th century and later phenomenon.40  
Furthermore, nearly all the work that has been done on humor and argument in the 
Roman world has resulted from a focus on one or the other individually rather than the 
relationship between them.41  There are, however, a few valuable studies.  Katherine 
Geffcken recognized parallels between Cicero’s Pro Caelio and New Comedy, arguing 
that Cicero identified with the comic hero and in so doing ingratiated himself with 
                                                
39 For more on the parameters of the study and the results, see Gruner 1967: 229-232. 
40 One of the earliest studies is a collection, Severinus Hammer’s Contumeliae Quae in Ciceronis Invectivis 
et Epistulis Occurrent Quatenus Plautinum redoleant sermonem (1905).  See also Syme 1939, Taylor 1949, 
Kennedy 1973. 
41 The work on argument is too vast to summarize here.  See Rubinelli 2010: 93-141 for the most recent 
work on Cicero’s method of argumentation.  On humor see Beard 2014, who is the first person to take up 
the matter seriously since Kraft 1943, and for the material world Clarke 2007and Croxford 2008. 
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juries.42  She did not, however, consider the question of how and why provoking laughter 
should help Cicero or explain the dynamics of the humor in the speech.43  Byron Harries 
has argued that Cicero employs the devices of the comic stage in other speeches as well, 
suggesting that he was influenced by friendships with actors and their patrons.44  Anthony 
Corbeill, in his seminal 1996 book Controlling Laughter: Political Humor in the Late 
Roman Republic, argues that Cicero uses humor, chiefly invective, in order to place his 
opponents outside the bounds of contemporary Roman mores.  Thus, when Cicero insults 
the mouths of Vatinius and Clodius, claiming that filth not only flows into them but also 
emanates from them in the form of polluted words, he is revealing a system of belief in 
which oratory and sexual probity are linked.45  Corbeill does not allow for Roman orators 
to deploy “humor for humor’s sake” or to demonstrate individuality.  Humor is 
something that is used strictly as a means of enforcing conformity.  While I agree that 
this can be the case, I also see in humor, particularly the passages of Cicero and 
Quintilian we will discuss in chapters three and four, a great deal of individualism.  In 
fact, the very joke from the film Life of Brian that Corbeill provides as an opening to his 
introduction illustrates the point where I differ from him: 
Brian: You’ve got to think for yourself!  You are all individuals. 
Crowd: Yes, we are all individuals! 
Brian: You are all different! 
Crowd: Yes, we are all different! 
Voice from crowd: I’m not. 
  
                                                
42 Geffcken 1973: 7. 
43 This has been done by Leigh (2004) but restricted to how humor was particularly effective given the 
specifics of the Pro Caelio, namely that the humor in the speech functioned to mock the seriousness of the 
prosecution and trivialize its arguments.  Volpe (1977: 321-323) comes a bit closer to making a wider 
argument about humor but again, does not attempt to explain how it might help persuade audiences. 
44 Harries 2007: 133-141.  However, he also argues that this comic influence waned over the course of 
Cicero’s career.  I would argue the opposite.  While Cicero may not have been thinking specifically of 
comedy in his later speeches, he nevertheless employed more humor in them (see chapter three below). 
45 Corbeill 1996: 99-124. 
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Corbeill claims that that “Cicero would not have gotten this joke; or at least he wouldn’t 
have laughed.”46  I am not so certain this is the case.  In the Monty Python scene the joke 
stems from the paradox of one individual claiming that he’s not different from anyone 
else, while the crowd collectively asserts its individuality, precisely the opposite claim. I 
agree with Corbeill that this is not the kind of joke a Roman of the last century BCE 
would make.  But I shall argue that this joke works in a way very similar to some of the 
most important jokes in Cicero, and most praised by Quintilian: namely, it is an 
admission that contradicts and challenges conventional wisdom. 
 Despite the small body of scholarly work directly focusing on humor and 
argument, a considerable body of scholarship addresses invective in oratory and in 
neoteric poetry.  The first systematic study Ciceronian abuse is Norman Merrill’s1975 
dissertation on the typology of invective.47  Merrill demarcates eight common types of 
abuse: “aspiring to regnum,” “sexual misconduct,” “plunder,” “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” “effeminate behavior and appearance,” “drunkeness,” “oratio inepta,” and 
“turpitudo generis.”48  Cicero uses all eight of these tropes, and Merrill credits him also 
with the invention of what he calls “base associations.”  Merrill further identifies 
physiognomic deformities as a common subject for Ciceronian invective.49  To these I 
would add blasphemy.  Although most of the evidence for blasphemy as a distinct topos 
                                                
46 Ibid. p. 3. 
47 To be sure, many scholars commented upon Roman invective before Merrill.  Both Pocock (1926) and 
Syme (1939) thought it so rampant as to be customary.  Nisbet (1961: 192-197) too thought that invective 
was so common that it couldn’t be viewed as accurate. 
48 Merrill 1975: 50-97.  Following Merrill’s approach Wolf (1999: 136) argued that all of the invective in 
his speeches againt Verres, Catiline, Vatinius, Piso, and Antony share similar imagery, particularly of 
beasts and ”unnatural prodigies.”  In contrast, Arena (2007: 60-73) argues that Cicero’s views on liberty 
changed through Cicero’s contact with Greek philosophy such that his invective against the dominatus of 
Antony is significantly different from the invective found in his earlier speeches.  
49 Ibid: 106-152, where Merrill draws attention to how the words convivium, popina, scortum, tunica, 
pallium, and unguenta are used by Cicero to make these arguments. 
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is from the Verrines,50 it also obviously plays a large role in Cicero’s prosecution of 
Clodius for desecrating the Bona Dea festival. 
 The next scholar to take up the topic of invective was Amy Richlin, in her 
groundbreaking study The Gardens of Priapus (1983).  Richlin argues that Latin 
invective is hyper-masculine and so stigmatizing to its targets that it reveals the 
insecurities of the Roman elite male.51  Richlin’s argument – that such invective, which 
she likens to the figure of Priapus who guarded homes and threatened transgressors with 
rape, is a tool for the elite to affirm its positions of power – is important because it 
represents the first step towards considering invective, and the humor therein, as evidence 
for Roman cultural values.  It moved the discourse of Ciceronian invective from 
rhetorical traditions and schools of philosophy52 to Cicero’s audience and Roman social 
history.  Although I disagree with her Freudian reading of humor and its application to 
Roman oratory, her willingness to use humor as a tool of social analysis is an original 
and, for me, influential approach to thinking about Roman politics.53 
 Two edited volumes of note with a focus on invective came out in 2004 and 
2007.54  In the first, Cicero the Advocate, Christopher Craig argues that Cicero used 
invective not to humiliate his opponents but “to make arguments of probative value in a 
judicial context.”55  He admits that not all invective charges were true, claiming only that 
                                                
50 Ver. 24. 
51 Richlin 1983. 
52 Indicative of studies prior to Corbeill is De Lacy (1941: 49) who tries to trace the invective in the In 
Pisonem to common anti-Epicurean arguments in the philosophical literature of Cicero’s time. 
53 Hickson-Hahn (1998: 1-7) has taken a similar approach to invective about incest.  Adopting a Freudian 
interpretation, she argues that incest wasn’t just a source of abuse for Romans, but was actually considered 
funny as well. 
54 A third, Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric came out in 2010 and, though replete with 
great discussions of invective in its second half (e.g. Jehne’s discussion of how Cicero criticizes parts of his 
audience – p. 111-125), offers few new conclusions about invective.  
55 Craig 2004: 212. 
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those which were perceived as true impacted the audience more deeply.  Regarding the 
subject of invective, in Cicero on the Attack Anton Powell argues that invective reveals a 
culture’s values.  Meanwhile, Robin Seager claims that the majority of Ciceronian 
invective highlights one of three things: that “the target’s behavior is (1) unprecedented, 
(2) unique and (3) highlighted by contrast with that of a ‘foil’.”56  Likewise, Javier Uría 
argues that invective is a tool of political manipulation, used to expel individuals from 
elite status.57  Regarding the target of invective, Steel argues that Cicero often omits 
naming his opponent, especially Clodius, in order to cast aspersions on the wider group 
of which that opponent is a part,58 while van der Wal claims that Cicero uses language 
similar to invective to weaken the “ēthos” of opponents with whom he is on good terms 
and does not want to subject to his usual invective.59   
 Ethnographic and feminist studies of poetry have also impacted our understanding 
of humor and argument.  Regarding the former, David Wray’s The Poetics of Roman 
Manhood followed Michael Herzfeld’s The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in 
a Cretan Mountain Village in considering the communal aspect to Catullan poetry.60  
Wray found that Catullus engages in a form of verbal dueling, much like the altercatio.61  
Among feminist scholars, Amy Richlin and Marylin Skinner’s discussions of how 
                                                
56 Powell 2007: 18 and Seager 2007: 43.   
57 Uría 2007: 60. 
58 Steel 2007: 123.  Thus when in the Pro Sestio Cicero promises to be restrained in his invective and goes 
on to mention the wrongs that his enemies have done to him, he is chiefly thinking of Clodius but also 
referring to Piso and Gabinius.  See p. 122 for Steel’s analysis of this passage. 
59 Van der Wal: 193-197. 
60 See Chapter five for more on the competitive nature of Catullan poetry. 
61 The word altercatio merely means verbal “give and take,” but some scholars take it to be a formal 
process, perhaps part of judicial procedure.  See p. 39-41 below. 
 
 20 
Catullus uses obscenity have added to our understanding of the very dynamics of 
invective that Cicero occasionally employs in his speeches.62 
 Few anthropologically-oriented interpretations of the language of Roman courts 
have been attempted apart from those of Riggsby and Hölkeskamp.63  Investigations of 
Roman politics have adopted anthropological methods, but have focused on material 
culture;64 for example, scholars have examined the traditional legislative bodies and 
battlefield;65 Paul Zanker considered the sculpture of the Augustan Roman Forum; 
Wallace-Hadrill has analyzed the Roman house.66 However, these works have attempted 
to understand the manner of communicating power rather than the language and rules of 
politics.67  That is to say, much more emphasis has been placed on describing how 
someone who wielded power justified that power to others than on how that power was 
obtained in the first place.   This emphasis, however, is understandable since the question 
of the role verbal performance played in the settling of power struggles is one which 
wasn’t conceivable prior to the earliest work on the power of language, which began with 
Austin’s theory of “performative utterances.”68  Since then much as been made of 
                                                
62 Richlin 1991 and Skinner 1992.  Richlin’s discussion of irrumare, for example, has added to our 
understanding of the implications of anything Cicero says about the mouth, os. 
63 Hölkeskamp 1993, 2009, 2010, Riggsby 1995, 1997, 1999, 2004, 2010 
64 There are some exceptions.  Roman texts of the late Republic have really only been treated from an 
anthropological perspective by Bettini 1991, Knight 1967, McCormack 1979, Pina Polo 2010 (although the 
latter is largely focused on the personal rather than the institutional dimension), and Wray 2001.  
Aristocratic competition has been treated more widely: see David 2009 and Farney 2007. 
65 De Blois 1987, Epstein 1987, Shatzman 1977. 
66 Wallace-Hadrill 1989, 1990, 1997. 
67 Zanker exemplifies this in his influential book on Augustan politics and material culture, The Power of 
Images in the Age of Augustus (1990). 
68 Austin 1955.  This is indeed earlier than most of the studies cited above.  However, this is more a 
testament to the speed with which the discipline of Classics embraces new ideas than a problem with 
linguistic theories (although such problems certainly exist). 
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performance, particularly by Richard Bauman and Charles Briggs,69 opening up the 
possibility for future investigations. 
   
1.5 The Following Chapters  
 I have divided this work into five chapters, including this introductory chapter.  In 
the second chapter I lay out some of my assumptions and the justifications for them: 
namely my belief that the framework of Political Anthropology offers an useful 
interpretive platform for explaining the high degree of competition among Roman 
aristocrats,70 both during the Republic and continuing on into the imperial period;71 and 
that Sociolinguistics helps explain the humor that was utilized by Cicero and certain other 
Romans of the late Republic.  In chapter three I compile tables on the characteristics of 
Cicero’s relevant defenses, chiefly the extent to which character and humor play a role in 
each speech.  I then analyze each speech and conclude that, ceteris paribus, the more 
serious the charge his client faced, the more likely Cicero was to use character humor in 
his argument.  I also argue that Cicero’s primary tactic for dealing with the abuse the 
prosecution directs toward himself or his client is to admit to the accusation in a 
misleading manner and to turn it against the accuser.  In chapter four I compile a list of 
jokes that Quintilian discusses in the sixth book of his Institutio Oratoria.  I argue that 
Quintilian largely shares Cicero’s sense of humor in that he most appreciates jokes that 
respond to criticism, avoid denial, and turn criticism back on the person who voiced it.  
                                                
69 Bauman (1983) investigated Quaker attitudes towards words, a concern which has become known as 
language ideology: the belief that a group has toward their language and its cultural context. 
70 Certainly this is an aspect to most aristocracies.  See Kautsky 1982: 211-228.  It has also been studied as 
a part of the Greek Symposium (Wecowski 2014), the Elizabethan and Stuart aristocracies (Stone 1965: 11-
64), and Early Modern France (Grasby 1960: 19-38).  Moreover, it has been a central part of assumptions 
in political science since the advent of anthropology’s influence upon that field. 
71 For the Republican period, see Rosenstein 1982, 1990a, 1990b, Farney 2000, Hölkeskamp 2010.  For the 
imperial period, see Roller 2009 and Werner 2010. 
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Lastly, in the fifth chapter I go beyond the world of the courts to examine the tactic of 
misleading admissions and counterattack within the wider context of the late Republic.  I 
consider examples in some of Cicero’s non-judicial speeches and an altercatio he 
famously describes in one of his letters to Atticus.  I additionally consider three poems of 
Catullus and multiple anecdotes from Plutarch’s Apothphegmata.  Overall, I contend that 
the verbal competition we find in Rome is characteristic of that culture and other “hyper-
masculine” cultures, and I suggest that it is the result of a scarcity of prestige in the 
context of a martial culture.72  I conclude by suggesting that the tactic of admission and 
counterattack is an adaptive strategy for those in masculine, competitive cultures who 
were either not equipped to claim prestige by traditional methods, such as in battle, or 
were facing an onslaught of criticism.  In other words, the individuals most likely to be 
skilled in responding to criticism are those who faced the most criticism.  It is thus, no 
surprise that we find so many examples of this strategy in Catullus and Cicero, both of 
whom sought renown outside the traditional military sphere, one through literature and 
the other through oratory and statesmanship, and Caesar who, as the first dictator in 
Rome in thirty years and just the second in one hundred fifty years, encountered strong 
opposition.
                                                
72 I think it is fair to describe Honduras in the 1970s, under the junta, as well as Harlem in the 1960s (see 
chapter two below), hyper-masculine and short on opportunity for prestige.  Of the other society famous for 
such verbal competitions, Turkey, I am not certain.  However, it is worth noting that the only known 
participants in such verbal competitions in Turkey are boys between the ages of eight and fourteen.  One 
could perhaps make the argument that, at this stage of intellectual, physical, and emotional development, 
boys have outlooks similar to those in martial societies.  See Dundes, Leach, and Özkök 1972. 
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Chapter Two: Assumptions about Competition and Roman Politics 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 To argue that Cicero had a common and successful response to criticism, namely 
to appear to admit to the criticism in such a way as to turn the debate toward an area in 
which he could excel, is to make an argument about much more than Cicero.  Indeed, it is 
an argument about more than Cicero and his opponent(s).  It is one about the two of them 
and the audience to whom they are appealing for support.  The argument that I intend to 
make does not depend on the specifics of that audience. I would maintain that the tactic 
of mock admission and comeback as a response to censure is an effective strategy 
regardless of the background of the audience – be that equestrian, senatorial, equestrian-
senatorial, or the people in the forum who gather around to listen for the sake of curiosity 
or entertainment (the corona).  However, the success of this strategy does depend on 
certain assumptions about politics, competition, and social interaction.  Those 
assumptions are the following: 
2.1a The use of political anthropology and sociolinguistics is an effective way 
to understand verbal power negotiation in the late Republic. 
2.1b Beyond the argument at hand in a particular case, Roman courts served as 
a locus for these verbal negotiations in which the performance of 
prosecutor and advocate alike determined how power was allotted. 
2.1c Humor is a tool of power negotiation beyond the Roman world.  Indeed, 
much ethnography demonstrates that humor wins arguments.   
2.1d Some ethnography demonstrates that the humor that most effectively wins 
arguments is that which avoids denial, ideally admits to the accusation, in 
such a way as to shift the ground to a subject matter in which the accused 
can excel. 
 
In this chapter I am interested in two large issues: why there are verbal contests in Rome 
at all; and what the dynamics of those contests are.  I address the first of these broad 
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issues in the following sections: I shall first discuss [2.2] how I define power and then 
competition [2.3]; I then explain why and how we can apply certain categories and 
methods of political anthropology to the Roman context [2.4].  The second broad issue is 
the topic of the remaining sections:  I shall then introduce the terms of sociolinguistics 
that we will be using, chiefly those surrounding the concepts of face and politeness [2.5].  
Having done this we shall consider a number of ethnographic examples that demonstrate 
that the tendency for audiences to be heavily influenced by humor is more widespread 
than the Italic peninsula [2.6] and how multiple examples of verbal duels outside Rome 
share a common sociolinguistic framework [2.7]. 
 
2.2 Defining Power 
Over the last century there has been much debate over how power should be 
defined.  There is no question that power has to do with gaining desired results, but 
whether it is about the potential to bring about these results or the actual bringing them 
about continues to be debated.  Furthermore, whether power should be viewed in terms of 
individuals or institutions has been a question.  These are problems that we must consider 
when discussing the nature of verbal competition.  Is it merely a form of symbolic capital 
and status over which Romans competed?  If so, it would suggest that their struggles 
were more about ability than what that ability could bring about.  Is the perception of 
power the same as actual power?  Can we even think in terms of the interests of 
individuals?  We need to arrive at our own definition of power in order to begin to 
address these questions. 
 
 25 
 Max Weber offers one of the simplest and broadest definitions of power.  He 
suggests it is “the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other persons.”1  
The first thing to note is that Weber sees power as a possibility.  It is not that there is no 
power in carrying out one’s will, but rather that its origin is in the possibility itself, 
without which one couldn’t carry it out.  One benefit to this interpretation is that it makes 
power more flexible.  If we were to view power only in terms of action, then we would be 
limiting the kinds of power that exist in the world.2  However, when we look at this 
definition from another angle, power unrealized is no power at all.  To say “it could have 
been” is no evidence of power.  I could have been president, but does that make me 
powerful?  If I truly were the strongest candidate, this would imply that I possessed 
power, but if something happened and this was not realized, then would not whoever 
became president become more powerful than I? 
 To consider this definition in terms of two powerful rivals in the late Republic 
with differing claims to prominence, Cicero and Piso,3 we first have to consider what the 
wills of Cicero and Piso were.  What did they want?  Stephen Lukes suggests that this 
kind of question can be addressed by considering the benefits of power which he equates 
to a subject’s interests, which he describes using the words of Joel Feinberg: 
[interests,] taken as a miscellaneous collection, consist of all those things in which 
one has a personal stake, whereas one’s interest in the singular, one’s personal 
interest or self-interest, consists in the harmonious advancement of all one’s 
interests in the plural.  These interests, or perhaps more accurately, the things 
these interests are in, are distinguishable components of a person’s wellbeing: he 
                                                
1 Weber 1967: 323. 
2 Wealth, for instance, would not be considered power unless it was spent.  Nor would physical strength if 
it were not exerted. 
3 After Piso supported Clodius in the latter’s attempt to keep Cicero in exile in 58 BCE, Piso and Cicero 
became enemies.  Cicero wrote the In Pisonem and Piso circulated pamphlets critical of Cicero.  These 
documents appealed to the same audience, and thus we can consider them to be in competition with each 
other.  Although we can’t be certain what Piso said of Cicero, there are some hints in Cicero’s invective.  
It’s likely that Piso appealed to his illustrious family background.  See Griffin 2001: 85-99. 
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flourishes or languishes as they flourish or languish.  What promotes them is to 
his advantage or in his interest; what thwarts them is to his detriment or against 
his interest.4 
 
Such a definition, Lukes notes, breaks up one’s interests into those of distant goals and 
those of more immediate means to achieving those goals.  What were the long-term goals 
of Piso and Cicero?  Speculating on this would be useless.  But we can say that, whatever 
they were, they were dependent on short-term goals, and these short-term goals were 
dependent on the others’ perceptions of them.  Furthermore, related to this public 
perception of one’s self is the public perception of one’s rival.  Cicero and Piso were not 
merely trying to paint themselves favorably but each other negatively.  It seems to be a 
zero-sum game.  But it does not have to be. 
 Feinberg’s definition allows for the question of intention to be addressed in that 
one’s immediate interests can be contrary to one’s ultimate goals and vice-versa.  These 
ultimate goals Lukes understands in terms of Feinberg’s “interest network,” where the 
achievement of one individual’s goal can further the interests of others who have their 
own set of goals.  Lukes quotes Feinberg’s example of the dream house: 
Thus, building a dream house is a means to the entertainment of house guests, to 
the private pursuit of studies and pleasures, to hours of aesthetic contemplation, 
and so on; the achievement of political power is a means to the advancement of 
favorite causes and policies; and the solution to a scientific problem is a means to 
the further advance of knowledge and technology, to say nothing of personal 
glory.5 
 
Thus, going back to our Roman examples, Piso and Cicero, both individuals could, in 
theory, shine at the same time.  Cicero could be famous for his statesmanship and Piso for 
his noble background.  However, this possibility would depend upon there being two 
                                                
4 Feinberg 1984: 34, quoted from Lukes 1986: 5. 
5 Ibid., 42, quoted from Lukes 1986: 7. 
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different, yet equal, places of power from which they could each exercise their claim to 
prominence: one that values statesmanship and one that values pedigree.  Given that this 
was rarely the case in Rome due to the scarcity of honors, especially at the highest levels, 
competition arises.  Both sides turn towards the same place, the same audience, and make 
contrasting appeals to it.  And given the importance of honor and recognition to the 
Roman aristocrat, invective inevitably enters the picture.   And once that happens, the 
conflict becomes that much more intense.   Invective is designed to wound.  It is the 
suggestion of the illegitimacy of another’s claim to respect.  Once Piso questions Cicero’s 
claim that his handling of the Catilinarian conspiracy makes him deserving of respect, 
only one claim to legitimacy can remain standing. 
 Once we are in the zero-sum world of power, Michel Foucault offers a great deal 
of insight.  His view of power is that it is only one part of a three part dynamic between 
truth and right.6  There is no one type of power, but many, and they depend on what one 
views as true and correct.  In fact, Foucault goes so far as to say that “there can be no 
possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth.”7  By such a 
definition, Cicero and Piso are not only arguing about who is right and who is wrong but 
about competing versions of reality and value.  The does not mean, however, that their 
arguments are sincere.  Cicero could be passionately arguing for the superiority of 
statesmanship over pedigree not because he believes in it, but because he believes he can 
convince his audience, the senate and people, to believe it.  In such a case, with two 
opposing appeals for political support, truth is irrelevant.  In other words, Cicero’s most 
basic desire is not that the world believe that politics and oratory are the most deserving 
                                                
6 Foucault 1976. 
7 Ibid. p. 1. 
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of praise.  Rather it is that he be respected the most, that he be seen to have greater 
dignitas than Piso.  Perception is what matters, not reality.  That oratory be seen as 
superior to lineage is merely a means to an end.    Furthermore, if perception is what 
matters, not oratory or triumphs in and of themselves, then we ought to speak of power in 
terms of individuals, not institutions.  But what about the question of ability versus 
action, the question posed initially by Weber?  Let us consider ability first. 
 If we are to use the Weberian definition of power as the ability to impose one’s 
will on others, then we would have to say that the ability in question regarding Cicero 
and Piso is persuasion.  Whoever is the more persuasive in selling his own claim to 
respect, and the concomitant unworthiness of the other, is going to have the ability to 
carry out his will.  In such a situation, where the ability to argue surpasses merit itself in 
importance, it would seem that Cicero, a more famous orator than Piso, would be at an 
advantage.  Simply by engaging in argument with Cicero, Piso is to some extent 
validating Cicero’s position.  For he is attempting to use rhetoric to argue that someone 
who came to prominence through rhetorical prowess has a less worthy claim.  However, 
just because Piso is justifying Cicero’s claims by trying to win over the public with words 
does not mean the debate is over.  Piso may be using words but they are not words that 
are designed to appeal to the same logic as Cicero’s.  Cicero is trying to sell the value of 
oratory and statesmanship, by means of oratory, to an audience.  Piso is trying to sell the 
value of nobility, not by means of verbal eloquence, but by simply declaring that he is 
from a better-known family, with more experience in leadership and more military 
accomplishments than Cicero.  In other words, Cicero’s argument is an appeal to oratory 
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whereas Piso’s is an appeal to tradition.  These different appeals are claims to legitimacy 
and respect, and thus, the ability to impose their wills on others. 
If, on the other hand we are to think of power not as ability but as action, then 
what action or actions would we be speaking of?  If the longterm goal of both Piso and 
Cicero is to gain respect, then that which brings about this respect would be the action in 
question, namely the success of one or the other’s appeals to lineage or oratory.  The 
problem of finding what earns respect is difficult because it depends on the values and 
mindset of others.  What may earn respect with one person one day may incur disrespect 
with another person the next day.  Thus, it seems as though we are dealing with elusive 
concepts.   
 In response to the question of “what interests us when we are interested in power” 
Lukes states: 
It turns out that there are various answers, all deeply familiar, which respond to 
our interests in both the outcomes and the location of power.  Perhaps this 
explains why, in our ordinary unreflective judgments and comparisons of power, 
we normally know what we mean and have little difficulty in understanding one 
another, yet every attempt at a single general answer to the question has failed and 
seems likely to fail.8 
 
Nevertheless, we can come to several conclusions about power in the world of Roman 
verbal contests.  The first is that we can only speculate about long term goals.  While it 
may not be a stretch to claim that Cicero’s long term goal was to be thought the savior of 
the Republic, it is safer to stick to the basics.  There is no question that in his forensic 
orations he is trying to win cases.  In all of our analyses of verbal debates, this can be 
assumed: the adversaries are trying to come out on top; we may not be able to guess their 
long term goals but their short term goals are to appear to win arguments in the eyes of 
                                                
8 Lukes 1986: 17. 
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the audience.  Another conclusion related to this is that the Weberian definition of power 
as ability to impose will is convenient for our purposes for the very reason that it is 
focused on the short term rather than long term.  Lastly, Foucault’s argument – that any 
claim to power is embedded within its specific cultural and moral context – is a useful 
way to consider the nature of the debate and the audience’s role in it.  Romans, such as 
Cicero and Piso, who engaged in verbal contests appealed to more than one set of values 
in order to obtain the ability to impose their will freely.  
 
2.3 Competition 
There have historically been two different ways of looking at competition or 
rivalry.  The first is to think of competition as being universal and biological, and the 
second is to view it as embedded within particular cultures and individuals.  The latter 
view was championed by Georg Simmel.9  While some consider these views to be at odds 
with one another,10 they do not have to be.  Scarcity is a fact of life, and much research in 
the social sciences is predicated, to some extent, on the assumption that societies face 
scarcities of resources.  Thus it is not without merit to say that competition exists 
everywhere.  Certain claims can moreover be made about its universal nature.  The first is 
that competition is always over something.  Hans van Wees claims that there are two 
types of competition, one form in which the purpose is to gain something desired by at 
least one other party and another form in which the purpose is to achieve superiority.  He 
claims that for the former to exist there has to be a degree of scarcity, whereas for the 
                                                
9 Coming from an economic perspective, Simmel (1903: 1010) differentiates between two types of 
competition: one between two individuals over money or reputation, and the other between collectives (for 
example, two theaters competing for audiences).  The former he describes more as fighting and the latter as 
true competition, which can bring the community benefits (1012). 
10 Nuffelen 2012. 
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latter scarcity is irrelevant.  Rather than being opposing ways of competing, or even 
opposing ends of a spectrum of competition, the competition for superiority always 
exists; one may overlook it when one is caught up in survival, but it is there.  Another 
way of saying this is that competition doesn’t have to be for material gain.  It can be for 
symbolic capital.11  Van Wees is right to see a form of competition with no end in sight.  
And it makes sense that when it comes to the competition for superiority, where there is 
no conspicuous prize, the struggle could go on indefinitely and might escalate in such a 
way as to become a threat to society, at which point society must step in to control it.  
The problem is that the same sort of endless struggle could take place over a conspicuous 
prize as well.12  What’s more, Van Wees’s dichotomy seems to imply that it is possible 
for one type of competition not to exist, for if in the pursuit of supremacy scarcity is 
irrelevant, then the only truly necessary or useful form of competition is for prizes.  The 
dichotomy not only makes for different kinds of competition but assesses the values of 
them.  It makes far more sense to see competition as having a clear goal, a prize, a 
conspicuous prize.  One doesn’t need to be able to see or touch that prize.  One need only 
to see or touch the benefits associated with that prize.  The Roman world, in fact, offers a 
perfect example of this: the fasces.  Bearing little to no value in themselves, the fasces 
came to be seen as the sign of political and militaristic power.13  They came with any 
office that held claim to imperium, the right to command an army.  One did not win the 
                                                
11 As Veblen showed in his seminal Theory of the Leisure Class (1912: 57-67). 
12 From a Marxist perspective it may be possible to eliminate the struggle for preeminence such that society 
could focus strictly on the allotment of materials, from prizes to grain and industrial goods.  For more on 
Marx’s views on competition see Stillman (1983: 297-306), who argues that Marx, following Hegel, 
considered material scarcity inevitable but thought human desires to be infinite.  In such a dichotomy, one 
can either see the infinite human desires and imagination as ways to cope with scarcity and minimize it or 
as exacerbating the problem of scarcity further.  It is only in the former view that one type of competition, 
the competition for preeminence, could be minimized. 
13 For more on the fasces as a symbol, see Schäfer 1988: 427-440. 
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fasces; one didn’t even win the imperium.  One acquired the office, and the imperium and 
the visual sign of it went along with that office.  The fasces were merely a symbol of 
power. 
 When we try to go deeper into defining the fundamental characteristics of 
competition, the waters get a little murkier.  However, we can still claim a few more 
universals.  Van Wees articulates his competition for superiority into four constituent 
parts: escalation, regulation, exclusion, and rejection.  His aim is to account for the 
breaking down of a competition, for situations when the game collapses and the loser 
challenges the winner’s legitimacy.  However, this collapse and challenge does not 
inevitably or necessarily happen.  In my view, allowing for either a clear winner or a 
challenge by the loser would make for a better taxonomy.  Thus I would propose a 
threefold articulation: challenge, regulation, and resolution.  If the resolution is 
challenged, isn’t it easier just to think of another competition taking place—namely, 
competition over a competition?  To question a resolution is simply to challenge an 
opponent on another level from what was previously being contested.  Usually this 
challenge takes the form of questioning whether the proper regulation was followed.14 
 
2.4a Political Anthropology 
  In Rome and elsewhere, competition is best understood as part of a larger 
political system.  We need to take into consideration not just the nature of competition 
but the nature of politics, or rather the politics of nature.  As Ted Lewellen lays out in one 
of the earliest and most complete handbooks on Political Anthropology, “Political 
                                                
14 We shall see that there are other ways to articulate the constituent parts of a competition, most of which 
only involve escalation and encounter.  See below. 
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Anthropology … consists mainly in the study of the competition for power, and the way 
that group goals are implemented by those possessing power.”15 Although we are more 
concerned here with the the competition for power, rather than with the wielding of it, we 
shall see below that we can fit passages of Cicero, Quintilian, and others into one of the 
following paradigms very effectively. From the early twentieth century to the early 
1990’s, when Lewellen published, there have been approximately three main ways of 
looking at political culture from an anthropological perspective: the structural 
functionalist, the processual, and the action approach.  Lewellen offers the following 
table to summarize their differences: 
 Structural- 
Functionalism 
Process Theory Action Theory 
Goal To show how 
particular 
institutions serve to 
maintain the 
equilibrium of the 
whole society 
To define the 
processes involved 
in political 





for gaining and 
maintaining power 
Unit of Analysis A society, tribe, 
social group, etc., 
usually treated as 




as a closed system 
insofar as little 




field,” a flexible 
and relative 
concept referring to 
any area in which 
political interaction 
takes place; may 
involve a part of 
society or extend 
beyond social or 
ethnic boundaries 
The “political arena,” 
an area in which 
individual actors or 
small groups vie for 
political power.  
Political arenas may 
be, or be comprised 
all or in part of, 
factions, patron-
client relations, 






is viewed as though 
outside of time, in 
Diachronic, or “in 
time”: analysis 
may focus on 
Diachronic, but often 
focused on the 
actions of individuals 
                                                





Process Theory Action Theory 
ideal present actual history or on 
ideal processes of 
change through 
time 





In some writings, 




was treated in a 
purely structural 
fashion; in other 
writings, change 
(in the sense of 
adaptive 
adjustments of the 
parts) was 
emphasized, but 
the whole was seen 
to be in equilibrium 
Conflict, tension, 
and change are 
viewed as the 
normal condition 
of society 
Change within a 
political arena is 
virtually constant, 
though there may be 
a relative stability of 
the wider system 










roles, goals, games, 
rules 
Examples African Political 




The Nuer, by 
Evans-Pritchard 










Continuity in an 
African Society, by 
Turner 
 













It is hard to look at this typology and not see a great deal in each of the three theoretical 
frameworks that could help one understand the world of the late Roman Republic – 
especially the last two frameworks, both of which Lewellen considers to be processual.  
Action Theory, in particular, offers a productive way to look at individual competition in 
Roman politics of the late Republic.  By de-emphasizing the value-laden rhetoric of 
Roman oratory, Action Theory gives us a window into not only cultural values but also 
the often strange world of Roman competitive values. 
 According to Action Theory, each “political man” seeks to maximize not only his 
financial situation but also, more broadly, his power.  When two of these so-called 
Political Men meet, a political arena is created and what results is termed the “Social 
Drama.”  The Social Drama has a series of rules, which may or may not be obeyed, and 
there can be only one winner.  The winner may be a group rather than an individual but 
this group can be viewed, for practical purposes, as an individual.  One of the first 
anthropological investigations to take up and develop this theory was Victor Turner, who 
analyzed the Ndembu of Rhodesia in Schism and Continuity in an African Society (1957).  
Turner moved away from looking at groups and focused instead on the individual.16  The 
individual can take up any number of strategies to advance his own interests.  According 
to Turner, the main protagonist of his ethnography, Sandombu, seeks to pursue his 
interests through religion, or more specifically, curses.  Another means of pursuing one’s 
interests might be physical violence.  Still other means include poetic dueling, debating 
policy, debating character, or engaging in athletic competition.  The important thing is 
that there are rules.  The individual might not always be aware of the rules, but the rules 
                                                
16 The individual being one person rather than the amalgamation of a group into an individual actor. 
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always exist.17  They may be normative rules that deal with (mostly) agreed upon 
principles – usually about ethics or other public ideals – or they may be pragmatic, 
dealing with the way the competition is won.  We may think of these two different sets of 
rules as public and shared (normative), and private and individual (pragmatic).  The 
competitors may not, and in fact rarely do, agree upon the normative rules but there is at 
least a debate about doing so with both sides trying to paint themselves as more closely 
following them.  The pragmatic, however, is the set of choices made by the competitor in 
order to distinguish himself.  This shall be our primary interest when it comes to Roman 
oratory. 
 Lewellen, following F.G. Bailey, sets out five elements of political structure, the 
first three of which are rather obvious: prizes or goals, the personnel seeking those prizes 
or goals, and leadership.  The fourth, which is particularly relevant to Roman politics,18 is 
the competition itself.  Lewellen, importantly, breaks this competition into two parts: 
confrontation, “or a move within the political arena that announces to an opponent one’s 
strengths in resources and one’s possible intentions,” and encounter, “in which both 
contestants publicly agree to test their strength against each other.”19  The fifth element of 
political structure is that which defines the rules: the judges. 
 Within the category of political competition, according to Lewellen, there are two 
types of political teams, the contract and the moral.  He defines contract teams as those 
that are bound by “the profit or potential profit to be derived from following a certain 
leader.”  Of contact teams there are two types: the transactional, in which the followers of 
                                                
17 In the case of Barth 1959, the rules could be so thin as to be nearly invisible and at times border on 
anarchy. 
18 The first three are: the political prizes, the people involved in the competition, and the leadership thereof.  
The last of the five are the judges of the competition.  Lewellen 1992: 115. 
19 ibid: 115. 
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a leader do so only as long as they perceive a direct benefit from him; and the 
bureaucratic,20 where the leadership is dispersed so that the leader can avoid any 
challengers.  Moral teams are those which share a core moral belief.21  Lastly, teams 
operate by means of what Lewellen calls “political symbolism,” which he says is “most 
powerfully manifested in nonpolitical institutions such as kinship, marriage, and other 
rites of passage, ethnicity, elitism, and various group ceremonies.”22 
  
2.4b The Political Anthropology of the Roman Republic 
In Action Theory, the so-called political men are the two opposing sides.23  The 
social drama is the competition itself and specifically the verbal exchanges that constitute 
it.  The political arena in which the social drama (see below paragraph) took place is 
simply wherever these verbal exchanges took place, chiefly in the courts, the quaestiones.  
Lastly, the political symbolism upon which Lewellen places great emphasis is the 
discursive subjects under debate, as mentioned in Merrill in chapter one above.24 
If we take Lewellen’s five aspects of political structure and apply these to the 
Roman world, we would find that anywhere arguments were made there existed social 
dramas; for us this is chiefly the world of Roman courts. The people involved, the 
political men, are the advocate(s) and client on the defense and either the prosecutor(s) in 
a criminal case or advocate and plaintiff in a civil case.  Outside the courts, the political 
men are the individuals exchanging words.  The leadership is the magistrate under whose 
                                                
20 Lewellen offers Labor Unions as an example of a transactional contract team. 
21 ibid: 116. 
22 ibid: 120. 
23 Lewellen (1992: 83) defines the political man as someone who has “manipulative strategies to gain and 
maintain power.”  For more see Blok 1970: 225-235. 
24 Namely, the range of the debate over character in which humor was used.  Sexual dominance, financial 
security, verbal capabilities would thus be three different kinds of verbal symbolism. 
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authority the case is tried for the courts, or a moral authority such as the censor or a 
particular college of priests for extralegal exchanges.  The competition itself, as stated 
above, is more difficult to define precisely.  The first part of it is easy enough.  What 
Lewellen calls the confrontation is what we would call the challenge.  It occurs on two 
levels, the bringing of the case and, within that or independent of it, the challenges and 
claims issued.  What would qualify as Lewellen’s “encounter” would have to be the 
exchange of speeches that followed the confrontation or challenge.  The arbiters are of 
course the audience, the onlookers and listeners and/or a formal judge, an unus iudex,25 or 
jury.  The prize for which the political men would be competing is, of course, reputation.   
There are three distinct terms that are used to indicate the initiation or carrying out 
of a verbal duel, or what Lewellen would call an encounter, where the social dramas 
under consideration would take place: the contumelia, altercatio, and the convicium.26 
Regarding the contumelia, we have a working definition in Cicero.  When Cicero 
differentiates between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of one’s opponent in the Pro 
Caelio, he says that the former involves proof and is for the purpose of argument.  The 
latter, he says, has nothing as its object beyond abuse, and he calls this contumelia.  Thus 
it is acceptable to denigrate the adversary’s social and moral failings, but not to do so 
falsely, which is not too far from saying that the adversary must be infamis.  
                                                
25 Civil cases of little political consequence would be heard by such a judge. 
26 The contio could be used to initiate a verbal confrontation but its format was such that it didn’t allow 
quick retorts.  It was a public gathering of citizens prompted by a magistrate for the purpose of informing 
them of something.  Cicero frequently discusses giving them in response to Clodius or Antonius, as well as 
vice-versa.    In the Pro Sestio Cicero suggests that Clodius held daily contiones against him.   Cicero 
further mentions a contio of Caesar’s that failed in a letter to Atticus.   Unpopular at the time, Caesar was 
attempting to discredit some edicts of Bibulus against him and Cicero says that he could not “squeeze a 
voice [out of the crowd].” Presumably this means that noise from the crowd indicated that they were 
receiving a speech well and thus the silence in response to Caesar’s contio meant that it was poorly 
received.  See Morstein Marx (2004: 34- 67) for details on where and how the contio was given.  He argues 
that it was used by the elite to mislead the crowds and justify their power (163). 
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One of the most commonly cited realms of verbal competition of the Roman 
world is the altercatio, a frequently brandished term which has little meaning in the 
Republican era. In fact, the word as a distinct form of confrontation is mainly found in 
ecclesiastical contexts;27 this pattern of usage is the polar opposite to the description 
offered by Peterson, who asserts that “the essence of the altercatio is that it was 
conducted in the way of short answers or retorts.”28  However, the evidence offered for 
this claim is a sentence in book twelve of Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, in which the 
author simply says “the Stoics argue bitterly about justice, probity, expedient, and the 
opposite, as well as about matters of the Gods while the Socratics are best at preparing 
the future orator for debates (altercationes) and interviewing witnesses 
(interrogationes).”29  It is hard to see how we get from this to short answers or retorts.  
The only thing that seems to be conveyed by the passage is that Stoics and Socratics 
prepare to debate differently and for different subjects; that the former focus on the 
abstract subjects of justice, honor and usefulness and the latter on the pragmatic winning 
of cases and examination of witnesses.  Quintilian isn’t contrasting the rhetorical style of 
the two schools but what they emphasize.  It is true that the nature of debating justice, 
honor, and usefulness is such that one would expect long sententiae rather than quick 
barbs, but that is not to imply that the interrogatio or altercatio are somehow short. 
Another oft-cited passage concerning the altercatio is from Cicero’s De Oratore, 
where Cicero discusses the value of unexpected words or claims for laughs.  He says: 
                                                
27 For instance, the Altercatio Iasonis et Papisci, Philo, and Anastasius the Sinaite, a partially preserved 
dialog between a Christian and an Alexandrian Jew where the latter ends up converting.  See Bruns 1973: 
287-294.  Most altercationes seem to be attempts to delegitimize Judaism.  See Frede 1981. 
28 From Shackleton Bailey, Ad Att. I, 319. 
29 10.1.35: nam et de iustis, honestis, utilibus, iisque quae sint istis contraria, et de rebus divinis maxime 




quae genera percurram equidem. Sed scitis esse notissimum ridiculi genus, cum 
aliud exspectamus, aliud dicitur: hic nobismet ipsis noster error risum mouet: 
quod si admixtum est etiam ambiguum, fit salsius; ut apud Nouium uidetur esse 
misericors ille, qui iudicatum duci uidet: percontatur ita: “quanti addictus?” 
“Mille nummum.” Si addidisset tantummodo “ducas licet”; esset illud genus 
ridiculi praeter exspectationem; sed quia addidit “nihil addo, ducas licet”; addito 
ambiguo [altero genere ridiculi], fuit, ut mihi quidem uidetur, salsissimus. Hoc 
tum est uenustum, cum in altercatione arripitur ab aduersario uerbum et ex eo, ut a 
Catulo in Philippum, in eum ipsum aliquid, qui lacessiuit, infligitur.30 
 
These sorts [sc. of jesting] I will now run over: but you are aware that that is the 
most common kind of joke, when we expect one thing and another is said; in 
which case our own disappointed expectation makes us laugh. But if something 
ambiguous is thrown in with it, the wit is heightened; as at the house of Novius, it 
seems there was a certain compassionate man who saw someone that was 
sentenced for debt being led away and inquired ‘for how much is he adjudged’? 
He answered, ‘A thousand sestertii’. If he had then added only, ‘You may take 
him away’, it would have been a species of joke that takes you by surprise; but as 
he said, ‘I add no more; you may take him away’, (thus introducing the 
ambiguous, another kind of jest,) the repartee, as it seems to me, is rendered witty 
in the highest degree. Such equivocation is most happy, when, in any dispute 
(altercatio), a word is caught from your adversary, and thence something severe is 
turned upon the very person who gave the provocation, as by Catulus upon 
Philippus.31  
 
From this we can gather little other than that the altercatio was something in which one 
might use the words of one’s opponents against him.  While it is easy to see why this 
would mostly occur in short exchanges (see [2.7a and b] below for more on this), there is 
no reason to think that it couldn’t appear in long ones either.  Indeed, there are numerous 
instances in which Cicero twists the words that his enemies have directed against him at 
length in his speeches.32  
 Others see an even more precise definition of an altercatio.  Following Kennedy 
and Frier, Riggsby33 cites Quintilian to suggest that the altercatio was a specific section 
                                                
30 De Orat. 2.255. 
31 Translation by J.S. Watson, with alterations. 
32 See chapters three and four. 
33 Riggsby 1999: 18, Kennedy 1972: 15, Frier 1985: 208-9. 
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of any trial, after the speeches and witnesses.34  This is a far more sensible alternative.  
Rather than define the word by its essential meaning as a distinct form of argument, it 
makes much more sense to consider it within a larger context, and in this case that of a 
judicial setting.  Therefore, some examples that other scholars have referred to as 
altercationes will simply be referred to as verbal contests here. 
 One mysterious area in which we can place verbal debate is something we will 
refer to as convicium, a word whose meaning is not entirely clear.  We see something 
suggestive of it, which is perhaps a specific kind of convicium known as a vociferatio, in 
the Digest: 
Ait praetor: 'qui aduersus bonos mores conuicium cui fecisse cuiusue opera 
factum esse dicetur, quo aduersus bonos mores conuicium fieret: in eum iudicium 
dabo'. Conuicium iniuriam esse Labeo ait.  Conuicium autem dicitur uel a 
concitatione uel a conuentu, hoc est a collatione uocum. cum enim in unum 
complures uoces conferuntur, conuicium appellatur quasi conuocium. Sed quod 
adicitur a praetore 'aduersus bonos mores' ostendit non omnem in unum collatam 
uociferationem praetorem notare, sed eam, quae bonis moribus improbatur 
quaeque ad infamiam uel inuidiam alicuius spectaret. Idem ait 'aduersus bonos 
mores' sic accipiendum non eius qui fecit, sed generaliter accipiendum aduersus 
bonos mores huius ciuitatis.35 
 
The Praetor says: "I will grant an action against anyone who is said to have made 
a convicium against another, or to have caused a convicium to be made, in a way 
contrary to good morals.” Labeo says that a convicium constitutes an injury.  
However, a convicium is said to be from a mob or a group, i.e., from a gathering 
of voices.  For when multiple voices are brought against one it is called a 
convicium as though it were a group of voices.  But what is added by the Praetor, 
that is to say, "Contrary to good morals," shows that he condemned not all the 
united clamor, but merely that which violates good morals, and which has a 
tendency to render someone infamous, or detested.  He also says that the 
expression, "Contrary to good morals," should not be understood to refer to those 
of the person who commits the offense, but, in general, to mean “in opposition to 
the morals of this community.” 
 
                                                
34 Inst Orat 6.4: the word altercatio is used eight times, without other words being used in its stead. 
35 47.10.15.2.1 - 47.10.15.7.1. 
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Despite the frustratingly ambiguous words aduersus bonos mores, we can still draw some 
conclusions about convicia from the reported words of the Praetor, especially when 
considered in light of another passage in the same chapter of the Digest.  First of all, it is 
clear from the passage that the shouting of abuse, while not in itself a cause for action, 
must surely be the result of some feud or serious communal complaint against an 
individual, and thus at the very least possibly part of a verbal debate.  It is not clear what 
makes a convicium actionable or not.  If we were to take the adversus as a predicate 
adjective agreeing with the qui, which has as its antecedent the eum near the end of the 
sentence (qui aduersus bonos mores conuicium cui fecisse cuiusue opera factum esse 
dicetur, quo aduersus bonos mores conuicium fieret: in eum iudicium dabo), it would 
seem that what is at stake is the character of the individual or individuals doing the 
shouting.  Thus, if a person who himself was considered to be hostile to or acting 
contrary to community morals is the one instigating the convicium, there is grounds for 
the victim to sue.  
 When it comes to the following interpretation of the Praetor, the meaning is less 
clear.  To whom does the alicuius refer in the clause quaeque ad infamiam uel inuidiam 
alicuius spectaret?  Is it to the victim of the abuse, as Watson clearly takes it?36  Or, does 
it refer to the person responsible for the uociferatio?  The latter would seem to be in 
keeping with the reported words of the Praetor, since the difference between someone 
who already is opposed to sound morals and someone whose words make him opposed to 
sound morals is somewhat slight.  In such a reading, the law would seem to be that a 
                                                
36 Watson has no commentary but his translation implies it.  He renders the last two sentences, “But the 
praetor’s qualification ‘contrary to sound morals’ shows that he does not condemn all loud calling after a 
person, but only that which offends against sound morals and is directed to the disgrace and unpopularity 
of an individual [my italics].  Labeo says that ‘contrary to sound morals’ is to be taken as referring not to 
those of the offender but to those of the city.” 
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vociferatio that is conducted in a manner that leads to the infamia or inuidia of the person 
who instigates it would be actionable.  However, this cannot be the case because there 
would be no need for someone who has already made himself infamous to be sued.  The 
alicuius must therefore be the victim of the vociferatio.  The indeterminate nature of the 
ali- prefix and the infamia and inuidia further suggest that it is the victim of the abuse.  
Moreover, eius is used to refer to the offender just below in the same passage.  If 
someone stirs up infamia or inuidia against someone that goes against sound morals, that 
person may be charged.  However, there is one more problem. 
 To take alicuius as referring to the victim of the uociferatio raises a question.  If 
the Praetor only disapproves of the convicium that “points to the infamia or inuidia of 
someone” (ad infamiam uel inuidiam alicuius spectaret) then what kind of convicium can 
we imagine that does not ad infamiam uel inuidiam alicuius spectat?  Is there any kind of 
abuse that doesn’t lead to infamia and inuidia?  Other than simply concluding that there 
was a difference between the letter of the law and practice of it, the only possible 
interpretation is the requirements of the quae … ad infamiam uel inuidiam alicuius 
spectaret clause and the previous quae bonis moribus improbatur clause must be met for 
something to be actionable.  If the aim of the vociferatio is to bring infamia and inuidia 
upon its target, but the manner in which it is carried out is not at odds with bonae mores, 
then the vociferatio would not be actionable.  Such an interpretation would suggest either 
that the words used in attempting to defame someone had to be polite or that the words 
were not against bonae mores if they were accepted as fact.  Given that there is no 
mention of any standard of truth, it seems that the issue is how the vociferatio is delivered 
rather than how it is received.  A vociferatio contrary to public morals is one that is 
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delivered with words contrary to public morals.  But what are words against sound 
morals?  Is it a matter of the choice of words or the manner in which they are spoken? 
Furthermore, if the Digest gives no examples of individuals performing a convicium, does 
that mean that there is no such thing as individual defamation? 
 One of the dominant views is that words against sound morals are those spoken 
with “deliberate or malicious incantation.”37  This seems to be what the law says.  
However, it does not mean that actions were pursued on this basis. There is often a vast 
difference between theory and practice in law and this is especially true when it comes to 
defamation.  For one thing, a great deal depends on the defamer.  It would be a rare 
occasion for a poor defamer to be sued since he would have no money to give as 
compensation, and with no potential compensation, a plaintiff is not going to want to 
have his dirty laundry aired.38  For another, what is or isn’t polite language is subjective.  
Moving from the question of where in the Roman world the verbal competitions 
of the social drama took place to the question of the prize(s) over which Roman political 
men competed, we can point to something much more specific than convicia or 
altercationes: political office, or honores.  High office not only augmented one’s 
reputation and increased one’s influence in the senate after holding office,39 but also 
                                                
37 From the Twelve Tables. Lex XII 8.1: qui malum carmen incantassit… 
38 On occasion the wealthy would have motive to bring someone of a lower social status to court if that 
person had the capability of spreading the libel.  In such situations, given the importance of reputation to 
Roman aristocrats, they might want to risk airing their dirty laundry in court to stop its spread.  Thanks to 
Andrew Riggsby for pointing this out. 
39 See Ryan (1998: 113) who cites FIRA I2 21 CAP 124: si volet, in eius locum qui condemnatus erit 
sententiam dicere, ex h(ac) l(ege) liceto.  He also cites Cicero’s statement in the Verrines that “if I seem 
here to have wished to rise at the expense of that man, something which I have not sought, in the event that 
he is acquitted, which is impossible without the criminality of many men, I’ll rise at the expense of many” 
(si videor hic, id quod ego non quaesivi, de uno isto voluisse crescere, isto absoluto, quod sine multorum 
scelere fieri non potest, de multis mihi crescere licebit). 
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came with the potential for holding a military command – something both lucrative and 
potentially a means to win glory for one’s name. 
Further, pursuit of public office in itself was a means of spreading one’s name and 
increasing one’s reputation.40  Cicero highlights this in the De Officiis: 
Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sermo sit, in altera contentio, 
non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio orationis maiorem uim habeat ad 
gloriam…41 
 
Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quae eloquentiam desiderent, multique in 
nostra re publica adulescentes et apud iudices et apud populum et apud senatum 
dicendo laudem assecuti sint, maxima est admiratio in iudiciis, quorum ratio 
duplex est.42 
 
But as the classification of discourse is a twofold one — conversation, on the one 
side; debate, on the other — there can be no doubt that of the two this debating 
power counts for more toward the attainment of glory. 
 
But while there are occasions of many kinds that call for eloquence, and while 
many young men in our republic have obtained distinction by their speeches in 
the courts, in the popular assemblies, and in the senate, yet it is the speeches 
before our courts that excite the highest admiration.43 
 
 
Furthermore, Jean Michel David and Francis Ryan have shed light on the benefits to be 
had by successful prosecutions while procedural questions and punishments have been 
investigated many times.44  When it comes to what I am calling challenge, regulation, and 
resolution, however, things are less well-defined.  We could say that in the courts a 
                                                
40 In the Commentariolum Petitionis the author notes that a new man could be thought deserving of the 
consulship if he successfully defended someone of consular rank.  See Q. Cic. Pet. 2: non potest qui dignus 
habetur patronus consularium indignus consulatu putari.  Indeed, David (1992: 67) argues that anyone 
who goes to an orator for help is subjecting himself to that orator.  While I would not go this far, the level 
of vitriol in Roman oratory is proof of its high stakes in and of itself. 
41 De Off. 2.48.1-3. 
42 Ibid. 2.49.1-5. 
43 Translation by Miller 1913. 
44 David 1992: 497-569 and Ryan 1998: 113-115.  For recent work on punishment in Rome, see: Saller 
1991, Robinson 1995, Bauman 1996, Beness 2000.  For a fuller bibliography (most of which is focused on 
procedural rather than substantive issues), see Bauman 1996, p. ix. 
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challenge simply consisted of a charge.  However, we are interested in verbal contests 
within the courts, and there may be multiple verbal contests within the same case.  It is 
better to think of the challenge in terms of Goffman’s concept of face, what we might call 
“a face threatening act” (see below for both).45  Such an act could take almost any form 
so long as it resulted in the opponent being insulted.  It could, for example, take the form 
of an explicit verbal insult, a particular tone of voice, a particular stance or gesture, or 
simply a rolling of the eyes.  As to what I, and indeed Van Wees, am calling the 
“regulation,” the competition itself; for our purposes that would be the verbal duel, and 
more specifically those of the Roman courts, the quaestiones. 
 
2.5 Face and Sociolinguistics 
 In order to understand fully the dynamics of verbal contests, I have found it 
helpful to bring a sociolinguistic perspective to bear.  I draw chiefly upon the work of 
Brown and Levinson, who themselves draw a great deal of their inspiration from Erwing 
Goffman and, to some extent, William Labov.  Before I begin to analyze some Latin 
passages, it is necessary to give a very brief overview of some of the terminology that is 
commonly used in sociolinguistic treatments of invective. 
 “Face” is a term used to describe the image that a person wants to claim for his or 
herself.46  It has two aspects to it: a negative and a positive.  The negative aspect is the 
claim to personal rights and autonomy.  The positive aspect is the way one would like to 
                                                
45 Goffman 1959.  See also Brown and Levinson 1987. 




be perceived. In general, all people cooperate to maintain face,47 but in the highly 
contentious world of Roman politics there was much to gain by not cooperating.  When 
one person threatens another person’s face, that action is referred to as a “Face 
Threatening Act” or FTA.  Actions which are designed to restrict someone’s claim to 
autonomy are “negative FTAs.”  Those which violate one’s desire to be perceived in a 
certain way are “positive FTAs.”  I shall be concerned primarily with positive FTAs.  
However, it will be useful to give examples of the range of both types of actions.  All of 
the following, 2.5a and 2.5b, is from Brown and Levinson.48 
  
2.5a). Negative FTAs 
Negative FTAs are those: 
1.) that assume a future action (A) of the listener (H) and in so doing put pressure on H to 
do or refrain from doing that A.  Under this category would fall: 
a) Orders and requests – Speaker (S) indicates that he wants H to do or refrain 
from doing A 
b) Suggestions and advice 
c) Reminders 
d) Threats, warnings, and dares 
2) that predicate some positive future act of S toward H, and in doing put pressure on H 
to accept or reject them, and possibly incur a debt: 
                                                
47 Brown and Levinson.  This has recently be challenged by Mühleisen and Migge (2005: 8-12) as well 
Eelen (2001) Wierzbicka (1985, 1991), all on the problems with the universal claims of Brown and 
Levinson.  This controversy is of little relevance when it comes to argument.  These linguists are concerned 
with everyday face maintenance, whereas we are concerned here with debate, often involving highly 
contentious claims relating to character and where, consequently, we would expect politeness to be at a 
minimum (though not absent entirely). 
48 1987: 65-68. 
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a) Offers (S indicates that he wants H to commit himself to whether or not he 
wants S to do some act for H, with H thereby incurring a possible debt). 
b) Promises (S commits himself to a future act for H’s benefit. 
3) Those acts that predicate some desire of S toward H or H’s goods, giving H reason to 
think that he may have to take action to protect the object of S’s desire, or give it to S: 
a) Compliments, expressions of envy or admiration (S indicates he likes or 
would like something of H’s) 
b) Expressions of strong (negative) emotions toward H (S indicates possible 
motivation for harming H or H’s goods) 
 
2.5b.) Positive FTAs 
1) Those that show S has a negative evaluation of some aspect of H’s positive face: 
a) Expressions of disapproval, criticism, contempt, or ridicule, complaints and 
reprimands, accusations, insults (S indicates that he doesn’t like/want one or 
more of H’s wants, acts, personal characteristics, goods, beliefs or values) 
b) Contradictions or disagreements, challenges (S indicates that he thinks H is 
wrong or misguided or unreasonable about some issue, such wrongness being 
associated with disapproval) 
2) Those that show S doesn’t care about or is indifferent to H’s positive face: 
a) Expressions of violent (out-of-control) emotions (S gives H possible reason to 
fear him or be embarrassed by him) 
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b) Irreverence, mention of taboo topics, including those that are inappropriate in 
the context (S indicates that he doesn’t value H’s values and doesn’t fear H’s 
fears) 
c) Bringing of bad news about H, or good news (boasting) about S (S indicates 
that he is willing to cause distress to H, and/or doesn’t care about H’s 
feelings) 
d) Raising of dangerously emotional or divisive topics (S raises the possibility or 
likelihood of face-threatening acts occurring; i.e. S creates a dangerous-to-
face atmosphere) 
e) Blatant non-cooperation in an activity – e.g. disruptively interrupting H’s talk, 
making non-sequiturs or showing non-attention (S indicates that he doesn’t 
care about H’s negative or positive-face wants) 
f) Use of address terms and other status-marked identifications in initial 
encounters (S may misidentify H in an offensive or embarrassing way, 
intenionally or accidentally) 
  
 I would like to take one passage from Cicero’s 2nd Philippic to illustrate the 
dynamics of face threatening acts.  In it Cicero is responding to the criticism that he is 
vain and a poor poet.  He does so in a progression of thought and language that begins 
quite explicitly but becomes increasingly exaggerated and hypothetical to the point that, 
by the end, it appears as though this whole line of thought was a joke.  That is to say, 
Cicero presents what is a very serious accusation, a convicium, in language that masks its 
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seriousness.  In his own words, he takes abuse and replies to it with urbanitas in order to 
make the original abuse look like mere jeering: 
At etiam quodam loco facetus esse uoluisti. Quam id te, di boni, non decebat! In 
quo est tua culpa non nulla.49 Aliquid enim salis a mima uxore trahere potuisti. 
'Cedant arma togae.' Quid? tum nonne cesserunt? At postea tuis armis cessit 
toga.50 Quaeramus igitur utrum melius fuerit libertati populi Romani sceleratorum 
arma an libertatem nostram armis tuis cedere. Nec uero tibi de uersibus plura 
respondebo: tantum dicam breuiter, te neque illos neque ullas omnino litteras 
nosse;51 me nec rei publicae nec amicis umquam defuisse, et tamen omni genere 
monumentorum meorum perfecisse operis subsiciuis ut meae uigiliae meaeque 
litterae et iuuentuti utilitatis et nomini Romano laudis aliquid adferrent. Sed haec 
non huius temporis: maiora uideamus.52 
 
But at one time you wished to be funny.  Good god, how little this suited you!  
And in this matter you are rather at fault.  You could have dragged something 
witty from that mime of a wife of yours.  “Let arms yield to the toga” (is the 
statement you make fun of).  What of it?  Did they not yield then?  However, later 
the toga yielded to your arms.  Let us look into whether it was thus better that for 
the arms of criminals to yield to the freedom of the Roman people or for our 
freedom to yield to your arms.  I shall respond no more to you about the poetry:  I 
shall just say briefly that you don’t know it or any other literature at all; that I 
have never failed the republic nor my friends, and furthermore that I made effort 
that in every genre of my writing that was made with a view to history my 
wakefulness and writings brought something useful to the young and something 
praiseworthy to Rome.  But this isn’t the time for that: let us turn our focus to 
bigger matters. 
 
Cicero opens this passage by trivializing and mocking Antony’s allegation, which was a 
positive FTA in that it challenged Cicero’s claim to power and influence – his handling 
of the Catilinarian Conspiracy.53  Instead of saying something weighty, Cicero accuses 
Antony of being petty, and of doing a bad job of being petty by not criticizing his poetry 
                                                
49 Ramsey calls this mock friendliness (p. 191). 
50 Ramsey points out that Cicero is deliberately misleading here.  He says that he was merely trying to say 
“let war give way to peace” but from Pis. 73 we know that the second half of this verse was concedat 
laurea laudi, from which it seems fair to say that Cicero was claiming that he deserved more praise than a 
victorious general (191).  Ramsey compares this to Off 1.77. 
51 See Phil. 3.21-2 and 13.43. 
52 Phil. 2.20. 




with any style or ability.  However, what follows is the real cleverness in Cicero’s 
response.  Instead of replying to the real charge, that of being a poor poet and a vain man, 
Cicero responds with language that suggests Antony had made an inaccurate historical 
claim – that arms did not yield to the toga – or claimed that the toga should have yielded 
to arms.  Cicero pretends that Antony never threatened his face!  In fact, Antony’s 
criticism was likely that Cicero was an arrogant hack.  What is odd about this is that we 
know how this speech was received.  Cicero clearly won the public relations battle.  How 
did Cicero manage to portray Antony’s words as abusive and yet portray his own words 
as wit?  The answer to this lies in the struggle to define one’s opponent as a slanderer and 
oneself as a witty victim of abuse.  Cicero’s strategy is to portray Antony as someone 
who seeks unsuccessfully to appear urbane and witty, but in fact is out of control and 
spewing irrational abuse.  He portrays Antony as an irate dimwit and himself as a calm 
and collected wit.  And by pretending to misunderstand Antony’s positive FTA he 
reinforces his own face with his own positive politeness. 
 
2.5c.) Redressive Actions and Positive vs. Negative Politeness 
 Lastly, and most importantly for our purposes, are Redressive Actions.  
Redressive Actions are attempts to negate face-damage whereby S tries to show H that he 
recognizes H’s face wants.  This is done in two different kinds of politeness, positive and 
negative.  Positive politeness refers to reinforcing the positive face of H, the image of 
himself to which he lays claim.  Negative politeness refers to the avoidance of insulting 
the face of H.54  In the schema of Brown and Levinson, Redressive Actions are used by 
                                                
54 A common example is that of asking for money.  Positive politeness would be to ask “will you lend me 
some money?”  Such a question gives the hearer the impression that you think he or she has money, 
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Speakers in order to “‘give face’” to the listeners.  To some extent, they are used to take 
back any FTA that may have been voiced by the speaker.  I would like to suggest that in 
much of Latin oratory, and indeed in much of English vernacular practice, there exists 
what I would like to call a false Redressive Action.  By this I mean that the speaker, S, 
caps his verbal abuse with what appears to be a Redressive Action but is in fact a strategy 
for deflecting future criticism.55 
  
2.6a Audiences 
 The strategy of evasion is a time honored one because it works.  The reason for 
the success of this strategy is too complicated to address here.  However, there is 
something to be said about the role of the audience.  If Cicero succeeds in his handling of 
accusations and retorts, it is only because the audience goes along with it.  When the 
audience does go along, does this mean that they are no longer paying attention to the 
issue at hand?  Is Cicero merely pulling wool over the audience’s eyes?  Yes, but the 
audience willfully lets it happen.  Arguments over important matters are often 
entertaining.  There is a reason that Aristophanes joked, in the Wasps, about the allure of 
the court among old men: 
φιληλιαστής ἐστιν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἀνήρ,  
ἐρᾷ τε τούτου, τοῦ δικάζειν, καὶ στένει  
ἢν µὴ 'πὶ τοῦ πρώτου καθίζηται ξύλου.  
ὕπνου δ᾽ ὁρᾷ τῆς νυκτὸς οὐδὲ πασπάλην.  
ἢν δ᾽ οὖν καταµύσῃ κἂν ἄχνην, ὅµως ἐκεῖ  
                                                                                                                                            
thereby reinforcing the image that the listener wants to have, that he or she is wealthy.  Negative politeness 
would be to ask “would it be too much for you to lend me some money?”  This kind of question avoids 
calling the listener cheap and allows him or her the possibility of saying “yes, it would be too much” 
without creating strife. 
55 Cicero carries out Redressive actions throughout his Pro Plancio.  The prosecutor, Laterensis interpreted 
Cicero’s support of Plancius as an affront so Cicero is careful to reiterate the basis of their friendship in the 
speech.  Likewise, he carries out what I call a False Redressive Action in the Pro Caelio when his 
compliments of the young prosecutor’s character evolve into criticisms for his leniency with words. 
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ὁ νοῦς πέτεται τὴν νύκτα περὶ τὴν κλεψύδραν.  
ὑπὸ τοῦ δὲ τὴν ψῆφόν γ᾽ ἔχειν εἰωθέναι  
τοὺς τρεῖς ξυνέχων τῶν δακτύλων ἀνίσταται,  
ὥσπερ λιβανωτὸν ἐπιτιθεὶς νουµηνίᾳ.56 
 
Of all men, it is he who is fondest [sc. of the Heliaea].  
Thus, to be judging is his hobby, and he groans  
if he is not sitting on the first seat. He does not  
close an eye at night, and if he dozes off for  
an instant his mind flies instantly to the clepsydra.  
He is so accustomed to hold the balloting pebble,  
that he awakes with his three fingers pinched together  
as if he were offering incense to the new moon. 
 
Philocleon is so enamored with serving on juries that he groans from pain when not 
seated in front; he can’t sleep at night, and when he can he dreams of sitting in judgment.  
This same obsession is today reflected in contemporary daytime television.  Courtroom 
shows like Judge Mathis, Paternity Court, The People’s Court, Last Shot with Judge 
Gunn, America’s Court with Judge Ross, Judge Joe Brown, Judge Alex, etc. demonstrate 
the vast popularity of the reality courtroom television genre.57 
 In a potential competition between two individuals for a job, a spouse, sustenance, 
or any other kind of resource, insults may be employed to attempt to dissuade the other 
from competition.  But such insults, if they are to be effective, have to be recognized by 
both sides as insults, and thus the insulting would be ritual.  However, if no dissuasion is 
possible and violence is presumed  not an option, then the only other way to settle the 
dispute is by appeal.  For invective to exist one needs not only two individuals at variance 
and an object that is the cause of that variance, but also an external audience who has 
control over that object and can adjudicate the competing claims.  Thus invective is 
always about worth, or the lack thereof.  And although its target might seem to be its 
                                                
56 Ar. Vesp. 88-96. 
57 For the popularity of this drama, see Nasheri 2002. 
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primary audience, it is is not.  The primary audience of any invective is the person or 
persons who have the power to adjudicate and assign control of the object desired by the 
two sides. 
 In political cases what is at stake in invective is the transfer of communal support 
from one person to another.  It always involves the assessment and evaluation of 
opponents by people to whom both sides are appealing.   And the greater the stakes, the 
greater the likelihood that the transfer of support will be larger in the end.  Take two 
poets exchanging criticism over who is more stylistically sophisticated, as they seek the 
support of their peers; then imagine it over who had more support among the audiences 
of their poetry.  In the case where the appeal is to one’s peers, the stakes are lower.  
Losing the debate among one’s peers rather than with the wider audience is less likely to 
result in one’s being abandoned by his patrons and public.  That is to say, given that the 
consequences are relatively trifling, the audience of peers is less likely to take the charges 
as sincere criticisms.  They would simply consider the debate a friendly sparring match.  
It doesn’t matter how serious the charges may be.  It matters how strongly they resonate 
with the audience and the strength of resonance is dependent upon how great the 
repercussions of winning are.  When Catullus, in poem 16, threatens to rape two critics of 
his poetry, this threat does not have to mean that something serious is at stake, that he 
truly hated Aurelius and Furius. If the readers of Catullan invective simply thought “Oh, 
those three are going at each other again,” then it is less likely that the end result of the 
debate between Catullus and his critics would result in the complete defeat of one side 
and the exaltation of the other.  Now consider what happens when we turn from an 
audience of peers to a broader public.   When the audience of the agonistic exchange 
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includes potential and existing patrons and clients, the stakes rise dramatically and so 
does the likelihood that the insults are going to be taken seriously.  No longer at issue is 
the question of standing within a group (first among equals), but standing within a larger 
social context, one that is tied up with prestige and capital.  We can thus say that the 
seriousness of invective, how brutal it is, is dependent upon two things: the size and 
composition of the audience and the importance of what is at stake. 
 The degree to which a verbal competition was regulated was not due to a set 
system of rules created according to cultural values but by the ability of the competitor to 
manipulate the rules to suit his interests.  Again, this is not to say that there was complete 
moral relativism in the Roman world.  In fact, the opposite could be argued – that 
Romans cared so deeply about character and morality that accusations became much 
larger than the simple matter of guilt or innocence in a particular instance.  However, 
even if we accept the reasonable assumption that there was no more agreement among 
Romans about morals than there is among individuals today, we can still say that the 
debates discussed in what follows were attempts to find common ground.  In any event, 
when it came to the courts, no matter what the yardstick was for verdicts, the people 
judging were the jurors and audience.  Their reactions to the words and claims of the 
speakers illustrate the rules of the game.  The praise or blame they gave to speakers 
demonstrates whether they thought the game was being played fairly or not, as well as 
whom they thought to be winning.  And as Leanne Bablitz has argued, audiences were 
not silent in their reactions.58  She documents, from Martial, many common outbursts, 
from which we can conclude that audiences were not simply judging a speaker by the 
                                                
58 Bablitz 2007: 133, taken from Mart. 2.27 where a patronus is in the middle of pleading a case while the 
crowd shouts 'Effecte! graviter! cito! nequiter! euge! beate!' 'Hoc volui! 
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quality of his argument but by the way in which he made it.59  Thus we can say that style 
was at least at issue, in addition to the straightforward substance that we commonly think 
of as the subject of a legal decision.  In fact, substance may not have played much of a 
role at all.  And audiences played a role in areas outside of the courts.  It is likely, as 
Fergus Millar has argued, that crowds were listening in on debate nearly everywhere it 
took place.60  
 Andrew Riggsby argues that Cicero’s speeches suggest that Romans at the very 
least wanted to believe in their verdicts or resolutions.61  He claims that the audience 
believed in the process, and that whether advocates considered themselves concerned 
with fairness and truth is besides the point.  Furthermore, although the advocates may 
have lied and twisted the truth, the whole enterprise was thought to be about determining 
guilt or innocence.  This may be true.  In fact, one of Cicero’s most famous speeches in 
antiquity, the Pro Milone, was a case that Cicero lost.  If jurors cared only about 
rhetorical elegance, the cleverness of the argument, and jokes, then Clodius’s prosecution 
must have been one outstanding piece of rhetoric.  More likely, however, is that the jurors 
simply did not accept the twisted logic of Cicero’s argument.  Milo was simply and 
unequivocally guilty.  But for every Pro Milone, there is an In Vatinium.  It is hard to 
discount the fact that some of Cicero’s most vitriolic invective was directed at a man with 
whom Cicero later exchanged pleasant letters.62  Of course, that men who were at odds in 
                                                
59 When we hear “graviter” it is hard not to see style as playing a role in audience assessments.  Graviter 
could be referring to the seriousness of an accusation, but just as possible is the sense of depth or strength; 
or, in a negative sense, severe.  
60 Millar 1998. 
61 Riggsby 1997. 
62 Ad Fam. 5.9 and 5.11.  In the latter letter Cicero calls Vatinius the most grateful man of all: cognoui enim 
te gratissimum omnium, idque numquam destiti praedicare. nec enim tu mihi habuisti modo gratiam, uerum 




court might be friends in private is not proof that jurors would have been aware of any 
hypocrisy.  However, if we accept Cicero’s correspondence with Vatinius as proof that he 
was simply playing a game and that Vatinius was, at least later in life, aware of it, this 
suggests a cavalier attitude to questions of guilt among advocates. In the end, it is 
difficult to say what Roman jurors believed.  But we can ask how and why they were 
influenced by some things and not by others.  We can ask what they cared about.  Humor 
and insult played a role in both of these questions.  Indeed, they likely play a role in every 
society’s legal system, but particularly in those where decisions are made by one’s peer 
group.  
 
2.6b Audience Ethnography 
 A perfect example of how a disagreement over right and wrong can become a 
subject of entertainment for an external audience is seen in an incident described in Colin 
Turnbull’s book on the BaMbuti pygmies.63  A dispute that arose between two brothers, 
when the wife of one brother insulted the other brother, came to the attention of the 
village.  One brother, Aberi, whose wife was the offender, threatened the other with 
death, to which the other, Masalito, replied “Go and get your spear, then, and come back 
and kill me. I’ll still be here. You don’t have the courage to kill your brother.”64  Turnbull 
goes on to describe what transpired: 
He [Masalito] said a lot of other things, goading Aberi on to an even higher pitch 
of fury.  Aberi tried to make himself more impressive by a graphic dance, which 
                                                
63 The pygmies of Central Africa have been specifically studied for their laughter.  Not only do they appear 
to laugh more easily than any of their near neighbors, the also laugh more physically.  According to 
Turnbull (1961: 45), their laughter is particularly infectious and “they hold onto each other as if for support, 
slap their sides, snap their fingers, and go through all manner of physical contortions.  If something strikes 
them as particularly funny they will even roll on the ground.” 
64 Turnbull 1961: 117. 
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was meant to show exactly how he was going to leap in the air and twist around 
and drive the spear home.  But he was not a good dancer, and when he tried to 
illustrate the leap he fell flat on his face. This was the end of the matter for Aberi.  
For weeks he was ridiculed, everyone asking him if he had lost his spear, or 
telling him to be careful not to trip and fall.65 
 
In the heat of the argument the audience, consisting of the rest of the village, ceased to 
consider who was at fault between the two brothers and one of their wives.  Instead, it 
focused upon how the antagonists handled themselves during the confrontation.  What 
had been a debate between the two brothers about whether Alberi’s wife had disrespected 
Masalito became, once it had gone public, a contest over who could put on a better show.  
This shift came about not just because, as Turnbull says, the BaMbuti are “a good-
natured people with an irresistible sense of humor; they are always making jokes about 
one another, even about themselves.”66  It was due, rather, to the fact that they had “no 
chiefs, no formal councils…no judge, no jury, no court.”67  As a result, “their humor can 
be turned into an instrument of punishment when they choose.”68  Had there been formal 
procedures and a specific place for Masalito to lodge a complaint, it is less likely that the 
manner in which the confrontation was settled would have shifted away from whether an 
offense had been committed. 
 With respect to how confrontations are settled, the Roman world may not have 
been so very different from the former Belgian Congo.  While the Romans had more 
formalized institutions, decisions were sometimes made less on the basis of normative 
debates – where content and logical arugments matter most – than on issues of 
                                                
65 Ibid 117-8. 
66 Ibid 114. 
67 Ibid 110. 
68 Ibid 114. 
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performance during the debates.  Further, there is ample evidence that the Romans used 
humor, as Turnbull stated of the BaMbuti, for punishment.69 
 
2.7 Retort Ethnographies 
 There are at least two cultures outside the Roman world where we can observe the 
effectiveness of the strategies discussed above: Honduran youths and the so-called 
“sounding” or “dozens” in the United States.70  In both of these verbal competitions, an 
ability to admit to an accusation, or at the very least ignore it, is often necessary to top 
your opponent.  
 
2.7a.) Honduras and Admission 
 Ricardo Agurcia recorded what he calls verbal dueling between anonymous 
participants, all adult men from La Ceiba, Honduras.  These duels are almost exclusively 
sexual in nature, consisting of back and forth accusations of homosexuality.  Agurcia 
only lists five sets of exchanges, but they are worth considering.  I use his translations. 
1. 
Speaker A: Pendejo (Asshole.)  
Speaker B: En el culo te la dejo (I will leave my penis in your ass) 
con cien varas de pellejo (with a hundred yards of foreskin.) 
A: Cabrón. (Asshole.) 
B: El que te agarró en el callejón (the one who grabbed you in the alley) 
y te dejó ir el jon-rón (and fucked you.) 
A: Culero. (Homosexual.) 
B: Así como el enfermero (just like the male nurse) 
que te rellenó el agujero (who filled your ass off) 
                                                
69 See section above on the public conuicium as described in the Digest.  If we take Tacitus’ remark about 
German humor, that they don’t laugh at one another’s failings, and conclude that Romans considered 
insults funny, then it is easy to see how humor could be seen as a sort of punishment, albeit an informal and 
non judicially enforced one. 
70 Another frequently cited culture for verbal duels is that of Turkish youths.  See Dundes, Leach, and 
Ozkok  1972. 
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A: No Jodás (fuck off) 
B: El culo me lo dás (give me your ass) 
y te meto la tamagás (and I will stick in my snake) 
con un litro de gás (with a liter of gas) 
para que te entre más (so that it will go in further) 
 
2 
A: Puro (I stick it in) 
B: Con orgullo (with pride) 
en el tuyo (in yours) 
 
3.  
A: Maricón (homosexual) 
B: El que te sampa el Horcón (he who shoves a post up yours) 
A: Diablito (little devil) 
B: El que te metió el curnito (he who stuck his horn into you) 
A: Berga de burro (donkey’s penis) 
B: Así te arrimo contra el muro (that’s how I fuck you against the wall) 
A: Quiebro (I break you) 
B: Meto (I stick it into you) 
A: Sampo (I shove it into you) 
B: Puyo (I thrust it into you) 
A: Urgo (I prod it into you) 
A: Supermán (Superman) 
B: Agarrame los huevos (grab my balls) 
que se me ván (as they are getting away from me) 
 
4 
A: Enano (midget) 
B: Seré enano (I might be a midget 
y sere lampiño (and I might have no pubic hair) 
pero estos huevos no son de niño (but my balls are not those of a child) 
A: Comé mierda (eat shit) 
B: No te como (I won’t eat you) 
A: Pizado (fucked) 
B: Me hago de lado a lado (I move from side to side) 
y a tu tata le dejo el ojo hinchado (and I leave your father with a swollen eye) 
 
5 
A: Caballo (horse) 
B: Tu nana de llegua y allí no fallo (with your mother as a mare I can’t miss) 
A: Tu Madra (I cuss at your mother) 
B: La Tuya )I cuss at yours) 
A: Aquí me la arrimo y le meto la cabuya (here I get up against her and stick my 
dick into her) 
A: Maricón (homosexual) 
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B: Marinero, mariner no dejes la oración (sailor, sailor don’t leave your prayers) 
y prestame a tu hermana  que te aumento la tripulación (and lend me your sister so 
I can augment your crew) 
A: (No response) 
B: Esa bomba que me has echado (that bomb you have thrown at me) 
hasta la cara me ha ardido (has even made my face sore) 
porqué no se la echás a tu madre que te ha parido (why don’t you throw it at your 
mother who has bred you) 
A: (No response) 
B: Tu madre es concinera (your mother is a cook) 
y a mi padre la calienta el chorizón (and she heats up my father’s sausage) 
tu hermana es pupusera (your sister is a pupusa maker) 
y yo no me canso de rellenarle el tortillón (and I don’t get tired of stuffing her big 
tortilla)71 
 
There are two commonalities between the five of these and the Roman sources we 
shall consider below.  First of all, the person who insults first always loses.  In all of the 
above examples participant B clearly has the more clever comebacks.72  Not only are they 
longer, filled with metaphors, and creative takes on participant A’s words, they 
occasionally leave participant A speechless.  Secondly, participant B appears to admit or 
outright admits to the accusations of A in exchanges 2, 4, and 5, and perhaps in 3 as well.  
In the second exchange, B appears to agree with A’s statement implying that he was 
going to “stick it in” B by saying con orgullo (with pride).  However with the delay and 
the next sentence in el tuyo (in yours) he breaks our expectation and switches from the 
position of the passive sexual partner to the active one.   In exchange 4, perhaps the most 
emblematic of the sociolinguistic strategy under discussion, participant B literally agrees 
to the charge that he is a midget.  He merely responds by saying “yes but this midget has 
some big balls.”  Therefore, the debate has gone from the issue of height to sexual 
dominance where he is particularly skilled.  At the words of pizado (fucked) he responds 
                                                
71 All are from Agurcia 1977: 21-24. 
72 Agurcia does not say whether or not these are the same two individuals throughout.  But given that he 
only had six subjects, there must have been some overlap. 
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with a highly sonorous and rhythmical me hago de lado a lado (I move from side to side) 
– presumably this means that he will physically evade any attempt to sodomize him.  
Similarly to the second and the fourth exchange, in the fifth, when participant B is called 
a horse, he responds by saying something akin to “and this horse is fucking your mare of 
a mother.”  The connotations of being called a horse are unclear but whether it’s a matter 
of a lack of class or being a tamed animal, B has shifted the matter to sex by means of an 
admission. 
 
2.7b The Dozens in Harlem and Denial 
In a seminal 1972 study of the language of a young African American gang in 
Harlem, William Labov demonstrated the verbal richness of a group that had previously 
been seen as deficient in language.73  One verbal context provided the primary framework 
for his linguistic analysis: the dozens.  Slso known as sounding, the dozens is a verbal 
game that provides the opportunity for youths to engage in trading insults with impunity.  
There are many reasons for the attractiveness of such a game, but primarily it allows for 
the expression of self and social standing within a group, while avoiding a resort to 
physical violence.74  The game achieves these outcomes by dint of the fact that, 
theoretically, what is said during the game is assumed to be fictional by the participants.  
The insults that are exchanged are usually limited to those areas which have implications 
for the social status of the participants.  In Labov’s study, there are four such areas: 
physical looks, family, poverty, and sexuality.   
                                                
73 See Labov 1972: 204-240 for previous literature on the topic.  Labov was one of the first scholars to 
investigate African-American language on its own terms rather than in terms of its differences and 
perceived shortcomings in comparison to standard American English. 
74 See Parks 1986: 440. 
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 Insults in the dozens usually take the form of “B is so X that P,” where B is the 
individual insulted, X is a negative attribute, and P is the proposition or punchline that 
proves X.  Labov gives the following definition of a sound: 
If A makes an utterance S in the presence of B and an audience C, which includes 
reference to a target related to B, T(B), in a proposition P, and 
 
a. B believes that A believes that P is not true and 
b. B believes that A believes that B knows that P is not true… 
 
Then S is a sound, heard as T(B) is so X that P where X is a pejorative attribute, 
and A is said to have sounded on B.75 
 
In most sounds the negative attribute X is omitted and all that remains is the proposition 
P.76 For example, in the proposition “your mother wear the seat of her drawers on the top 
of her head,”77 the implied negative attribute of the mother is her lack of intelligence.  
What is thus heard is “Your mother’s so stupid that she wear the seat of her drawers on 
the top of her head!”  Sometimes the sound is disguised as an anecdote.  For example, “I 
went up Money house and I walked in Money house, I say, I wanted to sit down, and 
then, you know, a roach jumped up and said, “Sorry, this seat is taken,”78 can be 
understood as “Money is so poor that when you go to his house you have to share the 
table with cockroaches.” 
 We can see from these examples and Labov’s definition that for the game to be 
played successfully – in other words, for the sound to be recognized as a sound – the 
individuals involved should know each other; ideally they should be of the same social 
class, age, and ethnicity.  Were it attempted by participants from different backgrounds, 
the possibility that a misunderstanding might arise would be great and could only be 
                                                
75 Labov 1972: 338-339. 
76 Ibid: 298-306. 
77 Ibid: 311. 
78 Ibid: 316. 
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diminished if the proposition is so unlikely that it is immediately recognized as 
fictitious.79  To take an example, the common dozens insult of implying that someone’s 
mother is sexually available is rarely given in the form, “I fucked your mother,” which 
could easily be interpeted as a statement of fact.  It is rather given in a wildly unrealistic 
fashion, such as, “I fucked your mother on top of the piano; when she came out she was 
singin’ the Star Spangled Banner.”80 
 Labov has numerous examples of individuals who misread a sound as a personal 
insult and what is interesting is how they deal with it.  The younger, less adept 
participants tend to deny it, thus causing their interlocutors to drive the point home and 
successfully win the exchange.  The older, more able participants admit to the criticism 
and shift the dynamics of the exchange to something related but different from that with 
which they were criticized.  Labov offers the following example that took place between 
the older and more accomplished sounder Boot and the younger David, 
Boot: Your father look like a grown pig. 
David: Least my-at least my father don’t be up there talking uh-uh-uh-uh-uh-uh. 
Boot: Uh-so my father talks stutter talk what it mean? 
 At least my father ain’t got a gray head!  His father got a big bald spot 
with a gray head right down there, and one long string… 
David: Because he’ old he’s old, that’s why!  He’s old, that’s why!… 
Boot: …and one long string, that covers his whole head, one, one long string, 
about that high, covers his whole head.81 
 
We can see here how devastating it can be to deny a charge.  By trying to justify why his 
father has gray hair, David reveals a weak spot that is taken full advantage of by Boot.  
The way Boot deals with the charge that his father stutters is markedly different.  At first 
he takes the charge personally by hesitating and saying “uh-so.”  Then, gaining control of 
                                                
79 Ibid: 330. 
80 Ibid: 308.  Note that the near rhyme of piano and banner formalizes the sound to some extent, thereby 
making it even less believable than it would be based on content alone. 
81 Ibid: 332-333. 
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the situation, he admits the charge by saying “so what?”  He then proceeds to change the 
subject of the insults being exchanged to great effect from one’s fathers’ ability to 
articulate to the age of one’s father.  Thus the successful sounder is quick-witted, able to 
distinguish a sound from a personal insult, quick to take advantage when he senses a 
weakness, and able to change the nature of the insults being exchanged to his own 
advantage.  Given the pace of the sounding, and the potentially hurtful nature of the 
insults, this is no small talent.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
While most of the exchanges that this investigation will examine take place in 
judicial settings, it will also examine political exchanges – that is to say face threatening 
acts between “polical men” – outside the courts.  The one uniting feature of all the source 
material is that all examples are of verbal duels, and those exchanges are face threatening 
to at least one if not both of the individuals involved.  Thus my investigation will be 
considering what has been called “capping,” but might simply be called one-upmanship.  
What works and what doesn’t work is the main concern but I am also concerned with 
understanding why things work or fail to work.  This “why” question might be answered 
by looking at the dynamics of these exchanges and noting any patterns.  We will notice 
that there are indeed patterns, and that these patterns find ethnographic parallels with 




Chapter Three: Moves to Character and Humor in Cicero’s Defenses. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter I have tried to show that Political Anthropology offers a 
useful way of interpreting Roman aristocratic competition, broadly speaking, and 
sociolinguistics a way for considering verbal duels specifically.  I have argued that there 
is a strategic advantage to avoiding denial and that audiences can be swayed by laughter 
as much as by what we today consider valid evidence in judicial disputes.  I have 
moreover suggested that there are linguistic similarities between certain Roman responses 
to criticism and the verbal duels of 1970s Honduras and 1960s Harlem. 
 In this chapter I will consider whether one can discern a pattern in Cicero’s 
discussion of character and use of humor, and furthermore, I will consider whether some 
of the unusual humor – humor that challenges traditional beliefs or seems out of context – 
might be explained by considering aggression and the scarcity of honor within the 
framework of verbal competition set out in chapter two.  In that chapter two I argued that 
power, the actual ability to impose one’s will on others,1 is often negotiated by rhetorical 
performance in verbal competitions.  It is not necessarily the case that the strongest 
(physically, financially, or with regard to symbolic capital), the most intelligent, or the 
most attractive should win in competing for a prize.  Often, the quickest wit is the winner.  
I suggested that what quick wits tend to share is an ability to sidestep criticism and reply 
to it in such a way that doesn’t contest the merits of that criticism in depth but changes 
the nature of the argument in such a way that the original criticism is turned around on 
the person who initiated it.  In chapter one I suggested that the ability to turn an insult 
                                                
1 Again, the Weberian definition of power. 
 
 67 
back on the insulter is particularly important in Roman courts because of a focus on 
character; and that Cicero made abundant use of character as a substitute for what we 
would consider traditional evidence (e.g. witnesses, motive, physical evidence).  
Although on occasion the prosecution raised the issue of character,2 in Cicero’s speeches 
he seems to be more preoccupied with the character of his client than the prosecutor.  The 
reason for this is that by bringing up character Cicero accomplishes a number of 
rhetorical ends.  For one, character can make the audience more sympathetic to his client 
or more hostile to his opponent.  For another, by discussing his client’s or opponent’s 
character Cicero avoids reminding the audience of the specifics in regard to what his 
client was charged with thus making it seem as though the charge doesn’t merit an 
answer.  Third, by not contesting the accusations he almost de-legitimizes them; were he 
to deny the accusations too explicitly he would risk making his client appear as though he 
had something to hide.  Lastly, by bringing up character Cicero creates the opportunity 
for more humor, something at which he excels.   But how does he bring up character and 
why?  Are there certain charges that necessitate more focus on character than others?  For 
what reasons would Cicero not discuss character?  And, finally, is there a general pattern 
that can be discerned such that we might even come up with a formula? 
 In the De Inventione, Cicero sets out guidelines for a proper speech and breaks 
down the order in which the various elements should be used, consisting of the following 
five steps: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio. Respectively, these 
were the creation of the arguments, the organization of those arguments, the finding of 
the best way of articulating said arguments, memorization, and delivery.3  However, he is 
                                                
2 As discussed below, Cato called Murena a dancer in Mur. 13. 
3 Inv. Rhet. 1.9. 
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speaking in the broadest possible terms.  He does not claim that first a speaker ought to 
deny the charges or go straight to a discussion of character or create an alternative 
narrative.  He merely gives five steps a speaker must go through to finish a speech.  Thus 
we can’t turn to Cicero for help in understandering the order of a defense or prosecution.  
We must look for patterns ourselves, restricting ourselves to court cases since there will 
be more continuity in these.4 
 In order to think about patterns I have included a table that summarizes my 
findings, and a brief word on methodology is necessary before discussing it.  More than 
half of the information I looked for was completely objective: presence and number of 
co-advocates, the result of the trial, and the nature of Cicero’s opening remarks.  The 
other three categories, however, need to be explained.  In order to determine the extent 
that character played a role in a speech – that of either the prosecutor or Cicero’s client – 
I have relied exclusively upon what have traditionally been considered character tropes.  
That is to say, I looked for the mention of the following positive qualities: republicanism, 
sexual propriety, beneficia, humanitas, virtus, sobrietas, eloquentia, diligentia, and 
pietas.5  Whenever I have found something related to one of these concepts in Cicero’s 
defenses, I concluded that there existed at least a minimal amount of character-based 
praise.  Likewise, whenever I found evidence of the negative opposites of the above 
qualities I considered that there existed at least a minimal amount of character 
denigration.6  
                                                
4 Fragmentary speeches like the Pro Scauro and Pro Fonteio which lack beginnings will not be considered 
as it would be too speculative to believe we could understand their order when so much is missing. 
5 See Merrill 1975: 50-97. 
6 Aspiring to kingship, sexual misconduct, plunder, crudelitas, effeminiate behavior, drunkeness, oratio 
inepta, turpitudo generis, and blasphemy. 
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 The more complicated matter of character is the question of how to measure how 
much of a role it plays in a given speech.  There are two ways we can begin to ascertain 
this.  For one, the sheer percentage of time that is devoted to character relative to the rest 
of the speech is an indication.  For another, we can look to the context in which the praise 
or criticism of character takes place.  Is it the only evidence Cicero is offering or is it in 
addition to other evidence?  For instance, in a hypothetical murder case, if the only 
evidence Cicero offers to counter the charge that his client committed murder is 
character, it’s safe to assume character is playing a greater role than anything else.  
Similarly, if the only evidence Cicero offers is to claim that the prosecutor is of a 
questionable character, the same applies.  If, on the other hand, Cicero offers both an alibi 
for the murder and praise for his client or blame for the prosecutor, character is sharing a 
role with something else and we thus can’t claim it is central – though it may still be 
important.  Finally, if an alibi, a lack of motive, and praise for his client are all offered, 
we can say that character is playing a minor role.  As such, I have decided upon only four 
categories of character: “much,” “moderate,” and “little,” and “none.”  When character is 
more than 50% of the defense with respect to the amount of time or importance devoted 
to it, I have deemed the speech to contain “much” character discourse.  When it 
approaches 50%, I have deemed the speech to contain “moderate” character discourse.  
And, lastly, when the speech contains less than approximately 50% of character 
discourse, I have deemed it to contain “little.”  When character is completely absent from 
the defense, I have simply listed it as having “none.” 
 The category of humor is much more difficult.  Sometimes there is external 
evidence.  For instance, we know that Cato accused Cicero of being a “funnyman” in his 
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defense of Murena.  Although not solid evidence, since Cato could have been making a 
character attack upon Cicero, it is still more likely that at least one person, Cato, thought 
that Cicero’s defense was relying too much on humor.  More often than not, however, all 
we can do is consider how often in a defense speech Cicero made use of jokes.  There are 
several ways to do this.  First, we can rely upon our reading of Quintilian.  If he says 
something Cicero said was a joke, we too can take it as such.  Thus, the fact the 
Quintilian considers funny Cicero’s response of “too late” to the question of “when was 
Clodius slain?” tells us at least that he received it as a joke and we too can take it as such.  
The second way we can determine the degree to which humor is playing a role is to ask, 
when we have seen something that strikes us as funny, what other function it could be 
serving apart from producing laughs.  If there is no other imaginable function or the other 
functions seem minimal in comparison to winning the laughter of the audience, then it’s 
likely we are looking at a joke.  Third, if we take what we think of as a joke and interpret 
it as having been said in complete seriousness, and the result strikes us as out of place, 
it’s more likely to be a joke than not.  More than anything else, however, I have used my 
own best judgment to judge what would have been thought humorous. 
 If we begin by considering Cicero’s advocate speeches in order of the severity of 




 Pro Publio 
Quinctio (81) 
Pro Quinto Roscio 
Comoedo (between 
76 and 68) 
Pro Caecina (69?) 
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 Pro Publio 
Quinctio (81) 
Pro Quinto Roscio 
Comoedo (between 
76 and 68) 
Pro Caecina (69?) 
Claim Sponsio Condictio certae 
pecuniae 





None None None 
Result Unknown Unknown Probably won 
Opening Facts of case Facts of case Plaintiff's malice 
towards client, facts 
of case 
Extent client’s 
character plays role 
Moderate: he is cast 
as humble and 
honest 
Little to moderate Much 
Extent opponent’s 
character plays role 
Little to moderate: 
questions the 
manner in which 
plaintiff brought 
case against his 
client; also calls 
plaintiff luxurious 
Moderate: referred 
to throughout as 
dishonest 
Moderate 
Amount of humor Little Moderate: he is, 
after all, advocating 
on behalf of a comic 
actor.  See 
Bonsangue 2010 
Little: a remark or 







 Pro Archia (62) Pro Balbo (56) 
Charge Lex Papia Lex Papia 
Co-advocates with Cicero None 2, M.L. Crassus and G.P. 
Pompeius Magnus 
Result Won Won 
Opening Facts of case Facts of case 
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 Pro Archia (62) Pro Balbo (56) 




character plays role 
Somewhat Little 




 Pro Flacco (59) Pro Rabirio Postumo (54-
53) 
Charge Lex Cornelia de repetundis Lex Julia de repetundis 
(quo ea pecunia pervenerit) 
Co-advocates with Cicero 1: Q.H. Hortalus None 
Result Won Unknown but likely won 
due to the client’s 
successful future career 
Opening Good character of client 
and prosecutorial malice 
Censure of client for giving 
money to a king, call for 
pity for client due to a life 
of misfortune 
Extent client’s character 
plays role 
Moderate: Cicero 
characterizes it as initiated 
by the prosecution but it 
could just as easily have 
been he who started it.  He 
praises Flaccus heavily 
Little: he is said to be 
generous and his father is 
praised and the prosecution 
alleged that he wore a 
Greek cloak — indicating a 
lack of loyalty to Rome 
Extent prosecutor(s)’s 
character plays role 
Moderate, focused on 
Laelius but there were 5 
prosecutors. 
None 
Amount of humor Little to moderate: Greek 
jokes, prosecution had not a 
staff but an army for its 
collection of evidence (flac 
13) 





 Pro Murena (63) Pro Plancio (54) 
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 Pro Murena (63) Pro Plancio (54) 
Charge Lex Tullia de ambitu Lex licinia de sodaliciis 
Co-advocates with Cicero 2: Q.H. Hortalus and M.L. 
Crassus 
1: Q.H. Hortalus 
Result Won Won 




Extent client’s character 
plays role 




character plays role 
Little: the reputation of the 
prosecutors was too strong 
to get away with this 
Little: he accuses Laterensis 
of jealousy but not much 
else 
Amount of humor Much: Cato called Cicero a 
“funnyman” during trial 
Little 
 
Murder or Attempted Murder 
 
 Pro Cluentio (66) Pro C. Rabirio (63) 
Charge Lex Cornelia de sicariis et 
veneficis 
Iudicum populi, for 
perduellio 
Co-advocates with Cicero None 1: Q.H. Hortalus 
Result Won Lost 
Opening Prosecutor wrong about 
facts 
Prosecution trying to undo 
the traditions of the 
Republic 




character plays role 
Much, though through 
Sassia 
Much 
Amount of humor Moderate to much humor: 
sarcasm directed at Sassia 
and Oppianicus 
Moderate to much: not 
much more to his case than 
that Rabirius was acting 
under orders from the 
Senate.  The rest of the 
speech is mostly devoted to 
humorous insults of 
Saturninus and his 
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 Pro Cluentio (66) Pro C. Rabirio (63) 
associates. 
 
Public Violence Cases 
 
 Pro Sulla (62) Pro Caelio (56) Pro Sestio (56) Pro Milone 
(52) 
Charge Lex Plautia de 
Vi 
Lex Plautia de 
vi 
Lex Plautia de 
vi 











































against him but 
his positions are 
mocked 





















 Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino (81-80) 
Charge Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis 
Co-advocates with Cicero None 
Result Won 
Opening Raises the stakes: claims that this trial is 
about more than Roscius but about good 
noble young men versus evil freedmen. 
Extent client’s character plays role Some: he is not depicted as outstanding 
but is said not to be bad 
Extent prosecutor(s)’s character plays role Little but the accuser’s character is 
thoroughly challenged 




 As we can see from the tables, character is not always a theme in Cicero’s 
defenses.  He does not, by default, proclaim his client’s good character or his opponent’s 
bad one.   He does not discuss character when the facts of the case (charge or complaint, 
documentary evidence, witnesses, motive, etc) take centerstage.  He also is less likely to 
focus on character for less serious cases:  With the exception of the Pro Caecina, civil 
cases and cases involving the contesting of citizenship contain little discussion of 
character.  
 The clusters of cases that contain the heaviest amounts of character discourse are 
criminal cases.  The only criminal case that contains minimal amounts of claims relating 
to character is the Pro Rabirio Postumo and it is noteworthy that in the opening of that 
speech Cicero questions the judgment of his client.  Moreover, he even admits to part of 
the charge against his client – that he lent other people's money to Ptolemy, whom he was 
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helping pay back Rome for its help in restoring him to power.7  There is only one non-
criminal case that contains a focus on character and that is the civil case, the Pro 
Caecina. 
 That the subject of character should come up in civil trials is not necessarily a 
surprise.  In cases with insufficient evidence the only thing that could be argued was 
character — the central question became “who would be more likely to be lying?”  What 
is worthy of asking is why Cicero’s advocacy of Caecina should be any different than his 
two other civil speeches.  The answer is, simply, that there was little else for Cicero to 
talk about.  In his defense Cicero claims that he would have no problem defending 
Caecina on the charges if the prosecution were to have played fairly, implying of course 
that the prosecution was acting inappropriately, thereby justifying him to depart from 
precedent himself: 
Nunc quoque in iudicio si causa more institutoque omnium defendatur, nos 
inferiores in agendo non futuros; sin a consuetudine recedatur, se, quo 
impudentius egerit, hoc superiorem discessurum.8  
 
And so in this count, if he makes his argument for the sake of custom and 
established principles of all, we shall not be his inferiors in managing our case; 
but if he departs from all usage, the more impudently he conducts himself, the 
more likely to succeed shall he be.9 
 
Instead, he claims that the prosecutor was not mounting a legal case against his client but 
merely acting out of effrontery.  When Cicero says “though that is a most scandalous 
thing, they thought that the trial in this case would appear to be not about the dishonesty 
of Sextus Aebutius, but about civil law”10 we can see what is really going on here.  The 
                                                
7 Rab Post. 5: nec suam solum pecuniam credidit, sed etiam amicorum. 
8 Caecin. 2.10-15. 
9 Clark 1909 with minor alteration. 
10 Caecin. 4.10-12: Simul illud quod indignissimum est futurum arbitrati sunt, ut in hac causa non de 
improbitate Sex. Aebuti, sed de iure civili iudicium fieri uideretur.  Again, if we are to follow Damon, one 
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prosecutor, Sextus Aebutius claims to be to be making a point de iure civili iudicium, 
while Cicero suggests that what’s really happening is that Sextus Aebutius is indulging 
his insolence (or wickedness).11  Indeed, Cicero takes care to present Aebutius as 
disreputable,  
Quam personam iam ex quotidiana cognoscitis uita, recuperatores, mulierum 
assentatoris, cognitoris uiduarum, defensoris nimium litigiosi, [...], inepti ac stulti 
inter uiros, inter mulieres periti iuris et callidi, hanc personam imponite Aebutio.12  
 
Whose character you know from your daily life, gentlemen, a flatterer of women, 
a widow’s advocate, an all too quarrelsome attorney, [...], useless and stupid 
among men, among women an experienced and shrewd lawyer, such a character 
should you ascribe to Aebutius.13  
 
The character Cicero presents here is one of an ambulance-chaser, concerned more with 
money than with justice. 
 Two other patterns can be noticed regarding character.  One is that the more co-
advocates Cicero had, the more likely character was to play a role in his speech.  Thus it 
is not just the severity of the case but the number of people defending it that could be 
prompting his focus on character.  The other is that as time progresses Cicero’s speeches 
became more and more focused on character and humor.  It is possible that this is just the 
direction his experience took him.  However, it also possible that the more politically 
prominent he became, the more he had to adjust his strategy.  To be sure, it was a delicate 
                                                                                                                                            
manner in which character might be involved in the speech is that Sextus Aebutius might intentionally have 
been depicted as a parasite.  However, I think it’s difficult to so given the fact that this is a case about 
money.  It’s impossible not to depict the other side as though they are improperly seeking money.  
Damon’s argument is much stronger when it comes to the In Uerrem and the In Pisonem where the 
individuals she suggests are described as parasites are not Cicero’s opponents but associates of theirs.  See 
Damon 1997: 224-234. 
11 De improbitate Sex. Aebuti.  It’s interesting to note that Cicero claims at the end of 29 that part of the 
argument he is making was devised by someone else (primum alium non me excogitasse) and that he does 
not approve of it (ne probatorem quidem esse me).  
12 Caecin. 14. 
13 Translation by Hammer, who sees this passage also as an attempt to associate Aebutius with effeminacy, 
such that he “is only as a man among women.”  Further, although he considers this passage to be an 
argument about character, he deems it comic.  See Hammer 2013: 161. 
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balancing act accusing one of Sulla’s freedmen of being in on a conspiracy to commit 
murder in 81 or 80.  Yet, it wasn’t personal for him.  Whether his client was found guilty 
or not was not important for his political future other than that the more his reputation 
rose the more cases he won.  Contrast that with his defenses of the mid to late 50s where 
he was at intense odds with Clodius and not only his reputation was at stake but his 
personal well-being.  In such a heated situation proclamations and accusations of 
character were bound to come up more frequently – the more that emotions rise in an 
argument, the more likely that invective is going to be employed. 
 Not only do the criminal cases contain more focus on character, humor plays a 
more central role in them.  The more serious the charge, the greater that role is. In such 
cases Cicero doesn’t simply have more jokes but more central jokes, jokes that seem to 
be important to his case, jokes that seem to be employed to evade much in the manner 
that Quintilian describes.  What’s more, these jokes operate in the same vein as the 
humor we discussed in chapter two: Cicero often wins because of his quick wit.  The 
wealth, appearance, and background of his client and himself may have played a role in 
his victories and losses, but wit played a role of paramount importance.  Conversely, in 
his defenses in cases involving financial misconduct – the lex Iulia de repentundis 
(TLRR no. 305)14 in the case of Rabirius and the lex Cornelia de repetundis15 for Flaccus 
– Cicero utilizes character and humor far less than he does in cases of ambitus or vis.  
 Lastly, Cicero usually begins his criminal defenses by claiming that the 
prosecution is misguided or simply wrong.  The exception to this is when he begins with 
                                                
14 Passed in 59, the law seems to have been an anti-bribery law, limiting what could be given to a governor 
abroad.  See Alexander 2002: 110. 
15 Passed in 81 during Sulla’s dictatorship.  Its seriousness was less than that of earlier de repetundis laws 
given that the punishment for it did not involve exile. Op cit.: 79. 
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a proclamation about his client’s good character, which he does in the Pro Sestio and the 
Pro Plancio.  We thus have to ask ourselves whether those speeches share anything in 
common that would account for this.  And on the surface there doesn’t appear to be 
anything substantial.  They are within two years of one another and both involve multiple 
prosecutors.  However, there are plenty of other cases in the mid 50s with multiple 
prosecutors where Cicero does not begin with character.  Also, whereas the Pro Plancio 
appears to have been motivated solely by politics, the charge against Sestius seems to 
have had some merit to it.  Vatinius supplied to the court hard evidence in the form of 
transcripts of contiones that Sestius had delivered.16  Certainly the fury with which Cicero 
attacked Vatinius could be taken as evidence that Cicero felt his testimony was 
potentially detrimental to his client.   The best explanation for their shared opening is that 
either Cicero simply felt that, for different reasons, both speeches called for opening with 
character or that Cicero was dissimulating.  Whereas two years later Pro Plancio, Cicero 
seems to have been accurate in his claim that the prosecution was merely attacking the 
pedigree of his client, he may have been pretending this was the case in the Pro Sestio.  
In other words, Cicero opens the Pro Sestio with character because he is acting as though 
that was the only thing that the accusation against his client came down to – as though 
Sestius wasn’t being charged with vis but merely said to be of questionable character and 
background.  He would therefore be attempting to manipulate the context of the case in 
the minds of the jurors.  We shall come back to this. 
 For now, let us sum up the pattern by saying that “the more serious the charge, the 
more character plays a role in the defense, and the more that character plays a role in the 
defense, the more humor that is utilized in the defense.” 
                                                





 Not surprisingly, there is little focus on the character of the defendant in the two 
extant cases Cicero took up on citizenship.17  Yet, citizenship in Rome was rarely 
considered on ad hominem bases.  These are cases where the citizenship of someone 
already assumed to be a citizen is challenged, not altogether unlike the contemporary 
American tea party challenging President Obama’s right to the presidency by claiming he 
was born abroad thus ineligible for office.18  As such, the only things to debate are family 
history, city of origin, residence, and ethnic identity.  Indeed, this is what we see in the 
Pro Balbo: a complete focus on details.19 To make the case Cicero has to argue not that 
his client is deserving of citizenship, but that he is a citizen.20  The same is true of the Pro 
Archia though character does seep in this defense given Cicero’s fondness for the arts.  
His fondness for his client can be seen in the second section of the speech when Cicero 
states “all arts which are relevant to the human condition have the same bond rooted in 
community and are connected to one another as though some kind of kin.”21  Connecting 
                                                
17 Contrast this with citizenship in the contemporary United States.  Among the requirements of U.S. Code 
§ 1427 - Requirements of Naturalization is that a person be “of good moral character, attached to the 
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the 
United States.”  According to the New York Times, the US favors immigrants who have served in the 
United States military (U.S. Military Will Offer Path to Citizenship, Feb. 14 2009).  Moreover, at least one 
Atheist was advised to join a church lest her application for naturalization be rejected (ABC News, June 
21st 2013). 
18 Most vociferously pursued by a dentist, ironically enough an immigrant herself, Orly Taitz. 
19 White (1973: 302) argues that Balbus ceased to be viewed as a citizen of his native Gades even before he 
left, thus part of Cicero’s argument is the “doctrine of incompatibility: a man cannot be in two places at the 
same time.”  Thus Cicero argues that Balbus can change civitas if he so desires. 
20 It is interesting to note, however, that character does play a role in Cicero’s defense. However, it is not 
that of his client.  The Pro Balbo contains some of Cicero’s characteristic evasion.  Barber 2004 argues that 
Cicero deliberately avoided defending the character of Balbus and instead focused on Pompey since the 
former was widely unpopular and would thus be too difficult to defend on the ground of character.  See p. 
4-10.  
21 Arch. 2: Etenim omnes artes, quae ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune uinculum, et 
quasi cognatione quadam inter se continentur.  Moreover, art itself is held up as an example of character.  
As Dugan as argued, Cicero takes the literary works of Archias and speaks of them as though they were 
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men and rooting them in community is clearly a service to the state and as such, a 
statement about character in the same fashion that Cicero elsewhere emphasizes his 
clients’ offices and military accomplishments. 
 
3.4b Financial misconduct 
 In the Pro Rabirio, character plays a small to moderate role.22  The case against 
Rabirius was related to another case, that of Gabinius, Piso’s co-consul in 58.  Gabinius, 
as proconsul in 57, was accused of leaving his assigned province of Syria to invade Egypt 
and restore Ptolemy (Ptolemy Auletes, a relative of Ptolemy II), who had been recently 
expelled by the people of Alexandria.  It was alleged that his motivation for the invasion 
of Egypt was a bribe of 10,000 talents that Ptolemy offered.  Rabirius became wrapped 
up in the affair by helping Ptolemy manage the debt that had been incurred by Ptolemy in 
his return to Alexandria.  Rabirius was charged because he was alleged to have gained 
some of the money in his capacity as an assistant to Gabinius in Syria.  Under the Lex 
Julia de Repetundis, he was liable to have that seized from him.23  However, Cicero 
claims that Rabirius had, through no fault of his own, lost the money in a loan which he 
had made to none other than Ptolemy himself. 
 It is important to note that Rabirius was only incidentally charged with a criminal 
act.  He was not guilty of extortion but of profiting from someone else who had been 
                                                                                                                                            
imagines in the household of a Roman aristocrat, thereby depicting his client as though he were the 
ancestor from an elite family and, as a result, a true Roman citizen.  See Dugan 2005: p. 40-43. 
22 Powell (183) notes that Cicero’s discussion of Rabirius’ services to the state are part of the defense 
proper rather than attestation of good character. 
23 The quo ea pecunia pervenerit clause.  See Alexander (2002: 111).  Technically, the Pro Rabirio is not a 
judicial speech since Rabirius was accused by the tribunes in front of the populus.  Nevertheless, the speech 
is a defense against criminal charges and before an audience.  The fact that it was the populus rather than 
before a quaestio might have influenced Cicero stylistically but there is no reason to assume that he would 
have fashioned his defense with regard to content.  See Mitchell 1979: 205 for more on this kind of case. 
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guilty of extortion.24  Thus, the charges against him were of a less serious nature than if 
he had been charged directly with bribery.  As a result, it should come as no surprise that 
there is less of a focus on Rabirius’s character than our other bribery case.  It is, however, 
not completely absent.  In the very beginning of the speech Cicero refers to Rabirius as a 
foolish character, thereby priming the audience to see him as too dumb to be guilty of 
anything, merely a tool of Gabinius.  Cicero mentions that the prosecution accused 
Rabirius of dressing like a Greek.  While that could be pure invective, it is just as likely 
related to the charge of benefitting from bribery, based on the Roman belief that Greeks 
were luxurious: it would make sense to a judge or juror that someone who benefitted 
from Ptolemaic largess would act Greek. 
 The speech doesn’t quite follow the pattern of our initial interpretation of the 
speeches.  Cicero doesn’t begin with a challenge to the prosecution.  Rather, he begins by 
admitting that his client trusted the wrong people and was thus somewhat to blame.  
However, this could have been the Ciceronian equivalent of the modern “insanity 
defense.”  Nevertheless, he eventually goes on to question the details of accusers’ claims 
and their interpretation of the law.  Moreover, the speech’s lack of central focus on 
character and lack of humor do meet our expectation for such a case, given that the 
charge was not particularly serious – Rabirius was only secondarily involved in extortion 
by profiting second hand from it. 
 The Pro Flacco differs from the Pro Rabirio in that Flaccus was charged directly 
with extortion, under the lex Cornelia de repetundis, as a result of his time as governor in 
Asia.  The prosecution claimed that he imposed a levy on the population to build a fleet 
and then kept the leftover money, that he extorted money from certain cities, and that he 
                                                
24 Gabinius was eventually convicted and exiled.  See Alexander 1990, case #297, p. 296. 
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had stolen gold from the Jewish community.25  Given this difference in the nature of the 
charges it is not surprising that character plays a larger role in Cicero’s defense of 
Flaccus than of Rabirius.  In fact, Cicero opens the speech by claiming his client’s 
character is beyond reproach, and character continues to play a large role in the speech, 
as we would expect given our claims about Ciceronian defenses.26  The tendency Cicero 
has to begin a speech by questioning the merits of the prosecution is not visible but that 
absence makes sense.  De repetundis cases, like ambitus cases,27 were not uncomplicated 
as most Romans profited from their time administrating provinces abroad and the line 
between extortion and reward for services rendered was not always as obvious as it was 
when in the case of Verres.  There would be less of a need as well as less of an impulse to 
take issue with a particular claim of the prosecution because the claims of the prosecution 
are not as cut and dried as they would be in cases of murder or public violence. 
 What is missing that we would expect to be present in a criminal defense with a 
moderate to large focus on character is humor.  There is a minimal amount of it.  At one 
point Cicero mocks the prosecution by claiming that whereas he had a small staff to 
investigate Verres, the current prosecution against Flaccus had an entire army – the 
implication being that, with so large a staff one could find evidence of wrongdoing 
against almost anyone.  This is certainly not the most hilarious of jokes but it is an 
instance of sarcasm.28  Cicero here is saying something that he doesn’t exactly mean; 
                                                
25 Flac. 54-66. 
26 As noted by Powell (184) who says that Flaccus’ good character was uncontested by the prosecution.  
Alexander (2002: 79) further describes the prosecution as “concentrating only on what is strictly germane 
to the charges of the case, vigorously collecting all available evidence, and disregarding the character and 
past life of the accused.”  This could, perhaps, be the result of Flaccus’ patrician background. 
27 See below. 
28 Certainly sarcasm’s primary characteristic is indignation, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be humorous as 
well.  The determining factor seems to be the level of seriousness.  Thus Witke has referred to Juvenal as a 
tragic satirist offering nothing more than pathos (Witke 1970: 113-151) because his satire is so critical and 
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everyone in the audience would know that the prosecution did not literally have an army.   
As such it was likely intended to bring about a smile but that is all.  Also, unlike much of 
Ciceronian humor, this joke is not defensive – it serves no defensive purpose in that it 
does not deflect a specific allegation.  The same can be said about his critical, and 
perhaps humorous tone, when he questions a Greek witness for the prosecution by asking 
“Where do we get that phrase ‘Testify for me and I’ll testify for you’?  Is it thought to 
come from the Gauls or the Spaniards?  No, it is so utterly Greek that even those who do 
not know the language know the Greek for this.”29  Were the suspicions he wished to cast 
on the witness not framed as questions, this could be seen as simple denigration with no 
humor attached.  However, with the sarcasm of asking whether this phrase comes from 
the Gauls or Spaniards and then the claim that everyone know’s the Greek for this, it is 
more likely that this was designed to spark at least a few laughs.  Nevertheless, with so 
little humor we cannot help but conclude that the Pro Flacco is an exception to the 
pattern we see in the rest of Cicero’s defenses. 
 
3.4c Ambitus 
 Character plays a very large role in the Pro Plancio.  Further, it resembles the Pro 
Flacco, in that despite the focus on character, the humor in Cicero’s defense doesn’t 
                                                                                                                                            
aimed at actual perceived injustices.  Contrast this with Cicero’s quip.  First of all, his claim that the 
prosecution had an army is stated within a verbal contest whereas Juvenal’s is in response to nothing but 
his perception of social ills.  That is to say, Cicero’s indignation, if we can even call it that, is limited to the 
case at hand; Juvenal’s is at society at large.  Secondly, while no one could belive Cicero’s claim that the 
opposition had an exercitus, Juvenal’s rage comes off as rear.  Contrast Cicero’s tone with the opening of 
Juvenal’s first satire (24-30): patricios omnis opibus cum prouocet unus quo tondente grauis iuueni mihi 
barba sonabat, cum pars Niliacae plebis, cum uerna Canopi Crispinus Tyrias umero reuocante lacernas 
uentilet aestiuum digitis sudantibus aurum nec sufferre queat maioris pondera gemmae, difficile est 
saturam non scriber. 
29 Translated by Rees (2011: 87).  The Latin is unde illud est: 'da mihi testimonium mutuum'? num 
Gallorum, num Hispanorum putatur? Totum istud Graecorum est, ut etiam qui Graece nesciunt hoc quibus 
uerbis a Graecis dici soleat sciant. Flac. 9-10.  Riggsby (1999: 130) notes that this is part of a larger habit 
of Cicero’s when it came to De Repetundis trials: treat the testimony of any foreign individuals as suspect. 
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appear to be consequential.30  However, unlike the Pro Flacco, there is a suitable 
explanation for this: it seems not to have been Cicero who was responsible for injecting 
character into the case.31  Contrary to the majority of Cicero’s defenses, where the 
prosecution appears to have initially stuck mostly to the the charges at hand, here the 
prosecution’s initial charges were conveyed along with some invective.32  The case 
involves a dispute between two individuals who were up for the same aedileship.  The 
loser of the election prosecuted the victor, Plancius, on a charge of ambitus.  Cicero 
makes the issue of character the central aspect of the exordium where he would normally 
challenge the prosecution’s claims and raise the stakes of case – arguing that the fate of 
the republic depends upon the outcome.  Instead, he claims that Plancius has lived the 
                                                
30 According to Corbeill 1996 (p. 7n), however, Cicero refers to the prosecution’s attempts to anticipate his 
jokes when he states in section 35 that he doesn’t mind it when people misquote him but he strongly 
dislikes it when people attribute sayings of other, unworthy men to him.  I’m not certain that the people 
mentioned are in reference to the prosecution and think it more likely that this statement stemmed from a 
larger, ongoing debate about Ciceronian tactics.  See Paterson (2004: 82), where he notes that Cicero had 
been called out similarly in his defense of C. Cispius in 56 BCE.  Nevertheless, this passage certainly 
shows how important Cicero’s reputation for wit was to him.  There is one definite piece of humor in the 
speech, a joke offered in response to an insult directed at Cicero.  Laterensis accused Cicero of going to 
Rhodes and then states “I have been” at some point.  While we don’t know where Laterensis says, Cicero 
states that he thought Laterensis was going to say “among the Vaccaei.”  Since the Vaccaei had a reputation 
for uncivilized behavior, Cicero is presenting a false choice: either he is soft and luxurious in the manner of 
the Greeks or Laterensis is a brute.  See Craig p. 140-141.  
31 Two other reasons might have played a role.  For one, Cicero was on friendly terms with the prosecutor 
and thus might have been hesitant to mock him.  Craig (p. 127) argues that Cicero deliberately avoided a 
contentio dignitatis lest it turn into a contumeliosa oratio.  For another, as Steel 2010 has suggested that 
Cicero wasn’t personally motivated to take the case and merely did so as a result of outside influence, in 
this case Caesar since Plancius was the son of one of his wealthy supporters.  She notes that Cicero uses 
“stock commonplaces, such as his description of gratitude (80-81) and discussion of rumour (56-57).”  See 
p. 43-44. 
32 Interestingly enough, Craig 2004 (194-196) argues that “in a judicial speech concerning a question of 
fact, the ad hominem attacks against the defendant must be at least plausible because their value is 
essentially probative concerning the target’s capacity for criminal behavior.”  Craig slightly revises this a 
mere page later by suggesting that invective may have been used widely outside the courts but was 
particularly successful when true.  I agree with the former but I would argue that this applies to the courts 
as well.  Just because invective that touched upon something recognized as true among the audience was 
the most effective type of invective does not mean that abuse with no substance was never employed.  This 
should hold true in a Senate contentio or in a judicial proceeding.  It may be that invective occurred more 
frequently outside the courts but to say that all or most ad hominem attacks against a defendant had to have 
some truth is to ignore the sheer amount of abuse we find Cicero employing himself and objecting to in the 
case of his opponents. 
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purest of lives, and has the most modest character, the highest amount of trustworthiness, 
self-control, piety, and integrity:  integerrimam uitam, modestissimos mores, summam 
fidem, continentiam, pietatem, and innocentiam.33  That he speaks so highly of his client 
so early in the speech makes sense given the central role his character played for the 
prosecution.  Indeed, character seems to be about the only argument of the prosecution, 
judging by the admittedly biased evidence of Cicero’s speech.  Cicero sums up by saying 
“Laterensis is asking, and doing so emphatically, how Plancius surpasses him in courage, 
praiseworthiness, and merit.”34 According to Cicero, Laterensis is arguing that Plancius is 
guilty because he is of a lesser moral character than himself.  Given the nature of the 
crime that Plancius was accused of committing, ambitus,35 it is understandable that 
character debate would predominate over facts in this case.  After all, the difference 
between gift-giving and bribery is a fine distinction, one that we ourselves have trouble 
defining today.  Instead, Cicero claims that Laterensis is operating under a false 
assumption – namely, that if someone who is worthy is passed over them, that person 
who was elected, must necessarily be condemned.36  Cicero portrays Laterensis as 
sulking from the belief that to lose an election is evidence that the people have rejected 
his worthiness and questioned his honor.  However, the more likely explanation is that, 
because Laterensis was a nobilis and Plancius eques, Laterensis thought himself more 
                                                
33 Pro Planc. 3.4-5: Quaerit enim Laterensis atque hoc uno maxime urget qua se uirtute, qua laude 
Plancius, qua dignitate superarit.  It is, of course, possible that Cicero’s emphasis on the blamelessness of 
Plancius is deliberately misleading; that the prosecution employed little invective and Cicero’s claims here 
are designed to make the audience think that it had.  However, given the prosecution’s apparent focus on 
class and Plancius’ status as a novus homo, it seems fair to assume that it, rather than Cicero, brought up 
character. 
34 Ibid 6.1-2. 
35 Cicero’s brother talks about this himself in his Commentariolum Petitionis.  Further, given the fact that 
gift-giving was such a prominent part of Roman electioneering, it was difficult to prove short of obscene 
examples of bribery.  See Mommsen 1899: 865 ff., Lintott 1990, and Fascione 2009. 
36 Pro Planc. 8.2-5: nunc tantum disputo de iure populi, qui et potest et solet non numquam dignos 
praeterire; nec, si a populo praeteritus est quem non oportuit, a iudicibus condemnandus est qui 
praeteritus non est. 
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deserving of office.  Indeed, Cicero says “you will respond, I believe, that you leaned 
upon the brilliance and antiquity of your family, and did not think it important to go 
around canvassing.37  Given that any accusation of low birth involves assertions about 
parents and ancestors, it’s no surprise that Cicero spends some time praising Plancius’s 
father, a publicanus, an easy enough thing to do considering Italians weren’t taxed; 
publicani would have been viewed favorably as bringers of revenue to Rome.  The 
accusations Laterensis made against Plancius’ father were likely mild.  Yet, some of the 
other charges lobbed against Plancius were specific enough as to present a challenge for 
Cicero. 
 Laterensis accuses Plancius of bigamy, having a mistress strictly for his lust, 
libidinis causa, raping a mime girl (mimula), and breaking a criminal out of jail.38  
Laterensis didn’t just hurl the typical invective.  He did his research, or at least came up 
with some creative accusations.  And although Cicero, of course, claims that none of 
these things happened he doesn’t attempt to disprove them with what we would consider 
conventional evidence.  He doesn’t challenge Laterensis on details, dates, or witnesses.  
He doesn’t attempt to offer an alibi for any of the charges.  The only point Cicero really 
                                                
37 Ibid. 12.7-8: respondebis, credo, te splendore et uetustate familiae fretum non ualde ambiendum putasse.  
This is an interesting statement for it implies that Plancius did “go around” on the campaign more than 
Laterensis and it links ambitus with the lower orders. 
38 ibid 30.8-31.4: Iacis adulteria, quae nemo non modo nomine sed ne suspicione quidem possit agnoscere.  
'Bimaritum' appellas, ut uerba etiam fingas, non solum crimina. Ductum esse ab eo in prouinciam aliquem 
dicis libidinis causa, quod non crimen est, sed impunitum in maledicto mendacium; raptam esse mimulam, 
quod dicitur Atinae factum a iuuentute uetere quodam in scaenicos iure maximeque oppidano. O 
adulescentiam traductam eleganter, cui quidem cum quod licuerit obiciatur, tamen id ipsum falsum 
reperiatur! Emissus aliquis e carcere.  Yonge’s translation for this is “you impute adulteries to him which 
no one can recognize, not only by having ever heard any one's name mentioned, but even by having heard a 
suspicion breathed against him. You call him twice-married, in order to invent new words, and not only 
new accusations. You say that some one was taken by him into his province to gratify his lust; but that is 
not an accusation, but a random lie, ventured on from the expectation of impunity. You say that an actress 
was ravished by him. And this is said to have happened at Atina, while he was quite young, by a sort of 
established licence of proceeding towards theatrical people, well known in all towns.  O how elegantly 
must his youth have been passed, when the only thing which is imputed to him is one that there was not 
much harm in, and when even that is found to be false. He released some one from prison illegally.” 
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contests is the alleged jailbreak, but even then he doesn’t deny it; he says that Plancius 
was merely following orders.  Interestingly, something Cicero says later in the speech 
raises suspicion that there is some truth to some of these accusations.  At the very 
beginning of section sixty-three, Cicero mentions that Cassius, the co-prosecutor, offered 
Plancius the opportunity to investigate whether he could find any vices in Laterensis.39  
While this could certainly be a bluff on the prosecutor’s part, it implies a certain amount 
of confidence, confidence which then lends credence to his claims about Plancius.  If 
Laterensis was confident that an investigation would reveal nothing suspicious in his 
character, then he must have been confident that he could find fault in Plancius.  Instead, 
Cicero ignores the matter and moves on to argue that Laterensis was misusing the Lex 
Licinia, thereby suggesting that his case lacked merit and was instigated from 
resentment.40  In many ways the Pro Plancio is an inversion of the typical Ciceronian 
defense.  Because Laterensis began without a concrete accusation (of something 
prosecutable that is), there was less a need for Cicero to shift the debate towards 
character.  To be sure, he does champion Plancius’s integrity throughout the speech.  But 
if the prosecution really did focus on character in its charge, then Cicero did not have to 
use character as a central argument against the charge.  In cases, which we shall discuss 
below, where his client is less clearly being charged for political purposes and more 
apparently being charged because of a sincere belief in his guilt Cicero relies upon 
character.  The argument in such cases is formulated around the claim that his client’s 
character is so upright he could never have been guilty of what he is charged with.  Here, 
although in the Pro Plancio character is partly present, what is also present is Cicero’s 
                                                
39 ibid. 63.1: Iubes Plancium de uitiis Laterensis dicere. 
40 The latter is 51.1-53.5.  The former is 36.2-50. 
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claim that Laterensis is merely jealous and holds an entitled outlook.  Since aspersions 
were cast upon the character of his client, Cicero did have to reply to them, but didn’t 
have to dwell on them because he could challenge Laterensis on the merits of his case.  
Thus, although an inversion, the case is in keeping with one common Ciceronian tactic: 
avoiding replying to the opposition.  Normally in his defenses Cicero begins with an 
attack upon the claims of the prosecutor.  Here, if we are to trust Cicero – and we have no 
other option than to do so – there was no substance to the prosecution’s claims and thus 
there was nothing he could reply to on that account.  The only thing he could reply to was 
the aspersions cast upon his client’s good name. 
 Like the Pro Plancio, the Pro Murena is a defense against the charge of ambitus.  
However, unlike the Pro Plancio, it begins in the traditional format – an initial denial of 
the legitimacy of the claims of the prosecution.  The form this denial takes is to claim that 
the prosecution relied primarily on personal invective,41 in which case it is curious that 
Cicero doesn’t begin the speech in the same way as the Pro Plancio and immediately 
affirm his client’s good character.42  He does, however, shortly get to this matter and 
indeed focus on it such that the speech follows the pattern we have laid out.  It begins 
with a challenge to the prosecution and then moves to a discussion of character.  Cicero 
claims that Murena was a loyal son, and that he went to Asia to perform military duties, 
                                                
41 Mur. 11.1-3: Intellego, iudices, tris totius accusationis partis fuisse, et earum unam in reprehensione 
uitae, alteram in contentione dignitatis, tertiam in criminibus ambitus esse uersatam.  Fantham suggests the 
charges were of uoluptas and luxuria given Roman opinions on Asia, citing Liv. 34.4.3.  Craig 2004 refers 
to this strategy as placing the prosecution in the position of “damned if they do and damned if they don’t.”  
See p. 194.  Regarding Cicero’s response to this criticism, his strategy is to mock one of the prosecutors, 
Sulpicius, for his preoccupation with law as opposed to soldiering or orating (23-29). 
42 Leeman remarks on the odd nature of Cicero’s opening as well but he focuses on the religious elements 
therein.  See p. 200-201, where he claims that “the normal periodic style of the prologue here assumes a 
character which recalls the style of traditional Roman prayers (carmina) within their rhythmic succession 
of cola and clusters of synonyms.” 
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not to partake in Eastern luxury.43  He even goes so far as to say that Cato himself 
couldn’t surpass Murena in worth, though he admits that Murena could not surpass Cato 
either.44  Cicero goes on to describe Murena’s military service at length as well as his 
professional accomplishments.  The speech is thus devoted to character to the near 
exclusion of everything else.  And as we have been arguing, ceteris paribus, the greater 
the focus on character, the more opportunities for humor.  Thus it should come as no 
surprise that, as noted above, Cato referred to Cicero as a “funnyman” during the 
prosecution.45  To Cato’s accusation that Murena was a dancer, Cicero offers a clever if 
not strained response.  Rather than deny the charge, Cicero claims that Cato doesn’t have 
enough evidence to prove this accusation, stating that one can’t be a dancer without also 
being a drunkard, madman, or partying feaster.  And since Cato hasn’t proven any of 
these, therefore, Murena could not possibly be a dancer.  While this argument might not 
have satisfied anyone on the jury, it at least served to present Murena as something other 
than a degenerate – he might dance but at least he doesn’t do so drunkenly or at Greek 
symposia.  It accomplishes something simply by challenging the letter but not the spirit 
of the accusation and thereby altering the debate.  Moreover, there is a lot of humor in the 
speech, as we would expect when character plays an important role.  Also, as we have 
been observing in most of his defenses, Cicero doesn’t deny the accusations in the 
                                                
43 Mur. 12.  Fantham 2013 (p. 100) sees this discussion of character as “a foundation on which Cicero will 
set out the second element of the charge, the contentio dignitatis or contest in merit.”  She further remarks 
that this next section is two-fifths of the speech and that its focus on character is an attempt to sway the jury 
from considering the facts of the matter.  I would just note that this focus on character was what allowed for 
the addition of humor to the speech.  See p. 104. 
44 Mur. 15. 
45 Plut. Cato Min. 21.  He quotes Cato in Greek as saying “ὦ ἄνδρες, ὡς γελοῖον ὕπατον ἔχοµεν” which 
seems to approach the condemning tone of Gunnery Sergeant Hartman in Stanley Kubrik’s Full Metal 
Jacket when he berates the protagonist of the film for mocking his authority during United States Marine 
Corps Recruit Training by asking “What have we got here, a fucking comedian?”  In both cases the person 
mocked denies the legitimacy of making mockery in the first place. 
 
 91 
prosecution’s invective;46 he merely makes counter claims, questions the motive of the 
prosecution, and criticizes its use of the law.   
 Further, given that Murena was not a nobilis, there is a discussion of lineage.  One 
noticeable difference between the Pro Plancio and the Pro Murena is that Cicero’s 
discussion of law is much weaker in the Pro Murena.  It is littered with what at first seem 
like irrelevant statements.  In fact sometimes it sounds as though he is merely trying to 
take up time: 
Fuit enim quidam summo ingenio uir, Zeno, cuius inventorum aemuli Stoici 
nominantur. Huius sententiae sunt et praecepta eius modi. Sapientem gratia 
numquam moueri, numquam cuiusquam delicto ignoscere; neminem 
misericordem esse nisi stultum et leuem; uiri non esse neque exorari neque 
placari; solos sapientes esse, si distortissimi sint, formosos, si mendicissimi, 
diuites, si servitutem seruiant, reges; nos autem qui sapientes non sumus fugitiuos, 
exsules, hostis, insanos denique esse dicunt; omnia peccata esse paria; omne 
delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum qui gallum gallinaceum, 
cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit; sapientem nihil opinari, 
nullius rei paenitere, nulla in re falli, sententiam mutare numquam.47  
 
For there was once a man of the greatest genius, whose name was Zeno, the 
imitators of whose example are called Stoics. His opinions and precepts are of this 
sort: that a wise man is never influenced by interest; never pardons any man's 
fault; that no one is merciful except a fool and a trifler; that it is not the part of a 
man to be moved or pacified by entreaties; that wise men, let them be ever so 
deformed, are the only beautiful men; if they be ever such beggars, they are the 
only rich men; if they be in slavery, they are kings. And as for all of us who are 
not wise men, they call away slaves, exiles, enemies, lunatics. They say that all 
offenses are equal; that every sin is an unpardonable crime; and that he does not 
commit a less crime who kills a cock if there was no need to do so, than the man 
who strangles his father. They say that a wise man never feels uncertain on any 
point never repents of anything, is never deceived in anything, and never alters his 
opinion.48 
                                                
46 In reply to the charge of Cato that Murena was a “saltator,” Cicero cleverly avoids denying it, while 
partially denying it, by claiming that Cato should have mentioned the reason why Murena danced.  He 
claims that one only dances when not sobrius or tempestiui conuiui, amoeni loci, multarum deliciarum 
comes est extrema saltatio (13.8-11).  He then states that Cato is making an unfair charge because he hasn’t 
provided evidence for any of these, implying that therefore Murena couldn’t have been seen dancing.  
Cicero further dismisses insult when in response to Cato’s claim that the Mithridatic war Murena fought in 
was basically a war fought against women, by stating that Cato’s great-grandfather fought in Asia. 
47 Mur. 61.7 - 62.1. 




What possible reason could Cicero have for listing sayings of Zeno?49  Why state that 
“The strangling of a cock when there is need is no less a fault than strangling one’s 
father?”  Cicero was trying to undermine Cato while still seeming to respect the man.50  
The way he accomplishes this is by mocking Stoicism rather than Cato himself.  Yet he 
could have simply described the tenets of Stoicism.  Instead he mentions a series of 
beliefs, all of which are actual criticism: Stoicism has contempt for anyone not perfect, 
punishes such people without restraint, considers anyone other than the wise man 
unworthy, and thinks all crimes are equal.  Yet, the examples he gives of these beliefs are 
ridiculous.  To forgive is the work of a fool and trifler, stultus et levis; even a man who is 
tremendously ugly, distortissimus,51 can be beautiful; and to kill a cock without cause is 
the same thing as patricide.  These examples are intended to evoke laughter from their 
absurdity.  The only difference between this and the usual Ciceronian humor is that it is 
being employed not as a defense against a charge but to soften up an accusation.52  
Considering no other evidence than the speech, it appears as though Murena was either 
guilty or difficult to defend.53  Cicero doesn’t seem to have a strong defense.  In fact, the 
very first remark Cicero makes regarding the charge is “you make the accusation of 
                                                
49 Van der Wal 207: 187-189 calls this passage “a daring move by putting the most orthodox Stoic dogma 
into Cato’s mouth and subsequently ridiculing it.” 
50 This is also the argument of Leeman 1982: 196. 
51 Fantham 2013 (p. 169) calls the superlative here “exceptional.”  That exceptionalism serves to make the 
example all the more preposterous and thus humorous, for how could the most deformed man be the most 
beautiful?  The adjective used is formosus, which is quite literally the opposite of distortissimus.  Cicero 
could have chosen to say pulcher or pulcherrimus, which could take on an abstract sense of excellence.  
That he didn’t suggests a deliberate attempt to poke fun at this belief.  
52 Craig 1986 recognizes the importance of humor in this passage although he sees it as more mocking than 
differential.  He argues that Cicero is merely trying to place Cato outside the mos maiorum and thereby 
make the character of his client more appealing to the jury.  Regardless, we find here humor being used in 
order to further an argument about character.  See Craig 1986: p. 231.   
53 Leeman also argues that Cicero uses humor in the speech to compensate for Murena’s probable guilt.  He 
does not explain, however, the way in which that humor operates or recognize it as a general pattern in 
Ciceronian defenses.  See p. 210. 
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ambitus; I don’t refute it”54 raising suspicion that there was some merit to the claims of 
the prosecutors.  Presumably he does consider what follows a denial of ambitus but the 
closest he gets to specifics is when he mentions seats at the circus Murena gave to his 
tribesmen.55  The only real differences between these two speeches on ambitus is that, in 
the Pro Murena, the defendant was clearly guilty or Cicero couldn’t (or didn’t want to) 
give as good of a defense to Murena as he gave to Plancius.  As a result the only thing he 
could do is fill the speech with a combination of fluff, vouches for his client’s character, 
and humor to deflect the alleged insults that the prosecution directed at his client.56  
Despite this, he won the case as he did the case against Plancius. 
   
3.4d Murder 
 In the Pro Cluentio, we find the pattern we have observed elsewhere.  Cicero 
denies the charge of murder, champions his client’s integrity, and then employs humor to 
mock the claims of the prosecution.57  Cicero begins the speech claiming that even the 
prosecution was aware there was little evidence against his client.  He states:  
Animum aduerti, iudices, omnem accusatoris orationem in duas diuisam esse 
partis, quarum altera mihi niti et magno opere confidere uidebatur inuidia iam 
inueterata iudici Iuniani, altera tantum modo consuetudinis causa timide et 
diffidenter attingere rationem uenefici criminum, qua de re lege est haec quaestio 
constituta.58 
                                                
54 Ambitum accusas; non defendo. 
55 Ibid 72-73.  Cicero’s reply to this is that there has never been a time when this wasn’t done. 
56 The humor in the speech has caused some to wonder how it is that Cicero could joke so much throughout 
the speech given the political climate of 63 - the defense was in November of that year and thus the Catiline 
conspiracy had only been unmasked one month prior - and his serious appeals at the end of the speech.  
Humbert went so far as to argue that the reason for these two tones is that what we have as one speech was 
originally two “tours de paroles.”  I see no problem with opposing tones in a single speech.  In fact, I 
expect it: given that ambitus was a serious accusation, Cicero would be more likely, ceteris paribus, to 
infuse his defense with humor.  See Humbert 1925: 119-42 for the two speech theory. 
57 Kirby 1990 claims that this is the sole function of humor, “to undermine the ethos of the prosecution” 
(73).  I would argue that it also serves to endear himself, and therefore his client, to the jury.  It further 
demonstrates a sharpness of mind that the jury is likely to interpret as evidence of superior wit. 




I noticed, judges, that the whole speech of the prosecutor was divided into two 
parts, part of which he seemed to me to be depending with great confidence upon 
the now old bias of the Junius trial, and the other part of which he seemed to make 
his argument timidly and with self-doubt on the charge of poisoning for the sake 
of custom only, for which law this court has been established. 
 
The prosecution began zealously with bias, inuidia, and ended treating the matter at hand, 
the accusation of poisoning.  Thus, even if Cicero is accurately describing the 
prosecutor’s speech, he admits that the second half of the speech was centered around the 
facts.  And while Cicero claims he is going to follow the same approach, he immediately 
brings in character.  He gives a narrative of events, to be sure, but throughout he 
demonizes the prosecutor, Oppianicus, accusing him of committing crimes himself.  
Further, he spends far greater time detailing these supposed crimes of Oppianicus than 
offering an alternative narrative from that of the prosecution.  He ends the speech with a 
peroration that hardly mentions Cluentius, instead focusing on Oppianicus, whom he 
addresses as a “wicked man,” homo nefarius.59 
 But perhaps the greatest character study in the Pro Cluentio is Sassia, the mother 
of Cluentius.  Sassia is painted by Cicero as the antithesis of everything motherly.  He 
claims that she fell in love with her daughter’s husband, forced her to divorce him, and 
then married him herself.  Throughout the speech she is seen as a master manipulator, 
intent on destroying her own son.  Cicero describes her journey from Larinum to Rome: 
Iam uero quod iter Romam eius mulieris fuisse existimatis? quod ego propter 
uicinitatem Aquinatium et Fabraternorum ex multis audiui et comperi; quos 
concursus in his oppidis, quantos et uirorum et mulierum gemitus esse factos? 
Mulierem quandam Larino aduolare, usque a mari supero Romam proficisci cum 
magno comitatu et pecunia quo facilius circumuenire iudicio capitis atque 
opprimere filium posset? Nemo erat illorum, paene dicam, quin expiandum illum 
locum esse arbitraretur quacumque illa iter fecisset, nemo quin terram ipsam 
                                                
59 Ibid. 201.4-5. 
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uiolari quae mater est omnium uestigiis consceleratae matris putaret. Itaque nullo 
in oppido consistendi potestas ei fuit, nemo ex tot hospitibus inuentus est qui non 
contagionem aspectus fugeret; nocti se potius ac solitudini quam ulli aut urbi aut 
hospiti committebat.60 
 
What do you think about this woman’s journey to Rome?  I’ve heard and 
discovered from many, because I live in the vicinity of Aquinum and Fabrateria;  
how many groans of men and women were stirred among these towns?  That a 
woman from Larinum would fly down along the coast to set out for Rome with a 
great crowd and money in order to that she might be able to cirvumvent justice 
more easily and oppress her son. There was not one of all those people (I may 
almost say) who did not think that every place required purifying, by which she 
had passed on her journey; no one who did not think the very earth itself, the 
common mother of us all, polluted by the footsteps of that wicked mother. 
Accordingly, she could not stay long in any city; of all that number of people, 
who might have been her entertainers, not one was found who did not flee from 
the contagion of her sight. She trusted herself to night and solitude, rather than to 
any city or to any host. 
 
This is dripping with humor.  She is such a vile creature that she creates a circus 
wherever she goes.  And wheresoever she sets foot subsequently requires ritual cleansing.  
The earth itself, our “common mother,” was polluted by this wretch of a mother.  
Similarly, her husband, whom Cluentius was accused of falsely prosecuting by bribing 
the jury, is the object of much scorn.  He is constantly referred to, sarcastically, as “that 
innocent of ours, Oppianicus” or “the singularly innocent Oppianicus.”61 
 In one particularly famous passage Cicero succeeds at thoroughly ridiculing 
Bulbus by describing him in a culinary context: 
Itaque, ut erat semper praeposterus atque peruersus, initium facit a Bulbo et eum, 
quod iam diu nihil quaesierat, tristem atque oscitantem leuiter impellit. 'quid tu?' 
inquit 'ecquid me adiuuas, Bulbe, ne gratiis rei publicae seruiamus?' ille uero 
simul atque hoc audiuit 'ne gratiis': 'quo uoles' inquit 'sequar; sed quid adfers?' 
tum ei quadraginta milia, si esset absolutus Oppianicus, pollicetur et eum ut 
                                                
60 Ibid. 192-193.  Kirby describes this passage as “mock-seriousness” and tongue in cheek (p. 71).  
However, I would argue that it is much more than that.  The images of the population of entire towns 
coming out to see this woman and the communal effort required to clean up after her is too absurd and 
insulting not to provoke laughter. 
61 Ibid. 76: illum vestrum innocentem Oppianicum and Clu. 108: innocentiam Oppianici singularem. 
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ceteros appellet quibuscum loqui consuesset rogat atque etiam ipse conditor totius 
negoti Guttam aspergit huic Bulbo.62 
 
Therefore, as he had always been a blundering and a perverse fellow, he begins 
with Bulbus, and finding him sulky and yawning because he had got nothing for a 
long time, he gives him a gentle spur. “What will you do,” says he, “will you help 
me, O Bulbus, so that we need not serve the republic for nothing?” But he, as 
soon as he heard this—“For nothing,” said he, “I will follow whenever you like. 
But what have you got?” Then he promises him forty thousand sesterces if 
Oppianicus is acquitted. And he begs him to summon the rest of those with whom 
he is accustomed to converse, and he, the contriver of the whole business, adds 
Gutta to Bulbus.63 
 
As described by Ramsay Cicero is referring to two members of the jury, Gutta and 
Bulbus, and he puns on their names.  A gutta is a vessel for oils, vinegar, or sauces; bulba 
is an onion or similar allium; conditor refers to the seasoning.  Therefore the meaning is 
that Gutta has “cooked up the whole plot” and “sprinkled a little sauce over Bulbus” and 
as a result Bulbus “having been thus seasoned appeared by no means harsh in flavour to 
those who had tasted and swallowed a little bit of hope from his discourse.”64  Not only is 
this a set of clever puns but it is directed at the jury.  Given the fact that Cicero is making 
fun of the names of jurors while he is addressing them, there can be little doubt that this 
is intended to elicit laughter in addition to casting doubt on the narrative of the 
prosecution.  Moreover, that laughter, in that it is challenging the prosecution, is serving 
the purpose we’ve been seeing elsewhere: silencing the opposition.  It is to be admitted, 
however, that this is not in response to a specific charge against him or his client.   If 
Cicero is justified in his claim that Bulbus and Gutta were in collusion, then what he says 
is technically a response, but it is not a play on their words.  It is merely a play on their 
                                                
62 Ibid. 71. 
63 Yonge 1856. 
64 Ramsay 1869: p. 184.  As noted by Ramsay, those who had tasted or swallowed refers to the jurors to 
whom he had communicated.  Fausset 1887 (131-132) points out that in Petronius’s dinner scene at Pet. 
Sat. 33 the onion comes at the end; therefore those who took a bite of Bulbus were doing so too soon or 
putting “the cart ahead of the horse” as Kirby says (74). 
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names and doesn’t necessarily bear any relation to anything the prosecution said, so far as 
we know.  
 Cicero’s defense of Gaius Rabirius on a murder charge also follows the pattern 
we expect.  As in the Pro Cluentio, the focus on character is directed more at the 
prosecution than at his client.  The case was unusual in that it addressed the murder of 
Saturninus which happened thirty-six years earlier.  As could be suspected in such a case, 
the prosecution’s motivation was both personal and political: Caesar was currently trying 
to weaken the Senate, and the prosecutor was the nephew of Saturninus’s associates.  The 
speech is interesting in that Cicero claims that he was being limited to thirty minutes to 
deliver it, which tells us that he was likely unable to talk about everything he wanted.65  
What we have, then, is what he likely considered to be the most important aspects in his 
defense.  
 Cicero opens the speech by asserting that it concerns much more than a case of 
accusing one senator of murder.  Rather, he claims, that the prosecution was a direct 
attack on the Senate itself.  The issue of character seems to have been brought up first by 
the prosecution, which, according to Cicero, claimed Rabirius didn’t spare his own 
chastity or that of others.66  He then jokes that the reason his time has been curtailed is 
that the prosecution is afraid he might talk too much about chastity – thereby intimating 
that the prosecutor is even more guilty of such behavior.67  He further jokes that while his 
                                                
65 Indeed, Craig points out that the prosecution’s attacks on the character of Rabirius were deliberately 
made in order to take up time: the more charges they made against him, the greater the list of replies he 
must make and therefore, the less time he could spend on each.  See Craig 2004: p. 183. 
66 3.8: hunc nec suae nec alienae pudicitiae pepercisse. 




client did not murder Saturninus, he wished he had so that he could brag about it.68  
Cicero goes on to admit that his client took up arms against Saturninus but claims that it 
was lawful to do so and consequently, killing him must have been lawful too.69  In so 
doing he slights the prosecutor, Labienus, in a witty remark upon Labienus’ claim that his 
uncle was with Saturninus on the Capitol and died with them there.  To this Cicero states 
that “no one has ever admitted such a thing: no one had been found so cast out by society, 
so abandoned, so bereft of common decent feeling, nay, of any pretense to such feeling, 
as to admit that he was in the Capitol with Saturninus.”70  These two witticisms – about 
the chastity of the prosecution and Labienus’ boast about his uncle – are in response to 
central claims of the prosecution: that Rabirius was had a questionable character and that 
the murder was committed in the open, in front of others.  That the prosecution may have 
been personally or politically motivated is beside the point.   These two specific claims 
were relevant and Cicero’s dismissal of them by jokingly mocking the one who made 
them only illustrates how important they were.  Despite this, the humor he uses to dismiss 
them is remarkably effective.  Again, a lack of denial and counterstrike is an incredibly 
powerful tool in sidestepping a serious accusation.  The text breaks off soon thereafter so 
it’s difficult to say whether the humor continued.  But, there is every indication that it did 
given that there is nothing substantive in what follows, especially given the fact that this 
was such a belated trial.  Instead, Cicero continues to denigrate Saturninus and claim that 
                                                
68 6.18: Utinam hanc mihi facultatem causa concederet ut possem hoc praedicare, C. Rabiri manu L. 
Saturninum, hostem populi Romani, interfectum!  Interestingly, right after saying this Cicero states that 
there was an outcry as a result of his words, to which he responds bizarrely that he is comforted, 
consulatus, that there are many inexperienced citizens: nihil me clamor iste commouet sed consolatur, cum 
indicat esse quosdam ciuis imperitos sed non multos. 
69 6.19: Si arma iure sumpta concedis, interfectum iure concedas necesse est. 
70 8.23: Neminem umquam adhuc de se esse confessum; nemo est, inquam, inuentus tam profligatus, tam 
perditus, tam ab omni non modo honestate sed etiam simulatione honestatis relictus, qui se in Capitolio 
fuisse cum Saturnino fateretur. 
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Rome should be thankful for the actions undertaken by Rabirius and those who stormed 
the Capitol. 
 
3.4e Public Violence. 
 In the Pro Sulla there is much discussion of character, both Cicero’s and his 
client’s, along with a moderate amount humor – particularly when Cicero is replying to a 
charge made against him personally.  And most of the speech is just that, a response to 
charges against him rather than his client.  Indeed, since the case involved the charge of 
both ambitus and vis relating to the Catilinarian conspiracy, it is not surprising that 
Cicero himself plays as large role in the case, if not a greater role, than his client.  The 
prosecutor in the case, Lucius Manlius Torquatus, apparently abused Cicero as much as 
the accused.71  Since Cicero had acquired a reputation for his harsh treatment of 
conspirators, the prosecution found it useful to criticize both Cicero himself and his 
decision to defend Sulla.  As a result, a good portion of the speech is devoted not to 
Cicero’s defense of Sulla but to Cicero’s defense of himself.  Cicero opens the speech by 
explaining why he has taken on the case, since he states that Torquatus claimed that he 
had never before defended someone associated with the Catilinarian conspiracy.72  To 
this end Cicero tries to distinguish Sulla from other individuals that Cicero prosecuted for 
their participation in the conspiracy.  He claims that Sulla only tried to challenge the 
court himself, based on his own reputation, but that Autronius gathered together 
                                                
71 Drummond (1999: 297-298) expresses confusion over such a tactic and attributes it to the innocence of 
Sulla and/or the “folly of youth.”  Yet, Craig (1993: 91) earlier offered a very reasonable explanation to 
this.  Namely that it was a result of Torquatus’ position relative to the defense.  Since he was “faced with a 
patronus who was himself the strongest witness for the defense, it fell to Torquatus to discredit this witness 
as best he could.” 
72 Sulla was prosecuted under the lex Plautia de vi.  See Lintott 1999: 116, who argues that it only involved 
cases of violence against individuals, as opposed to violence against the state. 
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gladiators and runaway slaves to riot.73  To Torquatus’ charge that Cicero is tyrannical 
and a foreigner, Cicero remarks flippantly that he can’t be both since there has never been 
a foreign consul.74  And later he claims that Torquatus ought to look in his own family 
tree if he is trying to find tyrants.75  He further jokes that since the pool of political 
offices has shrunk due to new men like Cicero himself, if Torquatus should find himself 
in a race with a fellow patrician he should take care not to call him a foreigner 
accidentally lest he lose the support of the very people he is now criticizing.76  All of 
these examples are classic Ciceronian evasions: an avoidance of denials, and a reshaping 
the charges to use against the prosecution.  What’s more they are clearly face saving to 
some of the most common accusations against Cicero – that he aspired to regnum and 
that he was merely a parochial equestrian.  Even when Cicero eventually begins talking 
about Sulla, as he does at 72, shortly thereafter he switches back to himself at 83 and 
doesn’t resume with Sulla until 89.  It’s possible that he felt this was necessary in his 
defense of Sulla.  It’s also possible that his vanity prompted him to talk about himself so 
much.  However, Cicero might have been focusing on himself deliberately in order to 
                                                
73 Gladiatorum ac fugitiuorum tumultu.  According to Craig, Cicero makes use of the dilemma in 
differentiating his testimony against Autronius and defense of Sulla by claiming that he himself can only be 
either untrustworthy in everything or completely trustworthy in everything (1993: p. 93). 
74 Craig interprets the accusation of regnum to be a deliberate mischaracterization of the prosecution’s 
argument, with the real claim of Torquatus being that Cicero is defending a guilty man and he is thus a 
hypocrite for doing so.  Ibid 94.  In this case, Cicero’s words at the end of this section on kingship are 
interesting.  He says, according to Craig’s translation, “If you think that this is tyrannical, then I admit that I 
am a tyrant; but if my despotic power, my tyranny, if some overbearing or arrogant utterance angers you, 
why do you not produce this rather than a prejudicial phrase and abusive slander?”  Thus, Cicero has 
twisted a legitimate argument into slander and then turned around to ask why he doesn’t make a legitimate 
argument.   See p. 96. 
75 27: Si quaeris qui sint Romae regnum occupare conati, ut ne replices annalium memoriam, ex domesticis 
imaginibus inuenies. 
76 24: quorum caue tu quemquam peregrinum appelles, ne peregrinorum suffragiis obruare.  The irony 
here is that peregrini could not vote. 
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avoid talking about Sulla because he found it easier to defend himself than someone who 
clearly had some small role in the conspiracy.77 
 Only near the end of the speech does Cicero address the character of his client, 
something that even he remarks upon.78  In fact, Cicero goes so far as to claim that 
character is the most important consideration when charges against someone are 
serious.79  And, of course, he claims that Sulla’s character is admirable, though he 
justifies his earlier conviction for ambitus by the remorse that he claims Sulla 
demonstrated after he was found guilty; in fact, he claims that he practically exiled 
himself.80  Yet, among all his protestations of his client’s good character, there is little of 
the humor related to it that, ceteris paribus, we would expect to find.  The reason that all 
of the humor in this speech occurs when Cicero is discussing himself is obviously that 
Cicero’s inconsistency in prosecuting Catilinarians was a central aspect to the 
prosecution.81  Moreover, when it comes to the defense of his client (rather than himself) 
he relies on a call to pathos, where humor would be counterproductive.  He describes 
Sulla’s young son as present at the trial and tells the jury that the boy is begging them to 
allow him to congratulate his father.  He claims that Sulla will accept any punishment the 
jury should choose and he refers frequently to Sulla as tearful and saddened.82  In such a 
pathetic depiction of his client, there is no room for humor.  However, as previously 
                                                
77 Cicero mentions in the speech that Sulla’s name was mentioned in the letters intercepted by the Gauls in 
§36. 
78 69: Iam enim faciam criminibus omnibus fere dissolutis, contra atque in ceteris causis fieri solet, ut nunc 
denique de uita hominis ac de moribus dicam.  He also admits that he is moving on even though he has not 
answered all the charges.  Berry 1996 (p. 274) suggests that this is an attempt to “keep the jury in a state of 
expectation.” 
79 Ibid: Omnibus in rebus, iudices, quae grauiores majoresque sunt, quid quisque uoluerit, cogitarit, 
admiserit, non ex crimine, sed ex moribus eius qui arguitur est ponderandum. 
80 74 ipse se exsilio paene multauit. 
81 Patterson sees raising the issue of the Catiline Conspiracy as absolutely necessitating Cicero’s focus on 
himself; that Cicero wasn’t merely trying to prove he had lentitas and misericordia for the sake of his own 
reputation but because successfully defending his client required it.  See Patterson 2004: 89-90. 
82 Sections 89-91. 
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observed, this case is in many ways more about Cicero than about Sulla.  Seen in that 
light, it follows our pattern: Cicero challenges the prosecution and champions his own 
character, using humor to dismiss the claims of the prosecution. 
 The Pro Caelio also follows this same pattern.  Caelius was charged with vis and 
Cicero uses character to contest that charge.  He also uses humor on a number of 
occasions to deflect criticism of his client, and this humor is instigated by discussions of 
character.  Moreover, he had to restrict himself largely to the character of his client 
because the prosecutor was of such a young age that Cicero could not abuse him as much 
as he normally would and not risk coming off as abusive; he thus focuses on the character 
of Caelius.83 The prosecution surely attacked Caelius’ morals and given his alleged affair 
with Clodia, if we are to take Catullan poetry to have some basis in historical fact,84 it’s 
hard not to think there could be some basis for such attacks.  Yet, Cicero brilliantly 
brushes off this criticism in one stroke: 
Nam quod obiectum est de pudicitia quodque omnium accusatorum non 
criminibus sed uocibus maledictisque celebratum est, id nam quod obiectum est 
de pudicitia quodque omnium accusatorum non criminibus sed uocibus 
maledictisque celebratum est, id numquam tam acerbe feret M. Caelius ut eum 
paeniteat non deformem esse natum. Sunt enim ista maledicta peruolgata in omnis 
quorum in adulescentia forma et species fuit liberalis. Sed aliud est male dicere, 
aliud accusare.  Accusatio crimen desiderat, rem ut definiat, hominem notet, 
argumento probet, teste confirmet; maledictio autem nihil habet propositi praeter 
contumeliam; quae si petulantius iactatur, conuicium, si facetius, urbanitas 
nominatur.85 
 
                                                
83 Assuming St. Jerome was accurate in his claim that the prosecutor was seventeen (Chron. II 143g 
Schoene).  The age of L. Sempronius Atratinus is one of the reasons David argues that prosecutors received 
the rank of those they successfully prosecuted.  Yet the role of Clodia in instigating the prosecution and the 
risks that such a young man would have to be willing to take seem to mitigate that a little - a middle aged 
man risks less in going after a superior rank since half his life is behind him.  See Dorey 1958, Cavarzere 
2008, and Valverde Abril 2009 for the connection between the three lovers. 
84 Cat. 58 and 77.  Stroh argues that Cicero made up the affair in order to raise questions about the 
reliability of Clodia as a witness for the prosecution.  See p. 269-273. 
85 Cael. 6.5-10.  As Austin (p. 51) points out, Gellius (xvii. I) cites this passage as an example of what he 
thought was great prose but which others criticized.  
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For as to the attacks which have been made on him on the score of chastity, which 
has been harped upon by all the accusers, not by regular charges, but by outcry 
and abuse; Marcus Caelius will never be indignant at that, so far as to repent of 
not being ugly. For those sort of reproaches are habitually heaped upon every one, 
whose person and appearance in youth is at all gentlemanly. But to vituperate is 
one thing, and to accuse is another.  An accusation requires a crime in order to 
define the matter, to bind the man, to prove its charges by argument, and to 
confirm them by witnesses.  But vituperation has no settled object except insult 
and if any one is attacked in that way with ill-temper it is called abuse; but if it is 
done with some sort of wit and mirth, it is then styled bantering.86 
 
In this quote we see denial, humor and counterattack all at once.  Caelius attracts insults 
from others because he is so good looking.  But how can he be blamed for his looks?  
And he is such a great guy that he doesn’t even take the abuse badly.  To top it all off, 
Cicero, the man who later accused Antony of having tried as a child prostitute to marry 
his pimp,87 thinks this abuse goes too far and calls it defamation, maledictio, which has 
no point other than insult (nihil habet propositi praeter contumeliam), rather than an 
accusation.   
 Another defense that Cicero employs to ward off criticism of Caelius’s character 
is to depict it as all the fault of Clodia.  In classic fashion, he takes references to 
debauchery, affairs, misconduct, Baiae trips, parties, feasts, revels, concerts, music 
parties, and sailing and asks Clodia whether she is going to disprove such slander against 
her.88 
                                                
86 C. D. Yonge, 1903. 
87 Phil. 2.44. 
88 Cael. 35: Accusatores quidem libidines, amores, adulteria, Baias, actas, conuiuia, comissationes, cantus, 
symphonias, nauigia.  As Craig has noted, Cicero goes on to confront the jury with a false choice, a 
dilemma, when he says, speaking to the prosecution (Craig’s translation) “And since in some mad and 
reckless frame of mind you have decided that these matters should be brought into the Forum and into this 
court, you must either disprove them, and show that they are false, or else you must confess that neither 
your accusation nor your evidence is to be believed.  See Craig p. 111.  Powell and Patterson 2004 also 
acknowledge the power of the dilemma in confronting Clodia, citing section 53 where Cicero claims that 
either she and Caelius were intimate and he told her what he wanted money from her for, or they weren’t 
intimate and he didn’t tell her.  They say Cicero viewed this tactic as “an invincible form of argument” and 
note how well it served him in other cases.  See p. 49.  Seager (2011: 103-105) argues that in presenting 
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 The Pro Caelio has a moderate amount of character discussion but its humor is so 
abundant that scholars have suggested it was modeled on New Comedy.89  Most mentions 
of character are in regards to Clodius and Clodia, but so too the humor.90  Geffcken has 
argued that it displays a comic cast of characters: Caelius is the naive adulescens, Clodius 
the pimp, Clodia the prostitute and a female miles gloriosus at once, and Herennius the 
“Catonic Puritan carrying his gravitas to absurdity.”91  All this serves to make Caelius 
out to be the unwitting victim of others.  Granted, he may have lost control and fallen for 
a meretrix, but he was being manipulating by larger comic forces that he couldn’t control. 
 Moreover, Cicero consistently drops one liners directed at Clodius and Clodia.  Of 
the two he says: 
Quod quidem facerem uehementius, nisi intercederent mihi inimicitiae cum istius 
mulieris uiro — fratrem uolui dicere; semper hic erro. nunc agam modice nec 
longius progrediar quam me mea fides et causa ipsa coget: nec enim muliebris 
umquam inimicitias mihi gerendas putaui, praesertim cum ea quam omnes semper 
amicam omnium potius quam cuiusquam inimicam putauerunt.92 
 
And, indeed, I would do so still more vigorously, if I had not a quarrel with that 
woman's husband—brother, I meant to say; I am always making this mistake. At 
present I will proceed with moderation, and go no further than my own duty to my 
client and the nature of the cause which I am pleading compels me. For I have 
                                                                                                                                            
this dilemma without pointing the jury in one direction or the other Cicero is making a greater attempt to 
harm Clodia than protect Caelius since one of the two options would clearly be better for him, namely that 
he did not tell her anything. 
89 In fact, Craig argues that the nine dilemmas in the speech serve to prevent the speech from being 
overwhelmed by its comic elements.  Ibid p. 121. 
90 The only real praise that Cicero offers for Caelius is that he had conducted past, important prosecutions 
in the interest of the Republic, against a certain Gaius Antonius and a certain Lucius Calpurnius.  See 
Burnand 2004: 280-281 for how Cicero is purposefully depicting Caelius as a young Cicero who will 
undoubtedly be of great service to the state in the near future. 
91 Geffcken 1977: 44.  Riggsby (1999: 101) would add to the humorous elements of the speech Cicero’s 
prosopopoeia of Appius Claudius Caecus (33-34) and the “battle of the baths” (61-67).  While the former 
may indeed have brought forth smiles, the latter must have induced hearty laughter.  Cicero describes men 
lying in wait in the baths only to jump out all at once in almost choreographed fashion upon the arrival of 
Licinius (repente evolasse istos praeclaros testis sine nomine and tempore igitur ipso se ostenderunt, cum 
Licinius uenisset, pyxidem expediret, manum porrigeret, uenenum traderet).  Indeed, Cicero describes the 
scene has just depicted as more a buffoonery than comedy (mimi ergo iam exitus, non fabulae). 
92 Cael. 32.  Austin suggests that Cicero’s use of amicam could be a reference to the story that Clodia had 
wanted to marry him, but this is taking the passage too literally.  The passage is quite clearly speaking of 
Clodia’s sexual relationships.  Amicam is merely a euphemism for meretricem or worse, scortum. See p. 90. 
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never thought it my duty to engage in quarrels with any woman, especially with 
one whom all men have always considered everybody’s lady-friend rather than 
anyone's enemy.93 
 
Clodius is guilty of incest and everyone has had sex with Clodia.94  The reprehensio of  
“I am always making this mistake” reinforces the levity of his words.  By stating this 
Cicero moves from outright abuse to humorous teasing.  Thus Cicero avoids the charge 
of maledictio.95  Later Cicero refers to Clodia as the Palatine Medea,96 a particularly 
clever retort to the prosecution’s addressing Caelius as a pretty Jason, pulchellum 
Iasonem.97   The pattern laid out in the analysis above is evident here.  First Cicero denies 
that the prosecution has a legitimate charge and he equates that charge with an attack 
upon his client’s character which he then defends: for to claim that his client committed 
vis is to besmirch his character, and that character is unquestionable.  In so doing, he 
avoids denying the charges of the prosecution either by explaining them away, as in the 
case of Caelius’ good looks, or by turning to mockery to cast doubt upon the 
trustworthiness of the prosecution.  There are few instances where Cicero twists the 
words of the prosecution to use against itself; however, as we see in other cases involving 
Clodius, this is not unsurprising given the intense animosity Cicero had against him – it’s 
hard to make jokes about your mortal enemy. 
                                                
93 Clark 1908. 
94 See Geffcken 1977: 35-36 for her discussion of the passage 
95 He had just argued above (6.8-10) that there is a difference between abuse and abuse sprinkled with wit, 
the latter of which is permissible and he deems urbanitas. 
96 6: Palatinam Medeam. 
97 Münzer (Pauly-Wissova, Realencyclopädie iii, cols. 1266 ff. (s.v. Caelius, no. 35) argues that if Caelius 
is Jason, then his accuser, Clodia, would actually be Pelias, who attempted to ruin Jason.  Austen (1988: 
69) suggests that Atratinus had said that “Caelius had won his golden fleece and kept it” citing 30.13 where 
Cicero says aurum sumptum a Clodia. 
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 The Pro Sestio, another case where Cicero’s client was charged with vis, is also 
filled with discussions of character and humorous abuse of Clodius.98  However, Cicero 
shared defense duties with three other advocates and given that his specifically assigned 
role was to promote Sestius’s character, the rest of the defense likely involved tactics 
beyond the programatic pattern for which we have been arguing.  We cannot, thus, draw 
conclusions about Cicero’s motive in his use of character.  We cannot, for instance, know 
whether character and humor were the main components of the defense and Cicero’s 
speech was simply the coup de grâce, or whether character arguments were merely minor 
finishing touches.  Nonetheless, we can still consider to what extent humor is dependent 
upon character in the speech.  We will find that it is that it is a great deal dependent. 
 Admittedly, some of the humor seems designed only to elicit a quick laugh.  
Cicero describes Clodius at one point as “that Tribune of the plebs [who] enjoyed great 
success in setting the commonwealth on its head, not through his own muscle – for what 
sort of muscle could a man have whose way of life had left him enervated from 
debauching his brother, having sex with his sister, and engaging in every unprecedented 
form of lust?”99  The mention of vile sex acts alleged to have been done by one of the 
most prominent men in Rome was guaranteed to generate of few laughs.  However, there 
may be more to this characterization than garnering easy laughs.  Cicero describes 
Clodius as debauching his brother but merely having sex with his sister.  He is said to 
have carried out a flagitium, a shameful act, on his brother, and been guilty of a stuprum, 
fornication, with his sister.  It’s possible the reason the act with the brother is described as 
                                                
98 Although, as Steel has noticed, Cicero does not name Clodius once.  He merely uses adjectives derived 
from it and then only in the second half of the speech.  See Steel 2007: 122. 
99 Sest. 16: is qui tribunus plebis felix in euertenda re publica fuit nullis suis neruis—qui enim in eius modi 
uita nerui esse potuerunt hominis fraternis flagitiis, sororiis stupris.  See Kaster 2006 ad loc. 
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more heinous is because sex between brothers was considered worse than between 
brother and sister, but it’s also possible this difference in description is an insult towards 
Clodia.  Whereas a flagitium was something horribly shameful a stuprum was just illicit 
sex, such as with prostitute.100  Cicero may very well not only be insulting Clodia by 
associating her with prostitution, but additionally mocking her by implying that this was 
to be expected.  In other words, Cicero tells the audience that sex between brothers is an 
outrage but he doesn’t need to tell the audience that sex with Clodia is an outrage – it’s 
insulting enough in its own right. 
 When speaking of Clodius’ allies, Gabinius and Piso, Cicero depicts the former as 
“dripping with perfumed oils, his hair crimped and curled, despising his accomplices in 
lust and the old despoilers of his oh-so-delicate boyhood, puffed up with conceit in the 
face of the usurers who hang about the ‘Well-Head’.”101  The vividness with which 
Gabinius is described here is satirical, from the oils to the curled hair and the mocking 
diminutive aetatula, tender age.  Later Cicero describes Gabinius emerging from 
“shadowy brothel orgies, undone by drink, gambling, whoring, and adultery after being 
raised to the highest rank — against all expectation and thanks to others’ resources — 
when in his drunken state not only could he not face the threatening storm, he could not 
even stand the unaccustomed sight of daylight.”102   The humor of the image of a drunk 
man stumbling out of a brothel into sunlight that he can’t handle is obvious.  And it is 
                                                
100 See Fantham 1991. 
101 Kaster (2006: 158) notes that the Well Head was a meeting spot for parties involved in litigation.  Sest. 
18.3: alter unguentis adfluens, calamistrata coma, despiciens conscios stuprorum ac ueteres uexatores 
aetatulae suae, puteali et faeneratorum gregibus inflatus. 
102 Kaster (2006: 50).  Sest. 20.11-16: subito ex diuturnis tenebris lustrorum ac stuprorum, uino, ganeis, 
lenociniis adulteriisque confectum? cum is praeter spem in altissimo gradu alienis opibus positus esset, qui 
non modo tempestatem impendentem intueri temulentus, sed ne lucem quidem insolitam aspicere posset.   
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directed against Sestius’s enemies.  Of the other in the pair, Piso, Cicero also uses strong 
sarcasm but with opposing claims, stating: 
Alter, o di boni, quam taeter incedebat, quam truculentus, quam terribilis aspectu! 
unum aliquem te ex barbatis illis, exemplum imperi ueteris, imaginem 
antiquitatis, columen rei publicae diceres intueri. uestitus aspere nostra hac 
purpura plebeia ac paene fusca, capillo ita horrido ut Capua, in qua ipsa tum 
imaginis ornandae causa duumuiratum gerebat, Seplasiam sublaturus uideretur. 
nam quid ego de supercilio dicam, quod tum hominibus non supercilium, sed 
pignus rei publicae uidebatur?103 
 
The other, O ye good gods! how horrible was his approach, how savage, how 
terrible was he to look at! You would say that you were beholding some one of 
those bearded men,—an example of the old empire, an image of antiquity, a prop 
of the republic. His garments were rough, made of this purple worn by the 
common people you see around us, nearly brown; his hair so rough that at Capua, 
in which he, for the sake of becoming entitled to have an image of himself, was 
exercising the authority of a decemvir, it seemed as if he would require the whole 
Seplasia to make it decent. Why need I speak of his eyebrow, which at that time 
did not seem to men to be an ordinary brow, but a pledge of the safety of the 
republic.104 
 
Whereas Gabinius is a caricature of the effeminate male, Piso is so much the opposite 
that he arouses suspicion.  This polarity is what makes them at once both jokes and 
dangerous to the Republic: they lie too far from the norm to be trusted. 
 Although Cicero continues to mock Clodius, Gabinius, and Piso in strong 
language, they are not the only objects of his abuse.  In describing what the prosecution 
was arguing had to be done to Sestius, Cicero says: 
Et cohortari ausus est accusator in hac causa uos, iudices, ut aliquando essetis 
seueri, aliquando medicinam adhiberetis rei publicae. Non ea est medicina, cum 
sanae parti corporis scalpellum adhibetur atque integrae, carnificina est ista et 
crudelitas: ei medentur rei publicae qui exsecant pestem aliquam tamquam 
strumam ciuitatis.105 
 
                                                
103 Sest. 19. 
104 Younge 1891, with corrections. 
105 Sest. 135. 
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Now the prosecutor has dared to urge you, judges, to ‘at long last be stern’, and 
‘at long last apply a cure to the commonwealth’.  It is not a cure when the scalpel 
is applied to a part of the body that is healthy and whole, it is cruel butchery: the 
people who cure the commonwealth are those who cut out a plague on the civil 
community as though it were a scrofula.106 
 
According to Cicero the prosecution has described Sestius as a disease that must be 
struck from the state for it to be healthy.  Cicero turns that argument around, claiming 
that Sestius is not the disease but part of the healthy body and that to take the knife to that 
part would be cruel; that what needs to be cut out is the goiter, which we are told Vatinius 
had on his neck.107  As a defensive strategy, this is a brilliant move.  Cicero doesn’t 
dispute that there is a disease ravaging the citizen body; he merely substitutes Vatinius 
for his client as the diseased part to be excised.  Since Vatinius had a goiter and Sestius 
was presumably healthy, the accusation sticks.  The barb also works because it is funny.  
Cicero doesn’t mention Vatinius’s name; he merely refers to a destructive physical 
characteristic for which he was known.  The statement is in reaction to a claim of the 
prosecution; it is indirect and thus less likely to cause offense; and it is unexpected in that 
Cicero was able to turn an analogy into a reality.  To say that Sestius was like a disease is 
obviously a comparison, but when Cicero then says the disease is not Sestius but the 
conspicuous medical condition of a person who himself is dangerous to the state, Cicero 
seems to agree with part of the claim only to reveal at the end of the sentence that he’s 
referring to someone else.  Indeed, the word for goiter, struma, is the second to last word 
in the sentence. 
 Although we can not know how early character was brought up in the defense 
given that we don’t have the first three speeches of that defense (for Cicero spoke fourth), 
                                                
106 Kaster p. 100. 
107 Mentioned at Sest. 135 and Vat. 39.  
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we can see that when Cicero refers to character in his speech he does so with humor.  As 
with the struma passage above, Cicero doesn’t disagree with a key assumption of the 
prosecution, which is that there were disruptive people subverting the Republic; Cicero 
merely denies that Sestius was among these.  And the person he offers in Sestius’ stead 
he depicts with such vivid abuse that the audience can’t help but laugh along with the 
orator.  And perhaps laughing with someone is the first step in coming to agree with 
someone. 
 Unsurprisingly, given the individuals involved, character figures prominently in 
the Pro Milone as well.  But it is not in the normal fashion of Cicero’s defenses for three 
very good reasons. For one, there was overwhelming evidence against Milo, from the 
location of the killing to his claim of self-defense when Clodius had already been 
wounded before the fatal blow.   Secondly, although technically a defense of Milo, 
Cicero’s speech, if it bore any resemblance to the surviving text which he composed 
years later, actually had the character of a prosecution of the late Clodius.108  Thirdly, 
Cicero was defending the man who had killed his greatest enemy which no doubt 
increased the seriousness with which he approached the case.  As a result of the last of 
these two factors, both of which relate to Cicero’s extreme hostility towards Clodius, 
there is virtually no humor in the speech.109    It also appears that the prosecution was 
similar to a Ciceronian defense where probative value is given great weight – Cicero 
describes the prosecution as claiming that Clodius never acted with violence and Milo 
                                                
108 Cicero accuses Clodius of: being unworthy of his family (Mil. 17, 55, 59, 18, 86), avarice (73-6), 
unacceptable sexual conduct (13, 72-73, 76,85, 87, 89), mistreating his family (75-76), aspiring to regnum 
(35, 43, 76, 80, 87, 89), cruelty to citizens (3, 18-20, 24-26, 31, 37, 38, 40-41, 52, 73, 77, 87), and plunder 
of private and public property (3, 17, 50, 73-75, 76, 78, 87, 89, 95).  See Craig 2004: 206-209 for a brief 
description to each of these. 
109 Another reason could perhaps be that though he had no problem proclaiming the evil of Clodius, he felt 
it improper to mock, in a jesting fashion, the deceased. 
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never without it.110  Thus, Cicero necessarily had to adopt an unusual defense.  He begins 
not with a challenge to the prosecutor but with a partial narrative.111  And the speech 
lacks any section uniformly praising Milo: instead Cicero peppers the speech here and 
there with positive attributes, almost as if he were afraid that we’d forget these attributes 
if given all at once.  More than anything, however, Cicero focuses on drumming up 
pathos.  Of course, he refers to Milo as a hero but it is almost by accident.  In fact, he is 
depicted in the latter half of the speech more as an instrument of the Gods than an 
independent agent acting in the state’s interest as a result of his good character.112  While 
his discussion of his client’s character is different than what we see in his other defenses, 
Cicero’s focus on Clodius is in keeping with what we would expect.  He describes in 
detail what he claims were the intentions behind his supposed machinations from his 
praetorship onward.113  Moreover, after section 71, Cicero devotes the rest of his speech 
to the character of Clodius.114  Nowhere do we see anything resembling a joke and 
although this seems surprising given the frequency with which Cicero employs humor to 
abuse him in his other defenses, it makes sense here because there was nothing to gain by 
it.115  What we have been seeing is that humor is a tool used to make charges against 
                                                
110 Pro Mil. 36.2-3: 'Nihil per uim umquam Clodius, omnia per uim Milo’.  This is similar to the common 
Ciceronian tactic of responding to an accusation with a claim that his client’s character would be incapable 
of such a act. 
111 Riggsby (1999: 109) suggests that this is similar to the Pro Murena but I would argue that there Cicero 
questions the motive of the prosecution to a greater degree, suggesting that it has an ulterior motive. 
112 §83-86 and 88-89.  See May p. 243-246. 
113 ibid. 24.1 - 30. 
114 May 1979 argues that the reason for the nearly exclusive focus on character is that Cicero was trying to 
drive the jury into a fever of outrage against Clodius and sympathy for Milo.  Thus any return to the 
evidence and Cicero’s own narration of the case would detract from that.  See p. 245-246.  Indeed, 
Fotheringham 2013 suggests that the higher percentage of complex sentences in Cicero’s digressio “may 
reflect a particular type of emotion.”  See P. 353. 
115 It should be noted that Craig seizes upon one sentence in this section as evidence that advocates and 
prosecutors only employed invective when there was some truth to it.  He translates this sentence as “I do 
not fear, gentlemen of the jury, lest inflamed by the hatred of my personal enmities I may seem to hurl 
these charges at him with more verve [Craig’s italics] than veracity.  He interprets this sentence as implying 
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enemies, but even more often to reply to charges.  With Clodius dead, Cicero had already 
won to some extent.  Upon taking up the case, he risked little other than harming his 
reputation as an advocate, a reputation already so stellar it couldn’t be significantly be 
damaged by one loss.  He owed it to his client to do his best to achieve an acquittal but 
given his animosity towards Clodius, he lost sight of his own role.  It is thus not 
surprising that this is one of the only cases Cicero lost.  If he had been able to divorce 
himself from the case and view Clodius merely as the victim whose death led to a charge 
against his client and nothing more than that, perhaps he could have taken himself less 
seriously and employed more humor.116  If Cicero had undertaken a more “Ciceronian” 




 The defense of Sextus Roscius was one Cicero’s earliest, undertaken during 
Sulla’s dictatorship.  After Roscius’s father was murdered, a freedman claimed that 
Roscius had committed the crime.  Cicero’s defense relies far less on character and 
humor than we would expect given the serious nature of the charge.  Rather than 
                                                                                                                                            
that Cicero expected the jury to be aware of and concerned with the truth of his claims.  Moreover, he uses 
it to argue that Cicero was not trying to humiliate Clodius but provide probative evidence.  I interpret this 
sentence slightly differently.  It seems to me that Cicero is not stressing the accuracy of what he is about to 
claim but the fact that Clodius is so terrible that nothing he could say would appear be too strong of a 
condemnation.  Thus, Craig is right that Cicero is saying he expects the jury to believe what he is about to 
say.  However, he isn’t saying this in order to praise the jury and its concern for veracity as much as he is 
trying to vilify Clodius as someone of such extraordinary criminality and perversion that no one could 
possibly doubt his claims to this.  See Craig 2004: 187-213. 
116 There is one possible joke in the speech.  Cicero refers to the death of Clodius by saying (translation by 
Uría) “Nobody can bear with equanimity the death of P. Clodius.  The Senate is in mourning; the knights 
grieve, the whole state is worn out with gloom; the municipalities weaken, the colonies are sad, even the 
fields themselves long for such a beneficent, such a useful, such a good citizen.”  It is no doubt possible 
that this was stated with too much contempt to be funny.  However, if Cicero used a sarcastic intonation 
then he might have evoked laughter.  See Lausberg 1998: 902-906 for this possibility. 
117 Cass. Dio. 40.54. 
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champion his client’s character, he merely states that neither Roscius nor his father hated 
the other.118  The only jokes he makes are sarcastic statements about those whom he 
claims carried out the act.  He argues that two other relatives of the elder Roscius were 
the real perpetrators, and that they conspired with Sulla's freedman Chrysogonus in order 
to accuse his client and seize his father’s property. 
 Cicero paints Roscius as a loving son and traditional Roman and contrasts this 
portrayal with the other Roscii, whom he claims are guilty of the murder, and 
Chrysogonus, whom he depicts as immoral and unsavory.  However, he offers little other 
praise of Roscius.  Although he occasionally mocks Chrysogonus with wit, the speech is 
largely devoid of humor.  However, Byron Harries does see comedy influencing the 
speech.  He claims that key words such as ineptia and imago (the Plautine word for mask 
in his earliest comedies) are evocative of comedy.  He notes that Cicero mentions the 
comic poet Caecilius in his attempt to prove Roscius and his father got along.119  For in a 
rewriting of the Menandrean Hypobolimaneus, a father favors a son who lives in the 
country over a son who lives in the city.  Yet, there is no joke made, despite the very real 
possibility that Cicero's familiarity with comedy might have helped to shape the speech.  
The comic influence is therefore, just that.  Simply because a speech is influenced by 
comedy does not mean that that speech is humorous. 
 Why should the Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino lack the traditional focus on the 
defendant’s character that is traditional in criminal defenses?  Given that Cicero was 
                                                
118 Cicero claims that there is no evidence for this at Pro Rosc. Am. 40.2  Dyck 2010 (p. 112) suggests that 
this is in imitation of the altercatio.  At the very least it’s evidence of imaginative exchanges between 
Cicero and the prosecution. 
119 Harries 2007: 136- 137.  Ann Vasaly (1985: 9-17) sees humor in the speech as well, arguing that the 
defendant’s personality is evocative of the rustic persona that dates back to Old Comedy, and that 
Chrysogonus and his associates are depicted as examples of the “urban scoundrels” found in New Comedy. 
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defending someone accused of parricide, of which he says “ I know that in such huge and 
atrocious affairs I can not speak appropriately nor cry out freely”120 he may have felt 
constrained from speaking too highly of his client.  Secondly, since Roscius was being 
accused by a powerful faction supported by Sulla, Cicero would risk incurring resentment 
or retribution by speaking too harshly of the opposition.  Thirdly, this is one of Cicero’s 
earliest speeches.  It’s entirely possible that his habits, what he found worked and didn’t, 
were still being formed.  And as Shane Butler has argued, it was only when he developed 
aristocratic pretension that Cicero became focused on character, as an attempt to distance 
himself from the equestrian reputation for focusing on evidence.121  Fourthly, Cicero was 
not as deeply immersed in the political scene during this case as he was in cases later in 
his career.  He had no Clodius to mock nor archenemies like Verres or Catiline to whom 
to compare his opponents to.  Finally, as a young man, Cicero had less political capital 
and might therefore be less willing to risk offending someone who could benefit his 
career. 
 
3.5 Conclusion about defensive speeches  
 There are some defenses that don’t fit this paradigm of denial, move to character, 
and utilization of humor, but for good reason that precludes us from discussing them.  In 
perhaps the greatest departure from his normal tactics, in the Pro Quinto Roscio 
Comoedo Cicero focuses almost exclusively on the disputed facts of the case, challenging 
every assertion of the prosecution.  There are two possible explanations for this.  For one, 
the case involved a dispute between two former partners.  Roscius, an actor, had teamed 
                                                
120 Pro Rosc. Am. 4.9: his de rebus tantis tamque atrocibus neque satis me commode dicere neque satis 
grauiter conqueri neque satis libere uociferari posse intellego. 
121 Butler 2002: 78-84. 
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up with Fannius to train Fannius’s slave Panurgus to be an actor.  The two men worked 
amicably together and were successful in promoting the slave’s career.  When the slave 
was eventually murdered they continued to work together for restitution.  Difficulties 
arose only after Roscius worked out a deal with the accused murderer wherein he gained 
a farm from the killer which he then ran so successfully that Fannius came to think half 
of its value was owed to him.  Thus, perhaps Cicero thought it unseemly or 
counterproductive to insult someone with whom his client had been so closely associated.  
The other possibility is that Fannius’s case was so weak that Cicero had the luxury of 
sticking to the facts.  And given the time elapsed between Roscius’s deal with the 
murderer and the eventual success of the farm, spawning the plaintiff to take Roscius to 
court, this is certainly a possibility.122  In either case, it is easy to understand why 
character would not be a central feature in a dispute over profits.  The same conclusions 
can be applied to the Pro Publio Quinctio which, although not a dispute between 
partners, was a disagreement between the brother of someone who had died and his 
former partner.123  Likewise the Pro Marcello and Pro Ligario are less defenses than 
praise for Caesar, since they weren’t charged with anything but rather chose Pompey’s 
side and thus left the city. 
 To summarize, Cicero largely follows a paradigm in his defenses where he begins 
by challenging the merits of the prosecution or raising the stakes of the trial and then 
either proclaiming the virtuousness of his client’s character or dismissing accusations 
against his client’s character by addressing something other than the nature of those 
                                                
122 We don’t know how much of time elapsed as it’s not stated in the text. But it had to be at least a couple 
years since the productivity of a farm could not be increased significantly in one season. 
123 As with the Pro Caecina, we could follow Damon and argue that Cicero depicts the prosecutor as a 
parasite but, as with the Pro Caecina, I think it’s difficult to do so in a civil case involving money.  See 
Damon 1997: 196-203. 
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accusations.124  He only departs from this paradigm when the charge he is defending 
carries with it little to no moral opprobrium, when there are multiple prosecutors such 
that we can’t speak of a Ciceronian tactic given the aggregate defense, or when there is 
an overwhelming reason not to focus on character, such as when his client too closely 
resembles the opposition or when the opposition was too politically powerful to challenge 
on grounds of character.  When Cicero challenges the prosecution, he tends to do so 
mildly, focusing on procedural misconduct rather than moral conduct.125  Lastly, Cicero 
tends to use discussions of character to evade discussing the merits of the case, and when 
he employs humor, especially defensive humor, to that end, he is enormously successful.   
 In addition to these observations, this loose yet conspicuous pattern can be seen to 
fit within the realm of Action Theory.126  These judicial cases are political arenas in 
which social dramas – which can be viewed as focusing specifically on “face” – are 
carried out.  The political players are transactional “Contact Teams” in that Cicero is only 
hired as an advocate in the belief that he can successfully defend his client and the 
prosecutor only takes up the case in the belief that he can win a conviction.  The social 
drama that these political players negotiate is initiated by a confrontation (the charge) and 
encounter (the proceedings).  The negotiation operates through a specific sort of 
“political symbolism,” one that focuses on character as an important determinant.  This is 
in part due to the fact that, as Riggsby has argued, Romans thought character was 
relevant in judicial cases, but it is also due to the fact that the typical Ciceronian defense 
                                                
124 Craig has discussed this habit of evasion but has not suggested that humor played a role in it.  Rather, he 
argues that Cicero employs the rhetorical tool of dilemma to present the jury with two false choices 
regarding his opponent, misrepresenting the prosecution’s position in the process.  See Craig 1993: p. 25. 
125 It should be noted that while Cicero does employ invective in the Pro Rosc. Am. (e.g. 17.5-10) it is 
directed not against the prosecution but against those whom Cicero claims are the real guilty parties. 
126 See p. 46-52 in chapter two above. 
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involves ignoring the details of the prosecution’s charges and focusing on the character of 
his client and/or the prosecutor(s) – regarding the latter, this would only be on the rare 
occasion he feels the need to go beyond procedural criticism.  Lastly, the rules to the 
social drama that takes place over character can be manipulated successfully through wit: 
to maintain face requires the ability to respond quickly to challenges and to do so in a 





Chapter Four: Quintilian’s Assessment of Cicero 
4.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter I have discussed how we can consider Cicero’s 
humor a performative mechanism of power exchange.  In this chapter I shall 
consider whether the most comprehensive theoretical discussion of humor’s use in 
oratory, Quintilian, saw humor in the same fashion.  Quintilian devotes the third 
section of book six of his Institutio Oratoria to a discussion of how the orator 
should make use of wit and humor.  The majority of examples he provides are 
Ciceronian.  However, his views on these examples are at best unclear and at 
worst seemingly contradictory, and thus merit further investigation.1  Although he 
devotes a lengthy chapter to humor and wit, Quintilian wavers between 
dismissing it and championing it as an effective tool.  As to the former, he 
mentions that Demosthenes was deficient in humor yet still a successful speaker.  
Furthermore, he states that he is wary of it, claiming that “the majority of 
humorous sayings are false” (ridiculum dictum plerumque falsum est.)2  However, 
as to the latter – the potentially effective use of humor – he sees it as relating to 
insults3 and he claims that “it has a most imperious force which is hard to resist” 
(uim nescio an imperiosissimam et cui repugnari minime potest),4 which can 
                                                
1 Beard (2014: 103-104) explains the ambiguity by suggesting that Quintilian found Cicero a little too 
humorous, citing Macrobius’ appraisal of Cicero as a consularis scurra.  However, for reasons discussed 
below, there are other explanations for this. 
2 Quint Inst. 6.3.6.  In 12.9.9 he also says: ea est enim prorsus canina, ut Appius, eloquentia, cognituram 
male dicendi subire. 
3  6.3.8: Habet enim, ut Cicero dicit, sedem in deformitate aliqua et turpitudine: quae cum in aliis 




cause an argument to be won or lost and dispel anger.5  I shall argue that the 
reason for this apparent contradiction of claiming humor to be cheap and useful at 
the same time stems from his belief that humor is so powerful as to be unfair.   
Essentially, Quintilian verifies our argument about Ciceronian humor: having the 
better joke is better than having the better argument.   
However, as opposed to the Ciceronian practice of excessive humor,  
which Quintilian claims was a widespread consensus,6 Quintilian thinks that as a 
result of humor’s power, it ought to be used judiciously; namely that it ought to be 
used only in defense, as a retort to an accusation, rather than as simple abuse.  I 
would further argue that Quintilian’s favoring of defensive over offensive humor 
stems not only from his fear of humor’s power but his admiration of wit overall; 
in other words, although he nowhere says so, his affection for retorts exists in part 
as a result of his belief that retorts demonstrate the power of humor much more 
than abuse.7  Anyone can heap insults upon an opponent and win a case.  But, to 
have those insults repackaged and sent back in such a way as to carry the 
argument is a truly impressive talent.8  Furthermore, the retorts Quintilian most 
admires either avoid denial or come right out and admit to the original charge.  
                                                
5 This is pretty close to what Cicero says in De Orat 2.216: Suavis autem est et vehementer saepe utilis 
iocus et facetiae. 
6 At the opening of 6.3 Quintilian claims that, regarding humor: nam plerique Demostheni facultatem 
defuisse huius rei credunt, Ciceroni modum. 
7 12.9.9: Quintilian elsewhere agrees with a saying of Appius that seconds this: ea est enim prorsus canina, 
ut Appius, eloquentia, cognituram male dicendi subire.  “It’s a dog’s eloquence to try to abuse one’s 
opponent.” 
8 Quintilian seems to think of this kind of humor as uenustus given the preponderance of the word in 
chapter three.  For the same argument, see Krostenko 2001: 101.  Cicero, on the other hand, calls humor 
that is dependent on the words of others cavillatio at De Orat. §218.  Regardless of the alternative 
terminology, however, Cicero approves of humor in response.  At §2.255 Cicero says “it’s pleasant when in 
an altercation, a word is snatched by an adversary and then turned upon the very person who made the 
accusation” (hoc tum est uenustum, cum in altercatione arripitur ab aduersario uerbum et ex eo) and he 
cites the Catulus joke (see below) as an example.  
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Lastly, as will be discussed below, Quintilian will break any of the rules and 
advice he gives about humor for a really good joke.9  It is thus safe to say that he 
values humor not only as a weapon to be used in argument but as an end in itself: 
the right joke at the right time is evidence of technical mastery and this mastery 
can be enjoyed in its own right. 
 
4.2 Targets of Humor 
 Quintilian wisely avoids any attempt to define humor.  But he does define 
the various Latin words for wit and humor10 and eventually claims that there are 
three places to which humor can be directed in oratory: others, ourselves, and 
public, res mediae.11  As we shall see below, there is some ambiguity as to 
whether Quintilian was referring to others and ourselves as targets or as subjects.  
For one can make a joke about oneself that is really an insult directed at another 
due to its sarcastic tone and vice-versa.  However, given the grouping of his 
examples, it’s much more likely that Quintilian is thinking of subjects.  Jokes 
about res mediae are more difficult to glean the purpose of.  Whereas jokes 
against others are clearly offensive in nature and jokes against oneself are 
defensive (or offensive if given in the manner advised by Quintilian), 
intermediary jokes can’t be said to be either.  If not for the purpose of defense or 
offense, jokes on res mediae must be non-adversarial – the sorts of jokes that 
                                                
9 As he does with Cicero’s response to an inquiry about what time Milo killed Clodius, and Cicero replied 
“too late.” 
10 6.3.17-21.  The words are urbanitas, uenustus, salsus, and facetus.  For more on uenustus and facetus see 
Krostenko 2001: 40-51 and 59-64 respectively. 
11 6.3.22-23.  What exactly is meant by res mediae is unclear.  Monaco (45) translates the description of 
this tripartite division as “il riso cerchiamo di farlo nascere o dagli altri o da noi stessi o da cose 
intermedie.” Russell (2001:75) translates it at “neutral circumstances.”  
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would lack targets, or at least targets whose senses of dignity could be offended.  
Thus, jokes about animals, ethnicities (as long as no one in the audience is of that 
ethnicity), or puns (again, as long as not to offend) would all fall under this 
category.  In short, res mediae jokes would seem to be jokes that are not designed 
to wound.  Their purpose then, could be anywhere from demonstrating wit or to 
provoking laughter for the merriment of the audience.  They could also, of course, 
do both of these simultaneously.  Of all the jokes in chapter three of book six 
there are few examples that could be classified as such,12 and only one of those is 
not discussed here.13 
 
4.3 Quintilian’s Catalog of Jokes 
 In this catalogue I will not discuss all of the jokes Quintilian mentions.  
Many of them – I count seventy-nine in total – require no explanation.  The 
twisting of someone’s name into an insult,14 metaphors and wordplay,15 or jokes 
with modern analogs are simple enough to understand.16  Furthermore, some of 
the direct insults cited by Quintilian require no investigation.17  Also requiring no 
inquiry are mere references to jokes that are not actually repeated (so that we do 
not know what they are about),18 and those that are so incomprehensible to us that 
                                                
12 Jokes 14 and 15 below could be considered res mediae since they lack targets. 
13 6.3.52: Fabius Maximus referred to a gift, congiarium, from Augustus as an heminaria, “half-gift,” 
because he thought it was too small.  This could be considered an insult but Augustus is not directly the 
butt of the joke.  The gift is. 
14 6.3.55-59.  The most famous of those listed by Quintilian is that of Verres sweeping away (uerreret) the 
property of others. 
15 6.3.51-54: For example, Cicero’s use of Ludus for brothel instead of school, and magister for debt-
collector instead of teacher. 
16 6.3.67: A man being “so tall” that he hits his head on the Fabian Arch. 
17 Caesar stating that his opponent looked like a Gaul at 6.3.38. 
18 6.3.39: Caelius’ story about Decimus Laelius. 
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we are incapable of analyzing them.19  We shall therefore limit our discussion, 
ordered by type, to the jokes that elicit the most commentary from Quintilian in 
order to investigate whether Quintilian prefers certain types of humor over others 
and what he sees as the function of humor in argument. 
 
4.3a: Jokes in Response to Criticism. 
 1.) After Cassius Severus’ opponent reproached him for the fact that 
someone, a certain Proculeius, had forbidden him entry to his home Severus 
bested him by saying “do I go there anyway?”20  
 2.) King Pyrrhus of Epirus questioned a group of young Tarentines, who 
had apparently made many denigrating comments towards him while dining.  
While calling them to account for their words, as Quintilian relates it, rather than 
deny that they had said anything critical, one of the youths shouted out “yes and if 
the bottle hadn’t been empty, we should have killed you!”21 
                                                
19 The mysterious yet unspeakable joke of Caelius involving a box (6.3.25) or Caelius describing someone 
as riding a dolphin like Arion (6.3.41). 
20 Quint Inst. 6.3.79: numquid ergo illuc accedo?  The wit in this comeback stems from Severus’ mocking 
of the charge.  If Severus doesn’t care that a particular person shut his door to him then the reproach 
doesn’t work.  This is likely the same Cassius Severus whom Tacitus considers to be abusive in his wit.  
Indeed, he says (Ann. 1.72) that Severus “defamed reputable men and women with shameless writings,” 
uiros feminasque inlustris procacibus scriptis diffamauerat.  In the Dialogus (§19), however, Tacitus 
claims that Severus gained his reputation for wit and abuse because the people wouldn’t tolerate long and 
“confused speeches,” impeditissimarum orationum spatia.  He further refers to a popular demand for 
invective at §40.  Seneca the Elder also approvingly reports some sayings of Severus.  He mentions him 
describing the performance of an orator who had just declaimed in both Greek and Latin as male καὶ 
κακῶς.  He also expresses wonder at how someone so gifted in wit could be so unsuccessful (memini itaque 
me a Severo Cassio quaerere, quid esset, cur in declamationibus eloquentia illi sua non responderet).  
D'Hautcourt 1995: 316 suggests that Cassius Dio has him in mind when he refers to Augustus seizing 
libelous books (βιβλία ἄττα ἐφ’ ὕβρϵι) although he is not named by the historian. 
21 6.3.10.  Whether the youths insulted Pyrrhus while dining with him or at an earlier dinner that Pyrrhus 
heard about is ambiguous.  All we are given is a relative clause describing the youths as multa de rege 
Pyrrho sequius inter cenam locuti, “having said many things out of turn about king Pyrrhus during dinner.”  
Plutarch tells this story in his Life of Pyrrhus.  Pyrrh. 8.12: ταῦτ' ὦ βασιλεῦ· πλείονα δ' ἂν ἔτι τούτων 
εἰρήκειµεν, εἰ πλείων παρῆν οἶνος ἡµῖν.  Likewise, Valerius Maximus says that the words of the youth were 
nisi uinum nos defecisset, ista quae tibi relata sunt, prae iis quae de te locuturi eramus, lusus ac iocus 
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 3.) An exchange between Brutus and Lucius Crassus as described in 
Cicero’s De Oratore must be quoted in full.  In response to some criticism related 
to property management that Brutus had directed at him, Crassus had some 
pamphlets on law written by Brutus’ father recited for the judges, and Crassus 
inserted comments along the way.  Quintilian narrates it thus: 
Ex libro primo: "forte evenit ut in Privernati essemus." "Brute, testificatur 
pater se tibi Privernatem fundum reliquisse." Deinde ex libro secundo: "in 
Albano eramus ego et Marcus filius." "Sapiens uidelicet homo cum primis 
nostrae ciuitatis norat hunc gurgitem; metuebat ne, cum is nihil haberet, 
nihil esse ei relictum putaretur." Tum ex libro tertio, in quo finem 
scribendi fecit – tot enim, ut audiui Scaeuolam dicere, sunt ueri Bruti libri 
– "in Tiburti forte adsedimus ego et Marcus filius." "Ubi sunt hi fundi, 
Brute, quos tibi pater publicis commentariis consignatos reliquit? Quod 
nisi puberem te, inquit, iam haberet, quartum librum composuisset et se 
etiam in balneis lotum cum filio scriptum reliquisset.”22 
 
On an extract from the first book, [the following was read] “It chanced 
that we were in the Privernian district,” his [Crassus’s] comment was, 
“Brutus, your father bears witness that he has bequeathed you an estate at 
Privernum.” Next, at the citation from the second book, “I and my son 
Marcus were on the Alban Hills,” he observed, “See how a man as shrewd 
as any in our community had discerned the nature of this devouring gulf; 
he was afraid that, when he had nothing left, it might be thought that 
nothing had been bequeathed to him.” Finally,on the words “I and my son 
Marcus happened to sit down together on Tiburtine land” being read out 
from the third and concluding book (for I have heard Scaevola say that the 
authentic volumes of Brutus are three in number), Crassus exclaimed, 
“Where are these estates, Brutus, which your father registered in his public 
memoirs as bequeathed to you? Why,” he went on, “had you not already 
turned fourteen, he would have put together a fourth book, leaving it on 
record that he had also washed in his son's company at those baths!”23 
                                                                                                                                            
fuissent, “If we had not run out of wine, what you have been told we said would have seemed mere teasing 
in comparison to what we were about to say of you.” The only difference between these accounts and 
Quintilian’s is that Plutarch and Valerius Maxiumus say nothing of killing; their youths only state that they 
would have spoken more (implying abuse) had they had more wine.  However, this difference is 
significant.  The moral of the Plutarch and Valerius Maximus story is in uino ueritas, and thus clemency is 
necessary when dealing with insults brought on by inebriation, but for Quintilian the significance of the 
story is that humor can defuse heated confrontations.  The moral there may well be in ridiculo tutamen. 
22 De Orat. 2.224-5.  The devouring gulf, gurgitem, refers to Brutus.  The joke is that the reason Brutus’ 
father documented so thoroughly what he was leaving to his son was that he figured his son was such a 





  4.) In an interaction between an eques and Augustus, when the drinking 
and eating of the eques at the games bothered Augustus, he was roused to send 
him a note saying “if I want to dine, I go home: so should you” (ego si prandere 
uolo, domum eo: Tu enim), to which the eques replied, presumably in a note sent 
back to the princeps, “you are not afraid that you’ll lose your seat” (non times, ne 
locum perdas).24 
 5.) An officer whom Augustus was dismissing dishonorably kept pleading 
with him by asking what he was to tell his father.  Augustus replied, “tell him that 
I displeased you” (dic me tibi displicuisse).25   
6.) Also involving Augustus, but with the princeps on the receiving end of 
the joke: when an eques was accused by Augustus of squandering his inheritance, 
he said “I thought it was mine” (meum putaui).26 
 7.) An unnamed accuser brought to the trial a painting depicting his 
opponent, Manius Curius in an unflattering light.  It showed him in at least two 
poses, one naked and in jail, and the other being restored to freedom with his 
                                                
24 6.3.63.  Augustus would have been seated at an elevated position, on a sella curulis in a tribunal opposite 
the Vestal Virgins, from where he would have had an unobstructed line of sight.  See Suet. Aug. 44. The 
very exclusivity of his position, however, is what makes the joke of the eques work.  It draws attention to 
the absurdity of Augustus comparing his situation to that of the eques.   See Jones 2008: 7-40 for more on 
the seating arrangements at Augustan spectacles.  
25 6.3.64.  According to Southern (2008: 163), the charge would have been one of ignominiosa missio.  
However, the only attestation to this term is in the Digest. 49.16.13. 
26 6.3.74.  The criticism of Augustus is the same as that of Brutus’ initial criticism of Crassus and Crassus’ 
counterattack.  The suggestion is that one who can’t manage oneself can’t manage a state.  C.f. the saying 
of Cato the Elder (Plut. Mor. 198F), “The worst ruler is one not able to rule himself,” Κάκιστον δ' ἔλεγεν 
ἄρχοντα εἶναι τὸν ἄρχειν ἑαυτοῦ µὴ δυνάµενον.  For more on the importance of having property to leave to 
one’s heirs, see Champlin 1991: 6-28. 
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friends paying his debts.27  After this accuser brought this forth and showed it to 
the court, Manius’s reply was simply “so did I never prevail?”28 
 8.) When Domitia, the wife of an advocate named Passienus, protested at 
Junius Bassus’s accusing her of cheapness by suggesting that she sold old shoes, 
Bassus replied “by Hercules, I have never said this, but I have said that you are 
accustomed to buying them” (non mehercules, inquit, hoc unquam dixi; sed dixi 
emere te solere).29 
 9.) One Gabba, when accused of buying a five foot long lamprey, quinque 
pedes longam murenam, simply said “I’m not at all surprised at that, for they 
grow so long there that the fishermen wrap them around their waists instead of 
ropes.”30  
                                                
27 Gesner says, probably following Festus (see Valla 1996 p: 141) who noted siparium est genus ueli 
mimici, as paraphrased by Watson 1891 p.446: “that the curtain was divided into compartments, and that 
some scene of his life was represented in each compartment.” 
28 6.3.73: ergo ego, inquit, “nunquam uici?  The insult here is that Curius was only released from jail 
through the intercession of his friends, thus demonstrating that he was not in control of his affairs.  His 
response can mean only one thing if we are to interpret this as a joke: “so what if I was in jail?  I’m free 
now.” 
29 6.3.74  The cleverness of the joke is that it initially appears to deny the accusation, and thus placate 
Domitia, but in fact ends up insulting her further.  Surely it is worse to buy cheap shoes than to sell them.  
The cheap shoes one sells could have been quality shoes when they were first acquired.  However, someone 
who buys cheap shoes never had any quality ones to begin with. Quintilian also references Passienus and 
Domitia at 6.1.50, where the wife, Domitia, forced her husband to take up a case against her own brother 
over money.  It is merely speculation but it’s not impossible that Domitia had a reputation as an harridan 
and that this was what provoked Bassus’ ridicule of her.  What little we know of her would back this up.  
Passienus left her to marry Agrippina the Younger, against whom she may have participated in an intrigue 
that brought about her own death at the hands of Nero in revenge.  See New Pauly iv, coll 634ff. (s.v. 
Domitia no. 1).  Of Passienus, we only know that his success as an orator was prevented by the dullness of 
his speeches.  See Controv. 3.pr10: Passienus noster cum coepit dicere, secundum principium statim fuga 
fit, ad epilogum omnes reuertimur, media tantum quibus necesse est audiunt.  See Syme  1986: 160. 
30 6.3.80: Nihil, inquit, mirum; nam ibi tam longae nascuntur, ut iis piscatores pro restibus cingantur.  
Criticism for buying a large eel must imply an accusation of luxury.  Gabba’s response can be interpreted 
two ways.  The first is that eels that big are common therefore to buy one is not luxurious.  The second is 
that Gabba is deliberately misunderstanding the point of the accuser, such that he responds as though the 
accuser were merely expressing astonishment that Gabba bought a fish so big.  The difference between 
these can be illustrated by imagining someone in organized crime being accused of massive racketeering.  
Were he to say “that’s nothing relatively speaking” his defense is to claim that he is being unfairly 
prosecuted for a common practice.  If, in contrast, he were to say, with a smile, “yes, we were running quite 
a racket” he would be mockingly dismissing the charge.  See below for more discussion. 
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10.) Likewise, when Afer was pleading against a freedman of Claudius he 
was accused by his adversary of always speaking badly of the Caesar’s freedmen, 
he simply said “yes but by God I’m not succeeding” (nec mehercule, inquit, 
quicquam proficio).31   
11.) In addition, to a Philippus who had tried to make fun of a Catulus by 
playing on the fact that his name meant “puppy” by asking “why are you 
yelping?”  Catulus simply replied “I see a thief” (furem uideo).32  
 12.) When the famously ugly Sulpicius Longus said that his opponent did 
not have the face of a free man, Domitus Afer, presumably the advocate of said 
opponent, said “From this opinion of yours someone who has an ugly face is not 
free?”33 
 13.) In Cicero’s famous defense of Milo, the prosecution suggested 
Cicero’s client had been lying in wait for Clodius and therefore kept repeating the 
question “when was Clodius slain?”34  To this Cicero replied simply “too late” 
(sero). 
 14.) When a certain Sextus Annalis gave testimony against Cicero’s client, 
the prosecutor asked “tell me, Marcus Tullius, what do you have to say about 
                                                
31 6.3.81. Afer’s response must be read as self-deprecating.  It’s almost satirical in that it is a speaker who 
sees what he considers injustice in the world yet is powerless to effect change. 
32 6.3.82. This joke is also repeated at De Orat. 220: Quid enim hic meus frater ab arte adiuvari potuit, cum 
a Philippo interrogatus quid latraret, furem se uidere respondit? 
33 6.3.32-33: Ex tui, inquit, animi sententia, Longe, qui malam faciem habet, liber non est?  Presumably, 
this Afer is the famous orator of joke 10 above. This Sulpicius Longus is known to us only via Quintilian, 
but his claim that he was ugly is stated so strongly that he likely was famous for it.  Quintilian calls him 
“most foul,” foedissimus. 
34 6.3.49: quo tempore Clodius occisus esset?  Quintilian finds this joke offensive but too clever not to 
mention.  In fact he says that “this response alone proves that we shouldn’t reject all such [jokes],” quod uel 
solum sufficit ut hoc genus non totum repudietur. 
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Sextus Annalis?”35 Cicero pretended to think that his questioner was asking about 
the sixth book of Ennius’s Annals and replied by quoting the famous opening of 
that book, “Unroll this great war from end to end” (quis potis ingentis causas 
euoluere belli).36  
15.) Similarly evasive, when asked what an unknown individual thought 
of a man who had been caught in the course of adultery, the individual said “he 
was slow” (tardum fuisse respondit).37   
   16.) In defending someone accused of assault, an advocate asked the 
plaintiff whether he had a scar to prove the assault.  When the plaintiff showed his 
thigh and revealed a conspicuous scar, the advocate remarked, “You should have 
shown your side” (latus oportuit).38   
17.) Also in a defense case, a certain Hispo responded to the accusation 
that he had been involved in really terrible crimes “atrociora crimina”39 by saying 
“you are measuring me by your own standard”  (me ex te metiris).40 
                                                
35 6.3.86: dic, M. Tulli, numquid quid de Sex. annali? 
36 The Ennius that we have and which makes more sense has oras rather than causas, since with the former 
fits together better with the evolvere.  The unraveling of the margins has a much wider range of meaning; it 
suggests both the telling of the whole tale and creates the imagery of unrolling a scroll, thus hinting at the 
age and fame of the story about to be told. 
37 6.3.87.  The same joke is referenced in De Orat. 2.275, where Cicero claims the dissimulating individual 
was a certain Pontidius. 
38 6.3.100: Lit: “your side was more fitting.” Most likely, the joke is that the plaintiff was expecting to see a 
minor scar and upon seeing a large one he implied that there was more scar than leg.  It is also possible that 
the latus is an adjective referring to the size of the scar.  However, if that were the case we would expect it 
to be lata since the word for scar, cicatrix, is feminine.  A third possibility is that the joke is “he should 
have stabbed you in the side.”  Lastly, since the wound was on the thigh and thus close to the genitals, it is 
possible that when the Plaintiff revealed his thigh he also revealed his genitals and the comment would 
mean something like “you should have showed it to us from your side.” 
39 6.3.100: Contumeliis Badius: umis AG: atrociora Halm: arbore MSS.  Despite the principle of lectio 
difficilior, the most sensible reading of this is Halm’s.  Regardless, the nature of the joke doesn’t change 
unless the arbore is read, in which case the opportunity for a joke is hard to envision. 
40 The ex te here must be causal.  Thus the retort declarative: “you measure me from yourself” or even “you 
measure me according to yourself.”  It could even mean “above” or “after,” thereby strengthening the claim 
of the retort, that Hispo’s crimes pale in comparison to the crimes of the accuser.  However, the causal ex is 
the most likely interpretation.  In any event, the joke is something like “you would know.” 
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 18.) When Cicero’s virility was questioned upon the eve of his marriage to 
a much younger woman, Cicero replied by saying “she’ll be a woman tomorrow,” 
(cras mulier erit).41   
19.) And when Hortensius, the advocate of Verres, said to Cicero 
regarding some of his claims “I don’t understand these riddles” Cicero said “You 
ought to.  You have a Sphinx in your house.”42 
 20.) Trachalus was told by Suillus that if something were true he would be 
sent into exile.  His response was “If it is not true, you go back [into exile].”43 
 21.) When someone accused one of Gaius Caesar’s (the famous Caesar’s 
father) clients of striking him in the thigh with a sword, Caesar said “what did you 
expect when you were wearing a helmet and breastplate?”44 
 
4.3b Insults in Response to Something Innocently Said. 
                                                
41 6.3.75.  Plutarch mentions that Antony was one of the individuals who mocked Cicero for this and also 
that he was a homebody, unfit for the military or business.  Thus, it’s likely that the insult to which Cicero 
was replying was not that it was inappropriate for him to marry a young girl, but that he was too old to 
marry a young girl.  See Plut. Cic. 41: “Antony, having recalled the marriage in his replies to Cicero's 
Philippics, says that he threw out the wife with whom he had grown old, and at the same time makes witty 
jibes upon the stay-at-home habits of Cicero, who was, he said, unfit for business or military service,” 
Ἀντώνιος δὲ τοῦ γάµου µνησθεὶς ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς Φιλιππικοὺς ἀντιγραφαῖς, ἐκβαλεῖν φησιν αὐτὸν 
γυναῖκα παρ' ἣν ἐγήρασε, χαριέντως ἅµα τὴν οἰκουρίαν ὡς ἀπράκτου καὶ ἀστρατεύτου παρασκώπτων τοῦ 
Κικέρωνος. 
42 6.3.98: Hortensius: ‘non intellego haec aenigmata’ and Cicero: ‘atque debes cum Sphingem domi 
habeas’.  This retort is also mentioned in Plutarch’s Moralia.  The joke is likely a reference not to the 
Sphinx as a guardian spirit (see Vermeule 1979: 171–5) but to its association with the Oedipus legend 
where she is a menace to Thebes.  In such an interpretation, Verres is the Sphinx and Hortensius should 
know his riddles.  
43 6.3.78: Suillus said si hoc ita est, is in exilium.  Trachalus said si non est ita, redis.  This is the same 
Trachalus that Tacitus claims worked for Otho.  See Tac. Hist. 1.90.  The accusation of Suillus is obviously 
that Trachalus has done something that merits capital punishment.  The only way to interpret the response 
of Trachalus as a joke is to assume that Suillus had been in exile himself and thus had thus been convicted 
of a capital crime.  With such a response Trachalus makes the jury aware that while he is being charged 
with a serious crime, Suillus has already been convicted of one, and therefore is not to be believed. 
44 6.3.91: quid enim faceret cum tu galeam et loricam haberes?  Quintilian claims that this joke operates 
through misrepresentation.  He says that the proper response of Gaius Caesar would have been to ask the 
plaintiff why he was struck in the thigh, presumably in order to argue self-defense.  Quintilian calls his 
response of “what else could have done?” an ironic fiction (ex ironia fictio).  The joke is basically mocking 
the plaintiff by suggesting that he had brought the wound upon himself by wearing his armor. 
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 22.) When Fabia, the wife of Dolabella, referred to herself as being thirty 
years old, Cicero is reported to have said “indeed this is the twentieth year I am 
hearing this” (nam hoc illam iam viginti annis audio).45 
 23.) When Vatinius tried to demonstrate that his health had improved by 
claiming that he walked two miles every day, Cicero said “the days are definitely 
getting longer” (dies enim longiores sunt).46   
24.) Likewise with Vatinius, when Cicero heard that a false report that 
Vatinius was dead, he questioned one of the latter’s freedmen.  He asked the 
freedman “is all okay?” and when the freedman replied that it was, Cicero said 
“so he’s dead then.”47 
25.) When Cicero was told by a man that his wife had committed suicide 
by hanging herself from a fig tree, Cicero said “do give me a branch from the tree 
that I may graft,” implying that the suicide was somehow joyous enough to merit 
celebrating the tree.48 
                                                
45 6.3.73. 
46 6.3.77. 
47 6.3.84.   
48 6.3.88: rogo des mihi surculum ex illa arbore ut inseram.  As pointed out by Russell (2001: 109n) figs 
were commonly used for suicide by hanging and jokes were made about them as a result.  Thus, Cicero’s 
quip works in part because it incorporates previous jokes, one of which is incredibly similar and is 
mentioned in the De Oratore.  In that (§278), a Sicilian says, upon being told of the death of someone’s 
wife says amabo te, da mihi ex ista arbore quos seram surculos.   Similarly, but without the wife or the 
grafting, is a passage in Plutarch’s Life of Antony where a misanthropic Timon gives notice to the public 
that he is about to cut down a fig tree on his property.  Timon says that since he knows it’s a site from 
which many people had previously hung themselves, he wants to give time for anyone who might want to 
do so before he takes it down.  Ant. 70: ἔστι µοι µικρὸν οἰκόπεδον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ συκῆ τις ἐν 
αὐτῷ πέφυκεν, ἐξ ἧς ἤδη συχνοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπήγξαντο. µέλλων οὖν οἰκοδοµεῖν τὸν τόπον ἐβουλήθην 
δηµοσίᾳ προειπεῖν, ἵνα, ἂν ἄρα τινὲς ἐθέλωσιν ὑµῶν, πρὶν ἐκκοπῆναι τὴν συκῆν, ἀπάγξωνται.  What all of 
these jokes have in common is a misanthropic joy at the thought of someone else’s suicide via fig tree. 
 
 130 
26.) When Pomponius pointed to a wound on his face he claimed to have 
suffered in battle, Gaius Caesar (again, the father of Caesar) said “you shouldn’t 
look back when you’re running away” (nunquam fugiens respexeris).49 
 
4.3c Direct Insults 
 27.) Without naming the individuals involved Quintilian gives his 
approval to the phrase “you are more lustful than a eunuch” (libidinosior es quam 
ullus spado).50   
 28.) Likewise, when Helvius Mancia was aggressively attacking Gaius 
Julius and the latter grew tired of the abuse, he responded by suggesting that 
Helvius had lost control and become manic.  He said “I’ll show you what you 
look like” and then he pointed to a Cimbric shield on display above a shop in 
which there was an image of a man resembling Helvius, thereby associating him 
with a people thought to be wild and out of control.51  
                                                
49 6.3.75.  Wounds on the front of the body, of course, were considered evidence of fighting bravely, 
whereas wounds on the back were assumed to be suffered while running away.  What Gaius Caesar does 
here is cut down his opponent simply by bringing up the possibility that there was more than one way to be 
wounded.  For more on the display of scars and their position on the body among Romans, see Evans 1999: 
83-90. 
50 6.3.64.  There are a number of interrelated reasons for the association of sexual appetite with eunuchs.  
For one, there is the tradition of the Sumerian/Assyrian palace eunuch, lú.sag/ša rēši, who could be trusted 
around women without supervision since they were incapable of creating illegitimate heirs.  Given this 
dynamic in which there is an implicit assumption that the Eunuchs are going to have sex with the women 
over whom they are watching, the association of them with sex, and therefore lust, is natural.  For a brief 
discussion of eunuchs in Mesopotamia, see Ambos 2009: 1-7.  For another reason more immediately linked 
to the Roman world, castration may at times have been a punishment for adultery see Richlin (1992: 216), 
where she cites Valerius Maximus 6.1.13.  If this were the case, the association with lust is even stronger 
than the palace eunuch as a non-threatening sexual partner.  For, what better evidence of concupiscence 
could there be than someone whose desires were so great that he was willing to risk losing his testicles for 
sex? 
51 Quintilian takes this from De Orat. 2.66: ut meum illud in Helvium Manciam  “Iam ostendam cuiusmodi 
sis;” cum ille “ostende, quaeso,” demonstraui digito pictum Gallum in Mariano scuto Cimbrico sub nouis.  
Part of the insult of calling a speaker wild stems from the expectation that an orator be in complete control 




 29.) Cicero made a quip about an opponent when he said “what does this 
man lack other than wealth and virtue” (quid huic abest nisi res et uirtus?).52   
30.) Cicero also said to the son of a cook “I too will favor you” (ego 
quoque tibi fauebo).53   
31.) And to someone with a severe father he said “I wonder why your 
father…left us someone like you, so variously colored” (miror quid sit quod pater 
tuus…te nobis uarium reliquit).54 
 32.) Afer said of an opposing advocate,, “for the sake of pleading causes 
the man is excellently…dressed” (homo in agendis causis optime…uestitus).55 
 33.) Publius Oppius said of a family, the Lentuli, who always had children 
smaller than their parents “they will eradicate themselves by being born” 
(nascendo interiturum).56 
                                                
52 6.3.84.  Thus the man doesn’t have anything if he lacks the most important qualities of property and good 
character.  Heinemann 1921 reads uirus and others read uirtus.  While uirus would certainly be the lectio 
difficilior, it would be pushing the boundary of the principle to read that since we know that at least one 
person, Quintilian, considers this a joke and it can’t be seen as a joke with uirus.  The same line is 
mentioned at De Orat. 2.281 and given that uirtus is used there as well, this is the safest reading. 
53 6.3.47: Based on the similar sound between quoque “also” and coque, the vocative form of “cook,” 
coquus.  The insult is not merely that of a comparison to a low status job.  As early as Middle Comedy 
cooks were associated with conniving and bragging, both hinted at in the adjective frequently used to 
describe cooks, ἀλαζονικός.  Arnott (1996:22) refers to comedic cooks as “combining arrogance, self-
confidence, irritability, and above all a claim to expertise in matters both culinary and extra-curricular.”  As 
to why there are no cooks in Old Comedy, Dobrov (2002: 175) argues that the servus callidus was 
originally a free “hireling,” and that as the “boundary between cooks and slaves softened…so did the 
boundary separating them in the theatre.” 
54 6.3.48-49: Translation of Russell.  The joke is “How could someone so severe leave such a colorful 
(black and blue from beatings) son?” 
55 6.3.84.  I have added the ellipsis for emphasis.  Quintilian provides no pause, despite the fact that the 
delivery of such a statement would necessitate one.  The joke stems from the fact that it starts out sounding 
like it will be a large compliment given the optime.  We expect something related to arguing or, even more 
likely, uersutus, experienced – thanks to Matthew Roller for this suggestion.   But when we encounter 




 34.) Nero said of one of his servants, whom he considered a thief, that there was 
no one most trusted in his house than that servant “since nothing whatsoever was locked 
or sealed against him.”57 
 35.) In an apparent proverb, it was occasionally said that when something bad 
happens to a person of ill-repute, one could respond to his pleas for help by saying “let 
someone who doesn’t know you help.”58 
 36.) Cicero, when examining the witness Sextus Clodius Phormio, in the Pro 
Caecina, said that he was “no less black and no less confident than Terence’s Phormio.”59 
 
4.4: Analysis  
 The reasoning behind the kinds of jokes and insults Quintilian favors and 
those of which he disapproves is hard to untangle.  At times he’ll condemn a joke 
only to praise a similar joke later.  For instance, he condemns Cicero’s pun [30] 
involving the son of a cook yet he commends Cicero’s likening a witness to a 
character in a comedy of Terence simply because they shared the same name.  
However, after an analysis of these jokes and what Quintilian has said about 
them, one thing will become clear: Quintilian appreciates creative jokes that 
further one’s own argument or challenge the argument of one’s opponent.  Thus, 
                                                
57 6.3.50-51: nulli plus apud se fidei haberi, nihil ei nec clusum neque signatum esse. 
58 6.3.98: tollat te qui non nouit. 
59 Caecin. 27.10.  The reference to the witness’s confidence must be a sarcastic comment on his 
truthfulness and reliability.  The reference to him being black is not as clear but likely refers to his 
character.  As noted by Russell who cites OLD s.v. 9 and the fact that the Greek µέλας functions the same 
way.  He also, however, suggests that the adjective could be used as a result of the character of Phormio in 
Terence wearing a black mask, or a play on the fact that the witness was a banker since the color black was 
associated with copper coins, citing Mart. 1.99.  See p. 91 n53.  I would argue that given Quintilian’s 
preferences in humor, the first option is the most likely.  A simple reference to a mask or copper coin 




merely playing upon someone’s name would be a cheap insult; but to play on the 
name of a witness who was giving particularly damning testimony in a reference 
to an old play would be appropriate, if not admirable.  
 All of the above jokes take an accusation, or in the case of Augustus and 
the young soldier, complaint, and do one of two things: (1) admit to it in such a 
way as to make light of the accusation, or (2) admit to the accusation by 
deliberately misunderstanding it.  Falling into the latter category are Cicero’s 
comment about his young wife [18] and his comment about Fabia [22], his 
reading of Ennius [14], his response to Vatinius’ exercise [23], Afer’s comment 
about Longus’ ugly face [12], Bassus’ response about Domitia’s shoes [8], 
Crassus’ reciting statements of Brutus’ father [3], Severus’ “do I go there 
anyway,” [1] and finally Manius’ “did I never win [7]?” The remaining fall into 
the former category, admitting and trivializing (1). 
 In the Manius joke [7], I take vici here to mean prevail in the sense of win, 
get out of jail and get his clothes back. By his reply, “did I never prevail” it is 
evident that his accuser was attacking his character rather than specifically 
charging him with gambling, an unusual case to bring given the prevalence of 
gambling in popinae and cauponae and references to it in other speeches we 
know to be about charges [see figure 1].60 But he pretends that his accuser is 
claiming that he never got out of jail.  As a result, while not admitting to the 
official charge of his accuser, he is admitting to a character flaw.  By questioning 
his accuser regarding whether or not he got out, he takes some of the sting out of 
                                                
60 The reference to gambling habits in an attempt to criticize the character of his opponent was a common 
tactic of Cicero.  He does this throughout the Philippics (2.23, 2.27, 2.39, 2.41, 3.14, 13.2), In Catilinam 
(2.10, 2.23), and once in the In Verrem (2.13).  
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the charge – he may be a gambler but at least he is clever.  It seems then that 
Quintilian’s idea of denying is basically to reply to an insult in a joking fashion.  
However, some could take the way Manius jokes as an affront.  To make light of 
a well-acknowledged character-flaw among the Roman elite could well be to 
question the values of his judge or judges.  And this is something that Quintilian 
himself had warned against earlier in the chapter when he says “there are certain 
judges too serious to endure much laughter,” sunt etiam iudices quidam tristiores 
quam ut risum libenter patiantur.61  Likewise, following this very warning, 
Quintilian claimed that a jest directed against an opponent could backfire as a 
result of the possibility that it could be applicable to the judge as well.62  If this is 
the case, one would think that Quintilian would be aware that a particular 
character flaw could be, rather than applied to the judge, one that he held in 
particular contempt.  Thus, if the joke has the possibility of backfiring, and 
Quintilian still approves of it, the best explanation for his approval of it is that it is 
clever.  Even when the joke does not accomplish anything – I will later argue that 
this does neutralize the charge in a way Quintilian doesn’t acknowledge – it is still 
useful simply by demonstrating wit.  And as such, Quintilian considers it a 
denial.63 
 In the case of Severus[1], where he responds to an accusation that he had 
been denied entry into Procleius’ home by noting that he never went there 
                                                
61 6.3.31. 
62 6.3.32: solet interim accidere, ut id quod in aduersarium dicimus aut in iudicem conueniat aut in 
nostrum quoque litigatorem; quanquam aliqui reperiuntur, qui ne id quidem, quod in ipsos recidere possit, 
euitent. 
63 It may also be the case that Quintilian thought of Manius’s reply as a denial because it could be received 
such that it made the accusation improbable.  In other words, he could view the reply as, rather than making 
fun of the accusation or dismissing it, a challenge to the probability of the charge.  Manius’s point would 
then be that it is unlikely that one would never win and to say so is obviously an exaggeration. 
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anyway, Severus turns the liability of being seen as someone denied entry into the 
asset of being seen as someone who is judicious in where he goes.  In doing so, 
however, he is agreeing to the claim that someone had declared him persona non 
grata at his home and thereby giving slight credence to the accuser.  However, at 
the same time he also claims that the truth of it doesn’t matter because he would 
never go to Procleius’, the implication being that Procleius had a questionable 
character.  He thus turns the question of being being shunned by someone into the 
question of whom one associates with.  What was a question about his reputation 
becomes a question of how careful he is with his friendships.  Again, this is the 
same as Caesar’s remark about Semiramis.   Although both Severus’ and Caesar’s 
remarks could be interpreted as admissions there is a difference between them for 
Quintilian: in Severus’ case, the admission is depicted not as a defensive strategy 
but as an opportunity to poke fun at his accuser.  While this may be true of 
Caesar’s response as well, the fact that the shame associated with effeminacy is so 
much greater than the shame of being denied entry to a friend’s house suggests 
otherwise.  A Roman with aspirations to be thought a real man would certainly 
react defensively at the charge. 
 When it comes to Crassus [3], his client had been accused of mismanaging 
his inheritance.  His response is not to deny that accusation but to claim that 
Brutus has been worse in this regard.  He distracts the audience by mocking 
Brutus’s selling of estates left to him by his father.64 Quintilian sees this as an 
                                                
64 Which Quintilian later makes clear when he says at the end of 6.3.44: et tum paterna emancupare 
praedia turpius habebatur.  The theatricality of this exchange does not put Quintilian off, as it logically 
might given his aversion to “overly dramatic and clownish sarcasm,” dicacitas etiam scurrilis et scenica 
(6.3.29) and this probably is due to its critical tone. 
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example of how lengthy displays of wit can be effective.  Since, rather than pure 
abuse or obscenity, which is usually not in reply to something stated in his 
framework, Quintilian consistently remarks that the superior form of humor is wit 
that appears effortless,65 and this clearly seems effortless from the quickness with 
which Crassus appears to have inserted his own commentary,66 it receives his 
approbation. In any event, this is clearly an instance of humor being used to get 
out of a difficult situation.  Brutus charges Crassus’ client with squandering his 
wealth and Crassus pretends the charge was that he squandered more wealth than 
his client had squandered.  We see similar dissimulation in the response of the 
eques to Augustus’ criticism of profligacy [6].  By saying “I thought it was mine” 
he turns the original accusation into something it wasn’t.  The original accusation 
of Augustus was based on the belief that one was supposed to die with more to his 
name than when he was born, that the eques should have saved his inheritance 
rather than spend it.  However, the response of the eques implies that the criticism 
of Augustus was that he had spent someone else’s money.  The eques makes it 
appear as though Augustus had meant something other than what it clearly meant.  
No one who heard this exchange could have thought that Augustus was accusing 
the eques of theft.  The retort would not confuse anyone into thinking that 
Augustus had made a claim about ownership yet somehow it still works.  It 
doesn’t matter that Augustus’ criticism still stood; it matters that the eques had a 
                                                
65 6.3.33: “let it not seem pre-prepared and created at home” (ne praeparatum et domo allatum uideatur). 
On the superiority of wit over abuse: 6.3.13, 6.3.19, and 6.3.28.  In regard to effortlessness, Quintilian says 
at 6.3.26 nihil enim est iis, quae sicut salsa dicuntur, insulsius.  He also says that jests must never appear 
praeparatum et domo adlatum at 6.3.33. 
66 The interjections amid the reading of the documentation must have come quickly to create a 
counterpoint.  With one person reading aloud at a moderate pace and Crassus inserting comments with 
quick bursts, attention is drawn to the contradictions. 
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response to it.  If saving for one’s heirs was unassailably important then we would 
not expect Quintilian to find this amusing.   We would expect Quintilian to 
mention that the eques was punished or rebuked by Augustus, but there is no 
mention of this.  The joke doesn’t actually distract anyone; it challenges a core 
cultural value and still we assume it succeeds.  This is all the more remarkable 
given the fact that the eques doesn’t appear concerned with the criticism or that it 
came from Augustus, someone who based a great deal of his authority on claims 
to the moral high ground.  It is easy to see why Quintilian might view this as a 
defensio.  
 The Hispo joke [17] functions in the same manner as the Crassus and 
eques jokes.  The original criticism of him was that he had committed terrible 
crimes.67  However, in his reply it is assumed that it was not about whether he 
committed atrociora crimina but whether his atriociora crimina were less 
offensive than his accuser’s. 
 When it comes to dealing with the boasts of the other side, Quintilian 
suggests neither denial nor admission but making light of them.68  He brings up 
the case of a cousin of Caesar’s father saying,  [26] “you shouldn’t look back 
when you’re running away,” nunquam fugiens respexeris.69  This is not a joke 
made out of harmless teasing, such as Cicero’s, nor a joke designed to show off 
one’s wit at no target in particular.  Pomponius had obviously claimed that he had 
                                                
67 This operates in much the same fashion as the Suillus retort.  We don’t know anything about what the 
charges against Hispo were.  If fact, the only case in which he was involved that we know was one where 
he was the plaintiff along with Caepio Crispinus against Granius Marcellus.  See New Pauly s.v. Romanius 
Hispo no. 1.  Furthermore, he appears in Seneca the Elder as someone inclined towards abuse, as in the 
case of Cassius Severus.  See Sen. Controv. 2.5.20 and 9.3.11. 




served the Republic at great risk to himself and pointed to a scar on his face as an 
attempt to prove that.  Gaius Caesar could have challenged how he received the 
scars simply by claiming that Pomponius got them in flight.  He could have also 
phrased it as a leading question, “did you not receive that while turning away 
from the enemy?”  However, by challenging Pomponius with something stated as 
though it were advice, the reply becomes a joke and it is this that makes the retort 
work.  If he had not replied as though offering advice, he would have opened up 
the possibility for debating the matter.  Pomponius could have noted the date he 
received his wound, those who saw him receiving it, and who the enemy was who 
gave him it.  By giving sarcastic advice, Gaius Caesar shuts down the debate for 
he can pretend that he was only joking but still put out an alternative message to 
the jury.  They laugh, they don’t necessarily expect the debate to continue, they 
don’t interpret the retort as overly abusive, and all the while they are reminded 
that there are cowardly ways someone can be wounded in the front. 
Related to the Gaius Caesar joke is Cicero’s response when he was 
mocked about his marriage [18] – Quintilian clearly considers them similar since 
he repeats the same verb by omission that he used for the Gaius Caesar joke, 
minuo.  The retort of Cicero was in response to the fact that he, a sexagenarian, 
was marrying a young girl.  The accusation must be along the lines of perversion, 
that Cicero was aberrant for his interest in so young a girl, along with the 
suggestion that in being too old for her, he might not be capable of consummating 
the marriage.  By responding “she’ll be a woman tomorrow,” Cicero acts as 
though the original accusation was about her rather than him, as though she was 
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the one insulted and not Cicero while also, by the way, asserting his virility.  
Whereas Gaius Caesar is introduced as a way to cut down an opponent’s boast, 
Cicero’s retort is a way to blunt the edge of a charge.  Although these are very 
different actions, they are linked by the fact that they both serve to diminish 
something said by their adversary.  Quintilian oddly links the Cicero retort to 
something else Cicero said, in response to the habit Curio had of beginning his 
speeches by apologizing for his youth, about which he said “his openings words 
get easier everyday.”70  These two jokes seem very different.  One, the marriage 
joke, is in response to an accusation made by another and the other, on the 
speeches of Vatinius, is a simple insult against someone not engaged in any 
argument with Cicero.  The only thing they have in common is that they are both 
in response to something said by an opponent.  Whereas we might differentiate 
jokes from comebacks, Quintilian only distinguishes between jokes based on 
someone else’s words and jokes that aren’t verbally tied to their targets.   Of the 
former, jokes that play on the words of someone else, he says, “some call this type 
of saying ‘consequent’,” hoc genus dicti consequens vocant quidam.71  That is to 
say, these jokes depend on the words of others – those of Pomponius, the 
individual who taunted Cicero, and Vatinius. When categorizing humor, we think 
from the perspective of the humor’s target.  We refer to “knock knock” rather 
than “who’s there” jokes.   Quintilian seems to categorize humor from the 
perspective of the joker.  And from that perspective, both Cicero’s retort and his 
insult are based on the words of others, one being the words of someone 
                                                




challenging him and the other those of a political rival. However, it is notable that 
the majority of the jokes Quintilian describes are in response: fifty-six out of his 
seventy-nine total jokes can be considered “consequential” since they are based 
on something someone else has said. Cicero’s quip about Fabia being thirty for 
the twentieth time; Bassus’ deepening the insult toward Domitia by denying that 
he said she sold cheap shoes and instead claiming that he said she bought cheap 
shoes; and Gaius Caesar’s “you should never look back when running away,” all 
of these are “consequential.”  At the end of this “consequential” section he cites a 
response of Cassius Severus who had been criticized by the praetor for insulting a 
particular friend of Caesar who happened to be an Epicurean.  Severus simply 
said, “I don’t know who insulted him, and I think they were Stoics,” nescio…qui 
conviciati sint, et puto Stoicos fuisse.72 Rather than lessening (minuo) or coming 
up with a double meaning (ratio duplex), this transfers blame.  It doesn’t make 
light of it or change the nature of it; it simply implies that Severus thought this 
matter had nothing to do with him.  
Notable among his “consequential” jokes, out of fifty-nine of them, the 
ones he discusses the most are ones that follow quickly in response to an 
accusation.  The response of the eques who Augustus thought should not be 
drinking at the games, that the princeps didn’t have to worry about losing his seat, 
was in response to an accusation.  As was the case with the retort of Manius when 
he was shown a painting of himself in disreputable situations as a result of his 
gambling.  Again, his “nunquam vici” [7] makes light of a charge, as Cicero’s 




response to criticism of his young wife, but also refuses to change the subject of 
the joke.73  
 The majority of the jokes that are replies to accusations are not challenges, 
however.  Most of the retorts are admissions that trivialize the accusations.74  
Regarding the joke that the eques made to Augustus about seating [4], we see the 
same formula as the jokes discussed above.  The eques admits that he is eating in 
public and therefore breaking a social code but by stating that he is only doing so 
because he fears losing his seat makes Augustus’ accusation seem insensitive.  
There is no hint as to what the reaction of Augustus was but the joke cleverly 
masks impudence with praise.   To challenge the princeps on a question of 
decorum is certainly provocative but the fact that in so doing he alludes to 
Augustus’ immense and conspicuous power softens the blow.  Add to this the fact 
that it is clearly a shrewd remark and it is difficult to imagine how Augustus could 
have continued to be annoyed.  Any action he took against the knight would have 
appeared excessive.  The urge to chastise dispels quickly upon laughter.  
 Immediately after this jest, Quintilian relates the response of Augustus to 
the solider he was dismissing.  That response, “tell him I displeased you,” is 
nearly the opposite of the knight’s in terms of power structures.  Whereas 
Quintilian had just mentioned a joke in which someone with little power mildly 
challenges someone of much greater power, he now describes a joke in which 
someone of great power challenges someone with much less power [5].  In the 
first case, the joke is to challenge with a reference to a positive quality: I am not 
                                                
73 The jokes in response to an accusation are 1-4, 6-13, 15-21. 
74 1,4,6, perhaps 9 if we interpret Gabba’s words as boastful, 10-13, 15-16, 19, and 21. 
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going to stop eating because you are so powerful that you do not have to worry 
about losing your seat if you go home.  In the second, the joke is to challenge with 
self-deprecation: you can speak to your father as though you are more powerful 
than me but this just shows how immature you are.  Both jokes silence criticism 
but because of the different directions of the jokes, towards one of higher power 
versus one of lower power, one must use different kinds of humor.  Also, both 
jokes are designed to shut up – to get the other side to cease complaining.  
Obviously it would have been untenable for the knight to say “quit complaining; 
you’re rich.”  But it would have been nearly as untenable for August to say, “shut 
up, you child.”  Both would give rise to anger and not helped the situation.  If 
Augustus had spoken bluntly, the officer would have walked off with a grudge 
and anyone else present might have thought the princeps had acted too severely.  
However, by undermining the premise of the officer’s complaint the officer is 
much less likely to bear ill will.  What’s more, anyone present would have 
laughed and expressed admiration for someone so powerful (seemingly) making 
fun of himself.  Jests can win friends and influence people. 
 Regarding the youths of Tarentum [2], the king found this retort so funny 
that his anger was mitigated.75  The youth who stated this was insulting himself 
and his fellow guests.  His admission implies that they did not have the courage to 
slay the king without drink, making them appear cowardly, indecisive, and 
capricious.  However, by also admitting they had been about to kill him, they also 
                                                
75 6.3.10: Documento sunt iuuenes Tarentini, qui multa de rege Pyrrho sequius inter cenam locuti, cum 
rationem facti reposcerentur et neque negari res neque defendi posset, risu sunt et oportuno ioco elapsi. 
Namque unus ex iis 'immo', inquit, 'nisi lagona defecisset, occidissemus te', eaque urbanitate tota est 
inuidia criminis dissoluta.  
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insult Pyrrhus.  The youth’s statement indicates discontent with the king, a lack of 
fear that he would punish them for their insults, and thereby implies the king was 
weak.  Also, just as part of the insult of Caesar was that if he was a woman, then 
the Senate was being dominated by a woman, here part of the insult is that 
Pyrrhus was nearly killed by drunken young men.  Matthew Roller has interpreted 
this account within the context of “convivial exchanges between aristocrat and 
ruler”76 that can go wrong, arguing that it is an example of one manner of speech, 
the offensive words of the youths, being replaced by a joke that the king receives 
“as a replacement for the offensive speech.”77  In such a scenario this was never 
about killing.  The youths were drunk, were too loose with their words, the king 
called them out for it, and they saved face with a joke.  In other words, this is an 
example of a redressive action (see chapter two).    
 It seems to me, however, that the language used by Quintilian in his 
account suggests that the intended killing and the escape from punishment for it 
are the main points.  Quintilian says, literally, that “when they were called to 
account for the deed and the matter could not be denied nor defended,” cum 
rationem facti reposcerentur et neque negari res neque defendi posset.  The first 
part of this is in the form of official, judicial charges with facti being a genitive of 
charge.  What’s more, that Quintilian uses the singular facti implies that there is 
something in particular that the youths were being called to justify.  Lastly, if 
Quintilian were thinking of words as the matter that the youths were being 
summoned for, why not say that?  Why not verborum or dictorum?  In the end, 
                                                




however, regardless of whether the issue is the words or the threatened action of 
the youths, the most significant aspect to Quintilian’s account of Pyrrhus is that it 
is another example of humor used to get out of a difficult situation. 
 The effectiveness of the Gabba joke, that eels are so large where he bought 
his five foot one that fishermen wear them as belts, [9] is in part in the absurdity 
of fishermen using fish as belts.  Quintilian refers to this joke as a lie bested by a 
lie, eluditur...mendacium quoque mendacio.78  Likewise, he claims that lies may 
be countered with false confessions, and for this he cites two very sensible 
comebacks.   The way these retorts work is clear.  Both avoid denial while 
keeping up criticism.  The prosecutor Domitius Afer admitted to going after 
Caesar’s freedmen, but in claiming that he never succeeded he renders the 
objection irrelevant by suggesting that they deserve it - they are so egregious that 
no matter how much he goes after them, he still has to go after them more.   He 
also ends up insulting himself slightly and, as such, this is an example of a 
redressive action – by admitting to a lack of success he implies that he is failing 
and thus the accuser can consider himself to have saved face  (see chapter two).  
As for Catulus, he not only doesn’t deny that he barks [11], he embraces it but 
then provides a very reasonable explanation for what would spur a dog to bark: an 
intruder or thief.  Indeed, Quintilian himself cites this joke as an example for how 
avoiding denial can be an effective way to reply to a charge.79 
                                                
78 6.3.80.  Part of the effectiveness of this comeback is that it is such a large lie.  It thus works similar to the 
phrase attributed (possible misattributed) to Goebells: “the bigger the lie the more they believe.”  For more 
see “Aus Churchills Lügenfabrik,” Die Zeit ohne Beispiel (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP. 1941), pp. 
364-369. 
79 6.3.81: Cui uicinum est non negare quod obicitur, cum et id palam falsum est et inde materia bene 
respondendi datur.  I would simply add that this is more useful than Quintilian acknowledges.  He says that 
this is useful when the charge is obviously false, palam falsum, and the nature of the charge, materia, 
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 Regarding Cicero’s response to Fabia [22], that he has been hearing that 
she is thirty for twenty years, it’s difficult to consider this an admission, despite 
the fact that Quintilian claims that it is.  Cicero is saying “you’re not really 
thirty.”  However, the particles suggest Cicero is agreeing.80  Without the nam it 
could be viewed as an outright contradiction.  With the nam Cicero is agreeing 
with part of what Fabia has said, that she has said she was thirty.  This is 
agreement in name only.  How are we to explain Quintilian’s odd definitions of 
what constitutes admitting and challenging?  One can’t be thirty for twenty years.   
Is he strictly concerned with the language of agreement and disagreement rather 
than the content involved? This jest, as with one we shall see below, doesn’t 
admit as much as it outright mocks the premise to which it is replying.  To admit 
something sarcastically is to admit nothing at all.  For Caesar to agree with an 
insult that had been hurled at him in the past is an admission.  Cicero’s reply is 
outright mockery.  Does Quintilian have radically different definitions or is he 
being loose with his words? 
 In considering the way in which the Manius (did I never win?) [7] and 
Cicero (she’ll be a woman tomorrow) [18] jokes are determined to be both denial 
(and thus in some way directed against ourselves) and agreement, the 
conjunctions which connect the quotes to those to which they are replying seem to 
be playing a role.  The Manius quip begins with an ergo, thus making whatever 
follows deductive: if what you have shown in the painting is true then this is 
                                                                                                                                            
allows it.  My argument is that denying the charge is almost always the most useful strategy.  Quintilian 
also says in §6.3.79 that ridicule can be evaded by more ridicule, eluditur et ridiculum ridiculo. 
80 See Kroon 1995: 144-168, where she claims that nam has three distinguishable usages: backward-
linking, forward-linking, and affirmative.  Here, the nam would be backward-linking — “Indeed what you 
have said is correct for…” 
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evidence that I was released from debtor’s prison.  Likewise, Cicero’s response to 
Fabia begins with a nam, making the rest of his reply confirmative and 
explicative.  Although ergo is certainly not a conjunction of denial, it is the only 
explanation for why Quintilian considers this quip a denial since what follows 
implies agreement.  And the fact that nam is confirmative by nature would explain 
referring to Cicero’s joke about age as an agreement.  But the nature of the actual 
jokes seems to be the opposite of what Quintilian claims.  Either he is hung up on 
the conjunctions or he has a very different view of the implications of Manius and 
Cicero’s jests. 
 A rudimentary answer can be found in another jest [18] Quintilian calls a 
denial.   This is a denial in name only.  Bassus’ response to Domitia’s complaint 
about his comments on her shoes [8] is that he never said she sold cheap shoes but 
merely bought them.  Bassus’ words suggest that he is denying Domitia’s claim, 
as evidenced by the mehercules.  But what he claims he said instead is much more 
insulting than what was alleged to be said. On the one hand, any reply that is to 
some extent a successful challenge can be thought of by Quintilian as a denial.  
The one commonality in the jests that Quintilian regards as denials is that they all 
serve the interests of the jester.  Manius [7] throws off his accuser and Bassus 
turns anger against him into humor [8].  What sets Cicero’s joke about Fabia [22] 
apart is not that it is a denial, though this is what Quintilian claims.  What sets it 
apart is that it is offensive rather than defensive.  Cicero has nothing to lose as the 
matter is not about him but Fabia.  Were he to say nothing about her age there 
would be no consequence of importance to him.  Perhaps he might regret missing 
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an opportunity for a jab, but his reputation would not suffer.  Whether or not 
Quintilian views something as denial really comes down to the stakes of the 
matter.  When they are great, it’s a denial.  When they are irrelevant, it can be 
something else.  Even when it may appear that there are no stakes in the context 
of the jests, if there is a remote possibility of them, Quintilian considers those 
jests to be defensive. 
 Quite a few jests that Quintilian reports seem to have little purpose other 
than to abuse one’s opponent or show off one’s cleverness, even at the risk of 
contradicting one’s own claims.  Quintilian so admires the sero joke [13] that he 
says “it alone justifies that this kind [of joke] is not to be rejected completely” (vel 
solum sufficit, ut hoc genus non totum repudietur) yet by saying this Cicero agrees 
with the prosecutor’s claim that Milo had lain in wait.  A large part of his defense 
of Milo was, of course, that Clodius deserved to die and that Milo had done the 
republic a service for eliminating him.  But he also takes pains to claim that the 
run-in occurred because Clodius had lain in wait for Milo.  This doesn’t help his 
case, which he of course eventually lost.  Yet Quintilian finds it to be a brilliant 
display of wit precisely because it is such a quick comeback and it is hard to 
imagine that the audience didn’t laugh hysterically at it.  This gets to the heart of 
what Quintilian sees humor as being: a deterrent against abuse, a tool to mislead 
audiences, but most importantly, something to be admired in its own right such 
that effective use of it can inspire confidence in and a positive predisposition 
towards an orator.  Humor is a quality that not only is difficult for audiences to 
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resist, but is also likely to elicit in audiences such approval of the joker that it is 
inclined to view his position with favor, Cicero’s loss notwithstanding.  
 In the eunuch joke [26], wherein someone is claimed to be more lusty than 
a eunuch, Quintilian claims that what he finds funny here is the surprise that we 
get when we reach the end of the sentence, since the expectation is that the 
comparison is going to be to a satyr.  Although eunuchs could be associated with 
illicit sexual activity, they were not conventionally thought of as in a state of 
constant sexual arousal.  What Quintilian would normally disapprove of – to be 
considered libidinous was not good for one’s reputation so the joke starts out very 
pointedly81 – he admires here because of the replacement of something expected 
with something unexpected, similar to Afer’s quip about the orator who was 
brilliantly…dressed [32]. 
 Although their subject matters may be serious, the jokes Quintilian lists 
don’t rely on highlighting the seriousness.  Moreover, although all of these cases 
involve some degree of acting, they are all what we would call deadpan.  The 
person doing the simulating or dissimulating acts in earnest.  This is most likely 
what sets apart this kind of humor for Quintilian.  The orator can make these 
kinds of jokes with a solemn look rather than taking up an unseemly countenance.  
Quintilian gives another example of irony, similar to simulation and 
dissimulation, in the form of an unusual exchange between the elder Gaius Caesar 
and one or two parties in a conflict, an exchange that is interesting because of its 
                                                
81 Williams 2010 (2nd edition of his 1999 monograph, which remains the best source for discussions of 
Roman manhood).  Gunderson 2000 also continues to be an authority for this. 
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sexual nature (joke [21] in the catalog).  Quintilian reports the exchange as 
follows:  
est et illa ex ironia fictio, qua usus est C. Caesar.  nam cum testis diceret a 
reo femina sua ferro petita, et esset facilis reprehensio, cur illam 
potissimum partem corporis uulnerare uoluisset: “quid enim faceret,” 
inquit, “cum tu galeam et loricam haberes?”82  
 
There is a sort of fiction which comes from irony, which Gaius Caesar 
used. For when a witness said that his thighs had been attacked by the 
defendant with a sword, and the [following] reprimand would be easy, 
“why did he wish to wound that part of the body in particular,” Caesar 
said “well, what could he do when you had your helmet and cuirass?” 
 
It is difficult to tell what role Caesar’s father was playing in this exchange, 
whether he was the prosecutor, the defendant, a judge, or simply an onlooker.  It 
does, however, make it clear that he is the one who is making the joke.  But what 
is the joke exactly and what happened that elicited the joke?  It seems that a 
witness claimed that the accused had gone after the witness’ thighs with a sword.  
While this could be as simple as one person swinging his sword at another’s 
thighs, there are more salacious interpretations.  For one, the sword could be a 
euphemism for the penis and thus the joke could refer to sexual assault.  For 
another, the ferrum could be a sword but the thighs could be a euphemism for the 
anus or genitalia.  Thus, out of three possible interpretations of what happened, 
two are sexual assaults and one is a simple physical assault.  Taking these odds in 
consideration with Gaius Caesar’s words, this is potentially a sexual matter, and at 
the very least some members of the audience may have taken it as such.  His 
response of “what else could he do?” not only makes light of the whole thing but 
also suggests intentionality.  Although there are other possibilities, interpreting 




this strictly literally raises more questions than it answers.  The literal 
interpretation would turn the joke into an outright admission at the very root of 
the case.  It would be one thing if the response was an admission and a 
repackaging, but it is only an admission.  As such it is tantamount to mocking the 
law, or at the very least the court at hand, itself.  To see in this exchange sexual 
overtones makes much more sense, especially given the use of words we know 
had sexual connotations.83  It involves no denial and turns the accusation into an 
absurdity by jokingly admitting to it.  The only difference between this joke and 
the Semiramis comment of his son is that one could be an admission of sexual 
aggression while the other is certainly an example of sexual passivity.  
 Just as Caesar fils made light of the accusation that he was a woman in the 
Semiramis comment, to some extent admitting it, here Caesar père offers a 
defense that does the same thing.  The only difference is that the admission here, 
though legally less permissible, is less embarrassing than his son’s admission to 
being feminine: in terms of the law, it’s better to be the victim of rape than the 
rapist; but, in terms of reputation, it’s better to be the rapist than the victim.  
However, given that this exchange seems to have taken place in a judicial setting, 
with the testis and the reus, it is an odd defense.  Caesar is defending the 
reputation of the accused when he should be defending the charge.  Again, what 
we see here is the deliberate preference given to humor over argument and 
evidence.   
                                                
83 Testis does have sexual connotations as it is occasionally used instead of testiculus or coleus.  However, 
there’s no reason to think it means anything other than “witness” here.  Ferrum, peto, uulnare, on the other 
hand, all have sexual overtones.  See Adams 1982: 67 s.v. testis, 152, 212 n.1 s.v. peto, and s.v. uulnus. 
 
 151 
 We see this preference at work even more explicitly in the example 
Quintilian gives shortly after the Gaius Caesar remark, namely the response of an 
advocate upon being shown a scar on the plaintiff’s leg [16].  It’s possible that the 
response “do you have a leg down there or is it all scar?”84 was made in 
frustration, without intention of challenging the plaintiff.  But, it’s almost too 
funny a remark to be made simply out of frustration.  And, even if the advocate 
was speaking to himself or complaining about his luck, the joke still has an effect.  
The remark is tantamount to admitting that the plaintiff was right, and this seems 
to place the reputation of the defendant above the question of his guilt or 
innocence.  In fact, if the remark of the defendant’s advocate had been taken 
literally by the audience, be that jury or judge, it would increase the severity of 
the situation, despite the fact that the Romans did not have different categories of 
murder, or indeed the concept of murder as a crime.85  For although there was no 
technical term for murder nor subcategories of it, it is inevitable that the degree of 
an assault would be taken into consideration, as is evidenced from the XII tables 
to the Justinianic Code.86 
                                                
84 I think this is the most likely interpretation of latus oportuit.  The second most likely is the genitalia 
interpretation – that the advocate was saying that the plaintiff should have taken greater care not to reveal 
his manhood.  What I find the most implausible interpretations are that: the latus is an adjective describing 
the scar, “you’re right; that’s big,” or that the latus refers to the place that the defendant should have 
wounded the plaintiff. 
85 This is to assume that the trial was one of assault, as noticed by Mommsen 1899: 613 and discussed by 
Gaughan 2010: 67-89.  Gaughan does of course acknowledge the punishment by murder by the state upon a 
traitor, as might occur through the iudicia populi and after the lex Sempronia ne de capite ciuium iniussu 
populi iudicaretur through the assembly, as well as the duumuiri perduellionis. 
86 Warmington 1935 Table VIII: si membrum rup<s>it, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto. manu fustiue si os fregit 
libero, CCC <assium>, si seruo, CL <assium> poenam subito si iniuriam faxsit, uiginti quinque poenae 
<asses> sunto.  From this we can clearly see that the social status of the victim of assault related to the 
damages that had to be paid.  But it is also evident from the membrum versus os differentiation that the 
more dangerous assault merited violent reprisal, whereas the perpetrator of a lesser assault could get away 
with a fine.  Moreover, it is simply hard to imagine that scratched skin from a slap could be viewed as 
equivalent to the breaking of bones or damage to central organs. 
 
 152 
 The humor that Quintilian admires the most is that kind in which one 
“takes an opinion or words in a way other than intended,” and he deems this ”the 
most charming of all this material” (genus decipiendi opinionem aut dicta aliter 
intellegendi, quae sunt in omni hac materia vel uenustissima).87  The examples he 
gives for these kinds of jokes are very similar to what I called “disguised” jokes, 
in that they don’t begin as jokes; rather they end as jokes by putting something 
unexpected at the end.  For instance, the Cicero joke [29] about the man lacking 
in nothing but wealth and virtue and the Afer joke [32] about the orator who is 
excellently dressed both fall into this category for Quintilian. 
 To these jokes, Quintilian adds what he considers the most funny: 
Plurimus autem circa simulationem <et dissimulationem> risus est quae sunt 
uicina et prope eadem; sed simulatio est certam opinionem animi sui imitantis, 
dissimulatio aliena se parum intelligere fingentis.88   
 
But the loudest laughter of all is produced by simulation and dissimulation, 
proceedings which differ but little and are almost identical; but whereas 
simulation implies the pretence of having a certain opinion of one's own, 
dissimulation consists in feigning that one does not understand someone else's 
meaning. 
 
What’s interesting about this kind of humor is that it sounds highly dramatic, 
something which Quintilian elsewhere disapproves of.89  One either pretends to 
hold an opinion one doesn’t really hold, or one pretends to misunderstand 
something that one in fact understands perfectly well.  For the former Quintilian 
cites an advocate pretending to think a female witness is a man and for the latter 
                                                
87 6.3.84. 
88 6.3.85. 
89 6.3.9: cum uideatur autem res leuis et quae ab scurris, mimis, insipientibus denique saepe moueatur, 
tamen habet uim nescio an imperiosissimam et cui repugnari minime potest.  See also, 6.3.29: dicacitas 
etiam scurrilis et scenica huic personae alienissima est. 
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he cites Cicero’s response [14] quoting Ennius in response to the prosecutor’s 
question about a witness named Sextus Annalis.90 
 In addition to jokes Quintilian praises, it is worth considering the jokes of 
which he disapproves.  These are notable for their complete lack of argumentative 
value.  He suggests that Cicero went too far in some jests and mentions several 
that he found uncouth.  Quintilian also disapproves of simple name-calling.  He 
gives the following examples: an Acisculus is called Pacisculus because of a 
compact he made; a Placidus is called Acidus for his ill temper; and a Tullius is 
called Tollius for being a thief.91  It seems clear that it is the simple association 
that he dislikes.92  However, he does find it funny when the associations are of 
actions rather than names, thus he approves of Cicero’s depiction of Verres 
sweeping away wealth from Sicily93 and Afer’s referring to an orator who was 
rushing about needlessly, to and fro, as not pleading but overdoing it.94  Although 
there doesn’t appear to be anything particularly more inventive verbal 
associations, it’s possible that such puns could be presented in such a way as to 
appear more extemporaneous.  The action of a play on the word verro presents the 
audience with an image whose vividness can distract from its lack of spontaneity.  
 
4.5 How Humor Should Be Used 
                                                
90 For the woman treated as though she were a man, see the end of §85. 
91 6.3.53.  He also mentions in 6.3.55 all the jokes based on Verres’ name that Cicero employed. 
92 Interestingly, however, he approves of associating individuals with the names of those with poor 
reputations whom they resemble.  He mentions Lentulus Spinther and Scipio Serapio at 6.3.57. 
93 6.3.55. 
94 6.3.54: non agere dixit sed satagere.  While the verb satagere literally means “to do just enough” (satis 
+ago) it often meant, to overdo it.  Thus here Afer is playing on the verb agere sarcastically and saying 
“he’s certainly trying.” 
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 Quintilian views humor in oratory as a means to rebuff accusations, inject 
levity into a boring case, and occasionally to align jurors with the orator. 
Laedere numquam uelimus, longeque absit illud propositum, potius 
amicum quam dictum perdendi. In hac quidem pugna forensi malim mihi 
lenibus uti licere. Nonnumquam et contumeliose et aspere dicere in 
aduersarios permissum est, cum accusare etiam palam et caput alterius 
iuste petere concessum sit. Sed hic quoque tamen inhumana uideri solet 
fortunae insectatio, uel quod culpa caret uel quod redire etiam in ipsos qui 
obiecerunt potest. Primum itaque considerandum est et quis <et> in qua 
causa et apud quem et in quem et quid dicat. Oratori minime conuenit 
distortus uultus gestusque, quae in mimis rideri solent. Dicacitas etiam 
scurrilis et scaenica huic personae alienissima est: obscenitas uero non a 
uerbis tantum abesse debet, sed etiam a significatione. Nam si quando 
obici potest, non in ioco exprobranda est. Oratorem  praeterea ut dicere 
urbane uolo, ita uideri adfectare id plane nolo. Quapropter ne dicet quidem 
salse quotiens poterit, et dictum potius aliquando perdet quam minuet 
auctoritatem. Nec accusatorem autem atroci in causa nec patronum in 
miserabili iocantem feret quisquam. Sunt etiam iudices quidam tristiores 
quam ut risum libenter patiantur. Solet interim accidere ut id quod in 
aduersarium dicimus aut in iudicem conueniat aut in nostrum quoque 
litigatorem, quamquam aliqui reperiuntur qui ne id quidem quod in ipsos 
reccidere possit euitent. Quod fecit Longus Sulpicius, qui, cum ipse 
foedissimus esset, ait eum contra quem iudicio liberali aderat ne faciem 
quidem habere liberi hominis: cui respondens Domitius Afer ‘ex tui' inquit 
'animi sententia, Longe, qui malam faciem habet liber non est?' Uitandum 
etiam ne petulans, ne superbum, ne loco, ne tempore alienum, ne 
praeparatum et domo allatum uideatur quod dicimus: nam aduersus 
miseros, sicut supra dixeram, inhumanus est iocus. Sed quidam ita sunt 
receptae auctoritatis ac notae uerecundiae ut nocitura sit in eos dicendi 
petulantia; nam de amicis iam praeceptum est. Illud non ad oratoris 
consilium, sed ad hominis pertinet: lacessat hoc modo quem laedere sit 
periculosum, ne aut inimicitiae graues insequantur aut turpis satisfactio. 
Male etiam dicitur quod in pluris conuenit, si aut nationes totae 
incessantur aut ordines aut condicio aut studia multorum. Ea quae dicet uir 
bonus omnia salua dignitate ac uerecundia dicet: nimium enim risus 
pretium est si probitatis inpendio constat.95  
 
Our jests should never be designed to wound, and we should never make it 
our ideal at once lose a friend sooner than lose a jest. Where the battles of 
the courts are concerned I am always better pleased when it is possible to 
indulge in gentle raillery, although it is, of course, permissible to be 
abusive or bitter in the words we use against our opponents, just as it is 
permissible to accuse them openly of crime, and to demand the last 




penalty of the law. But in the courts as elsewhere it is regarded as inhuman 
to hit a man when he is down, either because he is the innocent victim of 
misfortune or because such attacks may recoil on those who make them. 
Consequently, the first points to be taken into consideration are who the 
speaker is, what is the nature of the case, who is the judge, who is the 
victim, and what is the character of the remarks that are made. It is most 
unbecoming for the orator to distort his features or use uncouth gestures, 
tricks that arouse such merriment in farce. No less unbecoming are ribald 
jests, and such as are employed upon the stage. As for obscenity, it should 
not merely be banished from his language, but should not even be 
suggested. For even if our opponent has rendered himself liable to such a 
charge, our denunciation should not take the form of a jest. Further, 
although I want my orator to speak with wit, he must not give the 
impression of striving after it. Consequently he must not display his wit on 
every possible occasion, but must sacrifice a jest sooner than sacrifice his 
dignity. Again, no one will endure an accuser who employs jests to season 
a really horrible case, nor an advocate for the defense who makes merry 
over one that calls for pity. Moreover, there is a type of judge whose 
temperament is too serious to allow him to tolerate laughter. It may also 
happen that a jest directed against an opponent may apply to the judge or 
to our own client, although there are some orators who do not refrain even 
from jests that may recoil upon themselves. This was the case with 
Sulpicius Longus, who despite the fact that he was himself surpassingly 
hideous, asserted of a man against whom he was appearing in a case 
involving his status as a free man, that even his face was the face of a 
slave. To this Domitius Afer replied, "Is it your profound conviction, 
Longus, that an ugly man must be a slave?" Insolence and arrogance are 
likewise to be avoided, nor must our jests seem unsuitable to the time or 
place, or give the appearance of studied premeditation, or smell of the 
lamp, while those directed against the unfortunate are, as I have already 
said, inhuman. Again, some advocates are men of such established 
authority and such known respectability, that any insolence shown them 
would only hurt the assailant. As regards the way in which we should deal 
with friends I have already given instructions. It is the duty not merely of 
an orator, but of any reasonable human being, when attacking one whom it 
is dangerous to offend, to take care that his remarks do not end in exciting 
serious enmity, or the necessity for a grovelling apology. Sarcasm that 
applies to a number of persons is injudicious: I refer to cases where it is 
directed against whole nations or classes of society, or against rank and 
pursuits which are common to many. A good man will see that everything 
he says is consistent with his dignity and the respectability of his 
character; for we pay too dear for the laugh we raise if it is at the cost of 
our own integrity.96 
 
                                                
96 The translation is that of H.E. Butler. 1920-1922. 
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Although Quintilian acknowledges the power of humor and seems to agree with 
Cicero that humor has its basis in pointing out the faults of others, he goes on at 
length here to argue that jests should be avoided unless in the middle of a forensic 
debate (in pugna forensi)—but even then he thinks they should be mild.97  
However, he approves of abuse, in aduersarios, in the most extreme terms by 
speaking harshly and full of insults, contumeliose et aspere dicere.  Moreover,  
when Quintilian brings up the matter of invective in oratory and how to respond 
to it, it is interesting to note that the immediately preceding section is about the 
importance of not seeking applause for the sake of applause.98 This is all rather 
confusing when taken with what else Quintilian has said: jests are basically 
directed against others and thus should never be made, but they are indeed useful 
and can be made in court and not only made but made harshly and with abuse.  
The one thing we can say about this is that Quintilian not only approves of the use 
of jests in court, but deems them appropriate and natural in such a context.  What 
seems to be the key to it all, as he explains later, is the identity of the person to 
whom or about whom the joke is made.  As long as that person is an opponent of 
yours you may abuse him at will.  However, if he (or she) is a third party then 
                                                
97 This is interesting given that in book one (1.8.7-8) Quintilian recommends that young men read comedy, 
contending that this contributes greatly to eloquence because there are many different characters and 
emotions in the comedic genre.  LaCourse Munteanu (97-99) claims that Quintilian is thinking of humor 
here as a means of manipulating the emotions of the jury rather than questioning the character of an 
opponent.  I would argue, however, that Quintilian’s recommendation is related more to character than to 
emotion.  By reading comedy one could encounter the full spectrum of good to bad behavior and see how 
jokes are made about actions.  Jokes in New Comedy are, after all, almost exclusively at the expense of 
others. 
98 Quin. Inst. Or. 12.9. 
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abuse would be inappropriate.99  And while Quintilian might prefer that it all be 
kept light, he realizes that abuse is often of a serious nature in the real world.  
Despite the broad and seemingly contradictory pronouncements Quintilian makes, 
the final say in where humor should be employed and what kind comes down to 
context.  One must be aware of one’s opponent and audience when saying 
anything negative. 
 Quintilian proceeds to explain to the reader the sort of jokes that are 
appropriate and effective in forensic oratory.  By looking at what kinds of humor 
Quintilian sees as related, what he considers funny, and why he favors certain 
humor in certain contexts, we can begin to form a theory of what we might call 
“purposeful humor.”  What we find is that the common denominator in the jokes 
Quintilian admires is that they are retorts, hence defensive, that turn an accusation 
around on itself.   Moreover, the reason he admires such jokes is twofold: they are 
the most clever kind of humor because they have to be made extemporaneously 
and they are more gentlemanly than pre-planned, offensive insults. 
 Quintilian does not specify any purpose for making jokes at our own 
expense and in fact suggests that we not do so.  He claims:  
In se dicere non fere est nisi scurrarum et in oratore utique minime 
probabile: quod fieri totidem modis quot in alios potest, ideoque hoc, 
quamuis frequens sit, transeo.100 
 
To speak against oneself is unbecoming for all except clowns, and in an 
orator it is to be done as little as possible: this thing can be done in the 
same number of ways as insults against others and therefore I am passing 
by it, though it’s frequent. 
                                                
99 Cicero’s abuse of Clodia would be unfair according to this logic, since he insults her in multiple speeches 
and in only one of them, the Pro Caelio where she is a source of contention, is she directly involved.  





Although he mentions self-mockery as a specific direction that humor can take in 
an argument, he says that only a jester would make fun of himself.101  Yet, clearly 
other orators did not agree with this, since he also says that such joking about 
oneself is frequens. In looking at the jokes that Quintilian discusses, he seems to 
approve of false self-deprecation.  Indeed, such jokes appear only on the surface 
to be against ourselves.  What they do is admit to the insult of the original joke in 
such a way as to misinterpret the intent of it and turn that misinterpretation back 
against the person who made the original joke.  This, of course, is exactly what 
Caesar did during his humorous exchange in the Senate.  Whether or not it was 
intentional, the Semiramis comparison was slightly absurd, and it had the effect of 
both deflecting the criticism and insulting the Senate at the same time.   
 
4.6 Conclusion. 
 In Institutio Oratoria 6.3 Quintilian tries to create a typology of forensic 
humor, even though he rightly admits that such an enterprise is nearly futile given 
humor’s endlessly creative nature.102  However, there are a number of 
commonalities running through the types of humor he applauds as well as the 
types he finds fault with.  The humor that he lauds is almost always functional, 
                                                
101 Beard (2014: 103) claims that there were two basic kinds of humor, that of urbanitas and that of the 
jester or mime (scurra or mimus).  Her argument is that the Roman aristocracy had a sense of humor 
associated with wordplay and other Romans had one associated with mockery and imitation.  While this 
may be true, I would still argue that if it is considered urbanitas to misinterpret an accusation or admit to it 
and then turn it around on the accuser, then non-aristocratic Romans had just as much appreciation for 
urbanitas as Quintilian.  It is only a matter of comprehension – though I would argue that, unless the joke 
hinges on a literary reference that wasn’t widely circulated orally, the average Roman could pick up such 
jokes easily.   
102 6.3.101: sed repetam necesse est, infinitas esse tam salse dicendi quam severe, quas praestat persona, 
locus, tempus, casus denique, qui est maxime uarius. 
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whether that function is to make an argument or simply to one-up an opponent.  
Never does Quintilian cite a joke whose only purpose is to make people laugh.  
This should not be surprising given that the subject with which he is concerned is 
oratory, an utterly practical, outcome-oriented speech genre.  However, many 
specific instances of jokes he discusses come from beyond the realm of the courts.  
Many jokes are simply about one-upmanship, as is the case with the quip uttered 
by the knight at the games, whom Augustus criticized for eating and drinking in 
public.  Yet even then there is some forensic value for the orator-in-training: for 
the joke’s chief success lies in the fact that it is an example of a subordinate figure 
disarming a superior.  Another common thread in the jokes of Quintilian is that 
nearly all respond to someone else’s words.103  As he himself states, “jokes are by 
far more charming in response than in attack,” sunt enim longe uenustiora omnia 
in respondendo quam in prouocando.104  The only unprovoked joke Quintilian 
mentions is Cicero’s jest about Fabia turning thirty for the twentieth time.  What’s 
more, of jokes made in reply to criticism, the majority of those he cites contain 
some degree of admission of guilt but succeed by “changing the conversation,” as 
public relations experts have coined it.  The one thing uniting all the jokes 
Quintilian cites is that they are all have the effect of taking a person or a person’s 
                                                
103 This is likely the type of humor mentioned at De Orat. 218: “As there are two kinds of wit, one spread 
regularly through all of a speech, the other pointed and concise; the ancients denominated the former 
humour, the latter jesting. Each sort has but a light name, and justly.” Etenim cum duo genera sint 
facetiarum, alterum aequabiliter in omni sermone fusum, alterum peracutum et breve, illa a ueteribus 
superior cauillatio, haec altera dicacitas nominata est.  In such a dichotomy, Quintilian admires jesting, 
cauillatio, over humor, dicacitas.  Just as Cicero remarks, although neither can be taught, jesting cannot be 
prewritten whereas humor can be.  Interesting to our purposes, Cicero links the use of humor to cases 
where one doesn’t want to challenge the dignity of the opposition.  Thus, we might contrast the Pro 
Murena, in which Cicero was careful not to offend the prosecutors yet clearly depended on humor (at least 
according to Cato’s assessment of Cicero’s defense), with the last three of his vis defenses, the Pro Caelio, 




argument down a peg.  The only differences between such jokes are the contexts 






Chapter Five: Evasive Humor outside the Courts. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 We have seen how both Cicero, in practice, and Quintilian, in theory, thought 
humor to be a powerful tool in argument when used appropriately.  For Cicero, that was 
anytime his argument required it; for Quintilian, it was in self-defense.  Further, when we 
look at the humor in Cicero’s defense speeches, we see that it is closely tied to character 
(and Quintilian affirms this association by the quips he reports Cicero as having said), 
and that the humor used by Cicero that Quintilian most appreciated was the turning 
around of an insult and applying it to one’s opponent.  From these facts we have 
concluded that the strategic deployment of humor was both a common and effective 
practice of Cicero and, judging by the jokes of others for which Quintilian has the most 
enthusiasm, likely a few other successful advocates such as Domitius Afer and Q. 
Lutatius Catulus.  This makes sense given that the short supply of honor among Roman 
aristocrats created a great deal of verbal competition, and that verbal competition often 
leads towards a concern with saving face.  And as a result of the presence of an audience 
judging that competition, power was negotiated not simply through the logic of 
arguments presented, but by subjective rhetorical performance – as we have seen, 




But the negotiation of power was not limited to the courts.   For if it was present 
in the courts, where there was at least a pretense of pursuing truth according to Riggsby, 
it would most likely have been present wherever there were verbal arguments judged by 
third parties.  Thus, we would expect there to have been humor used in negotiations 
amongst family, within the patron-client relationship, within philosophy, poetry, politics, 
religions, marriage, and friendship.  In short, humor was probably used wherever that 
there was a third party – an audience – and an articulate individual with a sense of humor 
and social intelligence appealing to that audience.  In this chapter, we shall consider some 
of these non-judicial contexts for humor in arguments. 
  
5.2 Ciceronian Oratory Beyond the Courts 
In Pisonem 72-75:   
Qui modo cum res gestas consulatus mei conlaudasset, quae quidem conlaudatio 
hominis turpissimi mihi ipsi erat paene turpis, 'non illa tibi,' inquit, 'inuidia nocuit 
sed uersus tui.' Nimis magna poena te consule constituta est sive malo poetae sive 
libero. 'Scripsisti enim: “cedant arma togae.”' Quid tum? 'Haec res tibi fluctus 
illos excitauit.' At hoc nusquam opinor scriptum fuisse in illo elogio quod te 
consule in sepulcro rei publicae incisum est: 'UELITIS IUBEATIS UT, QUOD 
M. CICERO UERSUM FECERIT,' sed 'QUOD UINDICARIT.' Uerum tamen, 
quoniam te non Aristarchum, sed Phalarin grammaticum habemus, qui non notam 
apponas ad malum uersum, sed poetam armis persequare, scire cupio quid tandem 
in isto uersu reprehendas:   'Cedant arma togae.' 'Tuae dicis,' inquit, 'togae 
summum imperatorem esse cessurum.' Quid nunc te, asine, litteras doceam? Non 
opus est uerbis sed fustibus. Non dixi hanc togam qua sum amictus, nec arma 
scutum aut gladium unius imperatoris, sed, quia pacis est insigne et oti toga, 
contra autem arma tumultus atque belli, poetarum more tum locutus hoc intellegi 
uolui, bellum ac tumultum paci atque otio concessurum. Quaere ex familiari tuo 
Graeco illo poeta; probabit genus ipsum et agnoscet neque te nihil sapere 
mirabitur. 'At in altero illo,' inquit, 'haeres: “concedat laurea laudi.”'1 Immo me 
hercule habeo tibi gratiam; haererem enim nisi tu me expedisses. Nam, cum tu 
timidus ac tremens tuis ipse furacissimis manibus detractam e cruentis fascibus 
                                                
1 Linguae is read instead of laudi in PS Sall. In Cic. 6 but, as Nisbet points out, this too often has a negative 
association in Cicero.  Nisbet, p. 142, n.20.  Regardless of the reading, the meaning is the same: arms 
giving way to speech. 
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lauream ad portam Esquilinam abiecisti, iudicasti non modo amplissimae sed 
etiam minimae laudi lauream concessisse. Atque ista oratione hoc tamen intellegi, 
scelerate, uis, Pompeium inimicum mihi isto uersu esse factum, ut, si uersus mihi 
nocuerit, ab eo quem is uersus offenderit uideatur mihi pernicies esse quaesita. 
Omitto nihil istum uersum pertinuisse ad illum; non fuisse meum, quem quantum 
potuissem multis saepe orationibus scriptisque decorassem, hunc uno uiolare 
uersu. 
 
At a certain time he praised how things were carried out in my consulship, praise 
which as it was of the vilest of men was almost foul to me. “It was not these 
things that gave offense,” he said, “it was your poetry.”  Too strong a punishment 
was established when you were consul for a poet either bad or free.  For you 
wrote “let arms yield to the toga.” Yeah, and so what?  This is what excited the 
storm against you.  But I think that it was never written in that elegy which when 
you were consul was inscribed on the tombstone of the republic “May it please 
you that because Marcus Cicero has written verse,” but “because he has given 
punishment.”  However since we have you as our teacher – not an Aristarchus 
who puts a note next to a bad verse, but a Phalaris who pursues the poet with arms 
– I want to know what fault you find with the verse “let arms yield to the toga.”  
You say, he says, that the greatest general must yield to your toga.  What now, 
you ass, am I to teach you literature?  I would need not words but a whip.  I did 
not say this gown in which I’m cloaked, nor the arms of the shield and sword of 
one general, but since the toga is a sign of peace and leisure, and contrawise arms 
of tumult and war, when I spoke in the manner of poets I wanted it to be 
understood that war and tumult would give way to peace and leisure.  Check with 
your friend, that Greek poet: he will approve of and recognize this type of 
language, nor will he be surprised that you know nothing.  “But in the next part,” 
he says, “you get caught (when you say): ‘let the laurel branch submit to praise’.”  
Heaven help me, I owe you a thanks; I would be caught unless you had helped 
me.  For when you, timid and trembling, with your kleptomaniacal hands threw 
off the laurel that you had seized from bloody fasces towards the Esquiline gate, 
you showed that the laurel had conceded not only to the greatest but also to the 
most trivial praise.  But you still wish, you rogue, it to be understood that Pompey 
was made hostile to me on account of this verse; in such a way that, if the verse 
had harmed me, he whom that line offended, by him it would seem that my 
destruction was sought.  I say nothing about the verse not referring to him, that 
it’s not my way to injure this man in one verse, whom I often honored as greatly 
as I could in many speeches and texts.  But for now, let’s say that he was 
offended: would he not have taken this one little verse with my great many books 
of his praises?  Do you think about what, among whom, and about whom you 
speak? 
 
This passage, which Cicero delievered to the Senate in 55 BCE, was not part of a formal 
prosecution.  It is simple invective that stems from the blame which Cicero placed on 
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Piso for his role in Cicero’s exile, from which he had returned less than two years earlier.  
It is, to some extent, a cheap shot since Piso, although somewhat liable for the exile, 
certainly was not the primary instigator of it. 
 In this passage we have a description of the criticisms that Cicero claims Piso 
made of him.  These cannot be taken at face value given Cicero’s skill at 
misrepresentation.  However, the charges are ones we see time and again regarding 
Cicero: that he was vain, that his handling of the Catiline conspirators was cruel and 
illegal, as well as that he insults those of higher station.  
Cicero quotes Piso as saying “it wasn’t the resentment that harmed you but your 
verses” (non illa tibi, inquit inuidia nocuit sed versus tui).  This is, however, an odd way 
of putting it.  Nisbet cites section 75 of the Pro Milone to claim that non illa tibi inuidia 
means “non illarum rerum inuidia.”  The text there reads as follows:  
Sed ausum esse T. Furfanio dicere, si sibi pecuniam quantam posceret non 
dedisset, mortuum se in domum eius inlaturum, qua inuidia huic esset tali viro  
conflagrandum; qui Appium fratrem, hominem mihi coniunctum fidissima gratia, 
absentem de possessione fundi deiecit;  
 
But he dared to say to Furfanius, that if he did not give him as much money as he 
demanded, he would carry a dead body into his house, and so raise a storm of 
unpopularity against him;2 who turned his brother Appius, a man connected with 
me by the most faithful friendship, while he was absent out of the possession of 
his farm; 
 
In this passage something culturally unacceptable or taboo is threatened, to bring a body 
into another’s home and thereby pollute it, which then, through various communicative 
channels, gives rise to (conflagrare) inuidia.  The communicative channels, the agency, 
                                                




are not explicitly stated in either, but a good guess is that the method is word of mouth.3  
There is almost the sense that the inuidia has some agency of its own.  It’s not only 
people expressing disgust at the threat that makes the inuidia spread; it does so itself 
almost in the same way that we think of gossip as spreading.4  Inuidia, it seems, not only 
carries with it the meaning of “envy” or “hatred” but also an association with the verbal 
expression of that envy or hatred. 
 In the In Pisonem passage, however, there is no conflagrare, which according to 
the TLL is a common sort of imagery for inuidia along with chaotic, out-of-control 
growth,5 and additionally, the agency is directly stated, the versus.  Whereas in the Pro 
Milone it is a threat that causes inuidia to spread like fire, in the In Pisonem Cicero’s 
poetry causes him harm.  But what exactly is wrong with Cicero’s poetry?  Is it tasteless, 
vain, or something else?  One of the more commonly cited reasons is that his words were 
insulting to Pompey.6  This is unsatisfactory as a complete explanation for a number of 
reasons,7 but most importantly, it hardly seems a harsh affront, even for the sensitive ego 
of a competitive Roman aristocrat.  They were roughly the same age and Pompey had 
given Cicero reason to be upset with him for not helping to prevent his exile.  Having had 
                                                
3 One thinks of Labeo’s discussion of gatherings at one one’s house for the purpose of shouting in the 
Digest (47.10), as well as of Catullus 17, which Wray claims was meant to be an example of the practice of 
communal abuse delivered at the abused’s house (2001: 137-40). 
4 Inuidia thus spreads in the same way as fama does in Aen. 4.173-177 as it races through Libya, growing 
more and more powerful until it reaches the clouds: Extemplo Libyae magnas it Fama per urbes,  Fama, 
malum qua non aliud uelocius ullum: mobilitate uiget uirisque adquirit eundo, parua metu primo, mox sese 
attollit in auras ingrediturque solo et caput inter nubila condit. 
5 For example: Cluent. 136, Sest. 140.  Also, Lucr. 5.1126 e summo, quasi fulmen, deicit ictos inuidia, Sen. 
Dial. 6.15.5 tantam turbam non potuisse sine inuidia, Liv 6.4.11 qui in eadem inuidiae flamma fuisset, De 
Orat 3.8 ardentem inuidiam. 
6 Nisbet 1987, Ramsey 2003. 
7 Dugan (2005: 63) argues that Piso deliberately misinterpreted the phrase cedant arma togae.  The way 
this misinterpretation worked, Dugan suggests, is that Piso took Cicero as the imperator togatus and 
Pompey the imperator armatus, thereby implying that Cicero’s words meant that he had made Pompey 
yield to him. 
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three consulships and three triumphs, Pompey had a greater claim to auctoritas than 
Cicero.  What is wrong with bragging about besting such a person? 
 Someone who insults a person of a higher rank is always open to the charge of 
being a social climber.  However, that is likely not what is happening here.  Piso is 
unlikely to be suggesting Cicero should have refrained from insulting Pompey because of 
Pompey’s preeminence.  Rather Piso is suggesting that Cicero should have refrained from 
insulting him due to his own humble background.  Cicero’s status as a novus homo was 
something to which Cicero was highly sensitive and it would have been in Piso’s interest 
to bring this up.  Cicero’s response is to change the meaning of the insult from one of 
status in terms of background to status in terms of oratorical skill and reasoning - his 
home turf.  He first reminds the audience who his real enemy is, though he avoids 
mentioning his name explicitly: Clodius, not Pompey.  He does so by very cleverly 
referring to Clodius’ destruction of his house, monumental as that was,8 not by calling it a 
monumentum but a sepulchrum rei publicae.  He then quotes from the preamble to 
Clodius’ bill, which was inscribed in the shrine housing a statue dedicated to Liberty on 
the property of Cicero’s destroyed house.9 The effectiveness is similar to Caesar’s retort 
in that it achieves the goal of changing the audience’s perception of Piso’s accusation.10  
Instead of implying that Piso’s accusation was that Cicero was comparing himself to 
Pompey, Cicero’s response implies that Piso’s accusation was that Pompey was 
responsible for Cicero’s exile and the destruction of his property.  His next step is to 
detract from the accusation further by talking not of respect or the lack thereof, but of 
poetry. 
                                                
8 For more on this see Roller 2010. 
9 Nisbet 1961: 140-1. 
10 However, unlike Caesar’s retort, Cicero is clearly in denial mode. 
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Not only does Piso get it wrong about who his own enemies are, Cicero turns 
Piso’s criticism of the meaning of his poetry into criticism of the style of his poetry, 
making Piso out to be an ignorant yet harsh critic of literature.  By claiming that Piso 
mistook a metonymical reference to the toga as a symbol of republican governance for 
Cicero’s personal toga, Cicero takes Pompey out of the picture all together.  The issue 
thus becomes one of Piso’s intelligence.  Piso, in as much as we can reconstruct from 
Cicero’s words, never said anything about the toga literally.  In fact, it appears that the 
basis of his criticism was that the toga very much stood for something, just as Cicero is 
claiming here.  However, it was not Republicanism but rather Cicero himself.  It is a 
classic straw man argument.  And it is one that is contradicted by the very next part of his 
poem that Cicero claims Piso has also misunderstood.  For in the words concedat laurea 
laudi, the laurea clearly refer not to war in general, as Cicero claims of the arma above, 
but to generals in general.11  However, Cicero does not let this impediment stop him. 
Cicero’s retorts do not form a straight line. They arc back around themselves and 
the audience in the most illogical, yet convincing of ways.  And the way they do this is by 
his frequent claiming that his accusers are ignorant both of his and their own words as 
well as the reality they represent.  In so doing Cicero continually shifts the nature of the 
debate.  It goes from an issue of being too open with one’s words to disrespect and social 
climbing and then to the meaning of poetry.  And Cicero further hammers at his 
opponent’s supposed misunderstanding of literature by telling him that he can find out 
that metonymy is a perfectly valid poetic tool by checking with his Greekling teacher. 
This habit of trying to deflect criticism by claiming the charge was composed 
with poor oratorical skill is perfectly illustrated by the beginning of Pis. 75.9, with the 
                                                
11 As pointed out by Nisbet 1961: 141 n. 111. 
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question “quid tu, apud quos, tu de quo dicas, intelligis?”  Three things that must be 
considered by the orator when speaking – what he says, his audience, and his subject.  
Cicero is not only refuting Piso’s claims, but in his traditional fashion, he’s insulting 
Piso’s rhetorical ability as well—something he does so often, he nearly conflates the two 
things.  It’s almost as if Cicero takes the opposite approach to the Caesarian one, in two 
different manners.  In an highly unusual move for Cicero, he makes a denial.  But for 
another, he claims the misunderstanding is due to his adversary’s idiocy.  He draws 
attention to the contest, to the rhetorical competition, thereby ensuring hostility and 
further debate.  It is not a strategy that calms tensions and wins friends.  It widens 
differences and creates resentment.  Could it be that what really bothered Cicero’s 
opponents was that he insulted their rhetorical training and intelligence?  If so, the 
content of the claim did not matter.  If this were the case, it would explain Caesar’s 
success.  Caesar’s responses not only defused but they gave credit to the individuals who 
insulted him.  Caesar’s response says “good one, but…”  Cicero’s response says “you’re 
an idiot, you prove my point; you’re flat out wrong.”  Nowhere is this strategy more 
patent than in the Philippicae. 
  
5.3 Philippicae 
5.3a) Second Philippic   
 In the second Philippic Cicero wrote some of his most famous invective.  In it, he 
accuses Antony of being a drunk, a child (and adult) prostitute, generally dissolute, 
greedy, tyrannical, and utterly inept when it comes to reasoning and speaking.  In the first 
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half of the speech, Cicero discusses the charges Antony laid against him.  In five of those 
charges he makes a point of belittling Antony’s rhetorical ability. 
1.) Quid habes quod mihi opponas, homo diserte, ut Mustelae tamen Seio et 
Tironi Numisio uideris? Qui cum hoc ipso tempore stent cum gladiis in conspectu 
senatus, ego quoque te disertum putabo, si ostenderis quo modo sis eos inter 
sicarios defensurus. Sed quid opponas tandem, si negem me umquam ad te istas 
litteras misisse? Quo me teste convincas? An chirographo? in quo habes scientiam 
quaestuosam. Qui possis? sunt enim librari manu. Iam inuideo magistro tuo, qui te 
tanta mercede quantam iam proferam nihil sapere doceat.12 
 
What do you have that you can throw at me, you eloquent man, as you appear at 
least to Mustela Tamisius, and to Tiro Numisius? These men are standing at this 
very time in the full view of the senate with their swords; I will think you 
eloquent as well if you will show how you would defend them if they were 
charged with being assassins.  But what would you say in response if I were to 
deny that I ever sent those letters to you? By what evidence could you convict 
me?  By my handwriting?  Handwriting is something in which you have a 
lucrative knowledge.  How can you prove it?  For the letters are in the hand of a 
slave.  I now envy your teacher, who for all that payment, which I shall mention 
presently, has taught you to know nothing. 
 
2.) Tam autem eras excors ut tota in oratione tua tecum ipse pugnares, non modo 
non cohaerentia inter se diceres, sed maxime diiuncta atque contraria, ut non tanta 
mecum quanta tibi tecum esset contentio. Uitricum tuum fuisse in tanto scelere 
fatebare, poena adfectum querebare. Ita quod proprie meum est laudasti; quod 
totum est senatus reprehendisti. Nam comprehensio sontium mea, animaduersio 
senatus fuit. Homo disertus non intellegit eum quem contra dicit laudari a se; eos 
apud quos dicit uituperari. Iam illud cuius est, non dico audaciae – cupit enim se 
audacem – sed, quod minime uolt, stultitiae, qua vincit omnis, cliui Capitolini 
mentionem facere, cum inter subsellia nostra uersentur armati, cum in hac cella 
Concordiae, di immortales, in qua me consule salutares sententiae dictae sunt, 
quibus ad hanc diem uiximus, cum gladiis homines conlocati stent?13 
 
But you are so insane that throughout the your whole speech you were fighting 
with yourself, so that you said things that had nothing to do with each other, but 
which were disjointed and contradictory, so that the argument was not as much 
with me as with yourself. You confessed that your stepfather had been implicated 
in so much wickedness and yet you complained that he had been punished. And in 
this way you praised what was uniquely my achievement, and blamed that which 
was wholly the act of the senate. For the seizing of the guilty was mine, the 
investigation was the senate’s. But this eloquent man does not understand that the 
man against whom he is speaking is being praised by him, and that those among 
                                                
12 Phil. 2.8-9. 
13 Phil. 2.18-19. 
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whom he is speaking are being criticized by him. But now what a thing, I will not 
say of audacity (for he wants to be audacious) but (and that which he least wants) 
of idiocy, in which he surpasses all men, that he makes mention of the Capitoline 
Hill, when armed men are occupying space between our benches, when there are 
such men in this temple of Concord, immortal Gods, in which while I was consul 
helpful opinions were given, thanks to which we are all alive to this day. 
 
3.) At etiam quodam loco facetus esse voluisti. Quam id te, di boni, non decebat! 
In quo est tua culpa non nulla. Aliquid enim salis a mima uxore trahere potuisti. 
'Cedant arma togae.' Quid? tum nonne cesserunt? At postea tuis armis cessit toga. 
Quaeramus igitur utrum melius fuerit libertati populi Romani sceleratorum arma 
an libertatem nostram armis tuis cedere.  Nec vero tibi de uersibus plura 
respondebo: tantum dicam breuiter, te neque illos neque ullas omnino litteras 
nosse;14 
 
At one time you wished to be clever.  Good gods, how little did that suited you!  
And in this you are not a little at fault.  For you could have derived some amount 
of wit from your wife, the mime. “Arms to the gown must yield.” Well, have they 
not yielded? But afterwards the gown yielded to your arms. Let us ask whether it 
was better for the arms of wicked men to yield to the freedom of the Roman 
people, or that our liberty should yield to your arms.  I will reply no more to you 
about the verses: I shall only say briefly that you do not understand them, nor any 
other literature; 
 
4.) Sed stuporem hominis uel dicam pecudis attendite. Sic enim dixit: 'Brutus, 
quem ego honoris causa nomino, cruentum pugionem tenens Ciceronem 
exclamavit: ex quo intellegi debet eum conscium fuisse.' Ergo ego sceleratus 
appellor a te quem tu suspicatum aliquid suspicaris; ille qui stillantem prae se 
pugionem tulit, is a te honoris causa nominatur? Esto; sit in uerbis tuis hic 
stupor;15 
 
But look at the the stupidity of this guy, or I should say of this brute beast.  For 
thus he said “Brutus, whom I name for the sake of his honor, holding the bloody 
dagger, shouted to Cicero: from which it must be understood that he aware of the 
assassination.” Am I therefore called wicked by you, I whom you suspect 
suspected something; and the one who openly held the dripping dagger in front of 
himself, is he named by you for the sake of his honor?  Let it be.  Let this idiocy 
exist in your words. 
 
5.) Haec ut conligeres, homo amentissime, tot dies in aliena uilla declamasti? 
quamquam tu quidem, ut tui familiaris simi dictitant, uini exhalandi, non ingeni 
acuendi causa declamitas. At uero adhibes ioci causa magistrum suffragio tuo et 
                                                
14 Phil. 2.19-20. 
15 Phil. 2.30. 
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compotorum tuorum rhetorem, cui concessisti ut in te quae vellet diceret, salsum 
omnino hominem, sed materia facilis in te et in tuos dicta dicere. Uide autem quid 
intersit inter te et auum tuum. Ille sensim dicebat quod causae prodesset; tu 
cursim dicis aliena. At quanta merces rhetori data est!16 
 
So that you might collect all these [arguments], most oblivious of men, that you 
spent so many days in another’s villa declaiming? However, indeed, as your 
friends are wont to say, you often declaim, not for the sake of sharpening your 
intelligence, but for working off the effects of wine. And, indeed, you keep near 
you a teacher for the sake of jokes, appointed by your vote and your companions, 
a rhetorician, to whom you give license to say whatever he wishes against you, an 
altogether witty man, but the material for speaking against you and against your 
friends is plentiful.  See how far apart you and your grandfather are.  He was 
accustomed to speak sensibly such that he aided the case; you speak at random the 
words of another.  And how much money has been given to rhetorician! 
 
 Why does Cicero keep shifting the argument to rhetoric?  As mentioned above, of 
course, it is natural for him to want to shift the ground to where his talents lie.  Another 
reason is that, as we have been noting about Cicero throughout this study, although he 
occasionally rejects an accustation he prefers not to answer accusations with denials.  
However, there are likely ulterior motives as well.  If Cicero had staked his claim to 
power on his oratory and statesmanship because he was continually being insulted on the 
grounds of his humble origins, his falling back upon rhetoric may be more than simply 
trying to change the debate.  Knowing that he could never compete with someone from 
an old Roman family, he tries to offer an alternative to questions of family as the basis for 
statesmanship with questions of oratorical and political capability.  This is an element to 
John Dugan’s argument about Ciceronian self-fashioning.  However, I would place less 
value on Dugan’s principal contention, namely that Cicero had posterity on his mind and 
was both trying to achieve a “textual fixity”17 and set an example for the future, than on 
                                                
16 Phil. 2.42-3. 
17 Dugan 2005: 52. 
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the observation that he was offering an alternative set of values to those of the established 
elite.18 
However, if Cicero were really trying to advance a different paradigm, wouldn’t 
he acknowledge what was happening?  Why do we not more often see Cicero admitting 
that he was from a modest background, but then state that capability and character matter 
more than background?  By not recognizing the other side’s argument, he doesn’t frame 
his side as an argument either.  It could also be that he sincerely believes in the 
importance and rightness of his position.  It may also be a reflexive self-defense 
mechanism that serves a purpose useful only to him, self-denial.  If every time Cicero 
hears abuse directed towards his status he responds with a reaffirmation of the 
prominence of oratory, he could simply be lying to himself about the nature of the abuse.  
If every time someone calls you ugly you respond with “no, I’m intelligent,” you aren’t 
actually engaging in any debate about whether beauty or intelligence is more to be 
valued.  You are simply countering with “but I have this other quality.” 
 
5.3b Thirteenth Philippic  
 In the thirteenth Philippic Cicero responds to all the charges Antony made in a 
letter he sent to Hirtius that Hirtius later turned over to Cicero.  For most of the speech, 
Cicero simply quotes Anthony’s charges against him and replies: 
'Uictum Ciceronem ducem habuistis.' 
 Eo libentius 'ducem' audio quod certe ille dicit inuitus; nam de uicto nihil laboro. 
Fatum enim meum est sine re publica nec uinci posse nec uincere. 
'Macedoniam munitis exercitibus.'  
Et quidem fratri tuo qui a uobis nihil degenerat extorsimus.  
                                                
18 According to Butler (2002: 78-84), Cicero attempts to shed his equestrian image, gained and on display 
in his early speeches, the Pro Quinctio and Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino, for a more noble one by 
emphasizing his rhetorical abilities.  
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'Africam commisistis Uaro bis capto.'  
Hic cum Gaio fratre putat se litigare.  
'In Syriam Cassium misistis.'  
Non igitur sentis huic causae orbem terrae patere, te extra munitiones tuas 
uestigium ubi imprimas non habere?19 
 
Charge: You have the conquered Cicero as a general. 
Repy: I hear ‘general’ willingly because he says it unwillingly; concerning the 
‘conquered’ I could care less.  For it’s my fate that without the Republic I am not 
able to conquer or be conquered. 
Charge: You are fortifying Macedonia.20 
Reply: Indeed, we have wrested it away from your brother who strays little from 
you. 
Charge: You entrusted Africa to Varus who has been captured twice.21 
Reply: This guy thinks he’s arguing with his brother Gaius. 
Charge: You sent Cassius to Syria.22 
Reply: Do you thus not feel that the world lies open to this cause, that outside 
your home base you have nowhere to plant your foot? 
 
'Apuleiana pecunia Brutum subornastis.' Quid? si omnibus suis copiis excellentem 
uirum res publica armasset, quem tandem bonum paeniteret? Nec enim sine 
pecunia exercitum alere nec sine exercitu fratrem tuum capere potuisset.23 
 
Charge: You supplied Brutus with Apuleian money. 
Reply: So?  If the Republic had armed an excellent man with all of its troops, 
what good man would regret it?  For without money he could not have fed his 
army nor capture your brother with it. 
 
'Ser. Galbam eodem pugione succinctum in castris uidetis.'  
Nihil tibi de Galba respondeo, fortissimo et constantissimo ciui: coram aderit; 
praesens et ipse et ille quem insimulas pugio respondebit. 
'Milites aut meos aut ueteranos contraxistis tamquam ad exitium eorum qui 
Caesarem occiderant: et eosdem nec opinantis ad quaestoris sui aut imperatoris 
aut commilitonum suorum pericula impulistis.'  
Scilicet uerba dedimus, decepimus: ignorabat legio Martia, quarta, nesciebant 
ueterani quid ageretur; non illi senatus auctoritatem, non libertatem populi 
sequebantur: Caesaris mortem ulcisci uolebant, quam omnes fatalem fuisse 
arbitrabantur; te uidelicet salvum, beatum, florentem esse cupiebant.24 
 
                                                
19 Cic. Phil. 13.30.11-20. 
20 In reference to the Senate supporting the taking of this away from Antony by Marcus Brutus.  See Cass. 
Dio. 47.23-25. 
21 Shackleton Bailey (2009: 264n. 54) notes that Varus was captured at Corfinium in 49 and assumes the 
second time was in Caesar’s Africa campaign in 46. 
22 Cass. Dio 47.26-30, 
23 13.32.12-16. 
24 13.33.10-13.34.1.  This is the only source that claims Galba was a participant in Caesar’s murder. 
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Charge: You watched Galba in camp girt with the same dagger. 
Reply: I shall say nothing about Galba, a most brave and reliable citizen; he will 
make himself present for you and that dagger will respond to your charge. 
Charge: You drew together soldiers, either mine or veterans, as though for the 
purpose of ending those who slew Caesar, and then you drove those same soldiers 
who didn’t know the dangers to that of their quaester or general or fellow soldiers. 
Reply: Of course we hoodwinked and ensnared them.  The fourth Martian legion 
was ignorant; the veterans did not know what was being done.  They were not 
following the authority of the Senate nor the liberty of the people.  They wanted 
to avenge Caesar’s death, which they all decided was their fate; clearly they 
wanted you safe and sound! 
 
In none of the above replies to Antony’s charges does Cicero offer a denial.  He interprets 
what was a criticism as a compliment, that is to say he interprets a positive FTA as 
though it were a compliment.  It is true that some of Antony’s charges could indeed be 
seen as positive attributes from the perspective of someone hostile to Antony.  For 
example, the charge that Cicero had sent money to Brutus, that he was fortifying 
Macedonia, and mustered soldiers on false pretenses to go after Antony.   However, some 
of Antony’s accusations can be considered negative regardless of political leanings.  
 When Antony refers to Cicero as a dux he is surely being sarcastic since Cicero 
never served as general and took no part in Pompey’s campaign against Caesar.25  The 
victum must, however, be in reference to Pharsalus.  Thus Antony is drawing attention to 
Cicero’s uselessness outside the forum.   Cicero’s response is to mischaracterize 
Antony’s sarcasm as an honest assessment of Cicero.  When one pauses to think 
rationally about this, the retort doesn’t appear to work.  Cicero was never a general, so 
why would he imply that Antony addressed him as one?  If Cicero and Antony were 
exchanging words in each other’s presence, Antony could simply respond with a “you 
don’t understand sarcasm, do you?”  Since Antony was not present, however, Cicero gets 
away with the deliberate mischaracterization of Antony’s point.  While not the most 
                                                
25 In fact, Plutarch (Cic. 38) depicts him as harmful to morale at Pompey’s camp. 
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clever of Cicero’s retorts, his reply meets the most basic requirement in a verbal 
exchange: it shuts down an avenue of attack.  That he does so disingenuously doesn’t 
matter for in verbal debates appearances are more important than substance.26 
 
5.4 Altercatio: Verbal contests with Clodius 
 Given Cicero’s status as a prominent political voice, it is not surprising that we 
find examples of him using humor to make arguments as a politician rather than an 
advocate.  In the only reference to a late Republican altercatio of which we know,27 a 
letter to Atticus, we see Cicero using humor to make an argument to an audience. 
Sed quid ago?  Paene orationem in epistulam inclusi.  Redeo ad altercationem. 
Surgit pulchellus puer, obicit mihi me ad Baias fuisse. Falsum, sed tamen quid 
hoc? “Simile est,” inquam “quasi in operto dicas fuisse.” — “ quid” inquit 
“homini Arpinati cum aquis calidis?” “Narra” inquam “patrono tuo, qui Arpinatis 
aquas concupiuit;” nosti enim Marianas. “Quousque” inquit “hunc regem 
feremus?” “Regem appellas” inquam “cum Rex tui mentionem nullam fecerit?” 
Ille autem Regis hereditatem spe deuorarat. “Domum” inquit “emisti.” “Putes ” 
inquam “dicere: iudices emisti.” “Iuranti” inquit “tibi non crediderunt.” “Mihi 
uero” inquam “xxv iudices crediderunt, xxxi, quoniam nummos ante acceperunt, 
tibi nihil crediderunt.” Magnis clamoribus adflictus conticuit et concidit.28 
 
But what am I about? I have copied almost a speech into a letter. I return to the 
duel of words. Up gets our prettyboy, and throws in my teeth my having been at 
Baiae. It wasn't true, but what did it matter? "It is as though you were to say," 
replied I, "that I had been in disguise!" "What business," quoth he, "has an 
Arpinate with hot baths?" "Say that to your patron," said I, "who coveted the 
watering-place of an Arpinate." For you know about the marine villa. "How 
long," said he, "are we to put up with this king?" "Do you mention a king," quoth 
I, "when Rex made no mention of you?" He, you know, had swallowed the 
inheritance of Rex in anticipation. "You have bought a house," says he. "You 
would think that he said," quoth I, "you have bought a jury." "They didn't trust 
you on your oath," said he. "Yes," said I, "twenty-five jurors did trust me, thirty-
                                                
26 Just as physical appearance can supersede logic (c.f. the first Kennedy-Nixon debate where television 
viewers thought Kennedy’s performance outshined Nixon’s disproportionately to those listening to the 
debate), verbal dexterity and quickness can outweigh reason. 
27 Most altercationes are late imperial and Christian.  For the earliest possible altercatio, see Bruns, J. E. 
1973: 287-294.  For altercationes in general, Quintilian has a discussion of them in the small chapter four 
of book six.  See also Canellis 1997: 253-255 for a modern overview. 
28 Att. 1.16.8-10. 
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one didn't trust you, for they took care to get their money beforehand." Here he 
was overpowered by a burst of applause and broke down without a word to say.29 
 
Cicero’s replies are interesting.  In our interpretation, however, we must consider the fact 
that the audience for whom this exchange took place was everyone within hearing 
distance of Cicero and Clodius.  Thus, their words were designed to appeal to the 
sensibilities of those who with magnae clamores pronounced Cicero the winner of the 
exchanges. 
 In his very first reply to a charge of Clodius, that he had been at Baiae, Cicero 
does what we have been observing in his speeches: he avoids denial.  In his narration to 
Atticus he denies having been there but not to the audience for whom he was speaking.  
To them he merely says “It’s as though you meant to say I was in disguise.”  While this 
appears cryptic Shackleton Bailey sensibly interprets it as a reference to the Bona Dea 
affair, translating Cicero’s response as “Is that like saying I intruded on the mysteries?”30  
With such a reply Cicero minimizes the relevance of visiting Baiae in relation to the 
illicit invasion of a religious rite from which men are forbidden.  This is almost an 
admission, playing on the idea of furtiveness.  It’s as though Cicero is saying “yes, I 
lurked around Baiae but you lurked around Caesar’s wife as she conducted a ceremony to 
which you were forbidden.” 
 The next exchange pursues the Baiae accusation.  But since Clodius has failed to 
get traction by claiming that Cicero was someplace he normally mocks, he now switches 
the insult to one of background, and says “what was someone from Arpinum doing at the 
warm springs?”  This is exactly what happens in the verbal contests of Honduras: the 
unsuccessful speaker fails to get an insult to stick and so moves to another topic, one 
                                                
29 Shuckbergh E.: 1895. 
30 Schackleton Baily 1999: 87 
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related if possible.  Cicero’s response, while not as clever as his first, is a sufficient 
deflection.  To say “tell that to your patron, who was keen to get the land of someone 
from Arpinum” is to weaken Clodius’ accusation because it claims that someone close to 
him was in the same situation as Cicero.  The “patron” in question is Curio; the analogy 
may be inaccurate but at the very least it casts suspicion upon Curio and thus Clodius.31  
After this exchange, Clodius again switches the topic. 
 When Clodius cries out “how long are we to endure this king?” it is almost as 
though he is thinking of the present verbal exchange rather than Cicero’s political 
influence.  Cicero’s retort hinges on linking the accusation that he is a rex with a rex 
attached to Clodius.  He finds it in Clodius’ brother-in-law, Q. Marcius Rex, who left him 
out of his will.  This insult would not work were it not for the linking word rex.  With no 
connection to Clodius’ words, Cicero’s response would be no different from that of an 
Honduran who, having called someone a maricón and failed calls them a diablito.  Cicero 
wins these exchanges because he plays on a word or concept in Clodius’ insult and 
counterattacks with that rather than a denial.  Thus, when Clodius accuses Cicero of 
buying a house beyond his status, Cicero says “it’s not like I bought a jury.” 
 
5.5 Catullus 
There is wide agreement among scholars of Catullan poetry that the poet did not 
simply write for himself or posterity, but for a contemporary audience.32  There are 
numerous poems where Catullus addresses not only his social equals, but also other 
                                                
31 Little is known about Curio’s background other than that his ancestors came from prominent plebeian 
stock.  There is no evidence to suggest that he was from Arpinum.  For more, see Dettenhofer (1992: 34-
63) who has pieced together much information about Curio but not his birthplace. 
32 See Pedrick 1993 for a good overview of the role of the audience in Catullus.  
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poets.33  Some of the time these addresses are friendly, but elsewhere we can sense 
competitiveness with other poets engaged in the same pursuit.  These fall neatly into 
Wray’s reading of competitive poetics at play in Catullus.34  There are certain Catullan 
poems, however, that seem just nasty and have been read as just that.35  I shall go through 
some of the poems that I find to be the most indicative of the verbal dynamics we have 
observed in Cicero.  Let us start with Catullus 28. 
Pisonis comites, cohors inanis 
aptis sarcinulis et expeditis, 
Uerani optime tuque mi Fabulle, 
quid rerum geritis? Satisne cum isto 
uappa frigoraque et famem tulistis? 
ecquidnam in tabulis patet lucelli 
expensum, ut mihi, qui meum secutus 
praetorem refero datum lucello, 
‘o Memmi, bene me ac diu supinum 
tota ista trabe lentus irrumasti.’ 
sed, quantum uideo, pari fuistis 
casu: nam nihilo minore uerpa 
farti estis. pete nobiles amicos. 
at uobis mala multa di deaeque 
dent, opprobria Romuli Remique. 
 
Piso's Company, a penniless staff, with  
lightweight knapsacks, scantly packed,  
most dear Veranius you, and my Fabullus too,  
how goes it with you? Have you borne frost  
and famine enough with that sot?  Which appear  
in your tablets — the profits or expenses?  
So with me, who when I followed a praetor,  
inscribed more gifts than gains. "O Memmius,  
well and slowly did you throat rape me,  
from behind, day by day, with the whole of that  
beam of yours." But, from what I see, you’ve  
suffered the same; for you have been crammed  
                                                
33 Catullus 35, 40, 50, 55, 95, 116, et al. 
34 Wray 2001.  Catullus 116 is a good example of the poet actively vying with another poet to create the 
better verse. 
35 Marilyn Skinner (1992) sees Catullus 11, 37, and 58 as purely misogynist texts which arose as a strategy 
used by males in order to cope with the competitive environment in which they lived. 
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with a cock no smaller.  Courting friends of  
high rank! But may the gods and goddesses heap  
ill upon you disgraces to Romulus and Remus.36 
 
First of all, let us note that this poem is addressed to two of Catullus’ friends, or at the 
very least, two individuals about whom Catullus has nothing but good to say.37 They are 
both mentioned in poem 12 as the two individuals who sent as a gift to the poet the 
napkins that Asinius Marrucinus stole.38  Fabullus also appears in the very next poem of 
the corpus as an invited guest of Catullus,39 and Vatinius is described in 9 as “Verani, 
omnibus e meis amicis antistans mihi milibus trecentis.”40  They both appear together  
again in 48, where Catullus is lamenting that Piso preferred Porcius and Socration to 
them.41 
 The poem takes place in a context where the poet and the addresses have found 
themselves in the same situation – they are all suffering from their experiences with 
inhospitable praetors.  As such, Catullus can get away with insulting his friends with the 
understanding that he is joking.  And insult he does.  Although he admits to having been 
raped by Memmius, he says that Fabullus and Veranius “have been stuffed by no less a 
                                                
36 Smithers, L.C. 1894, with modification. 
37 This is not to say that Catullus could not speak badly of his friends. As Quinn (1999: 45) remarks 
“exaggeratedly abusive language is not uncommon among friends, particularly if they are of Catullus’ 
violent temperament, and there are hints in in the Furius poems, and in other violent poems, that the abuse 
was not meant to wound.”  While I would agree that abusive language can be common among friends, it 
occurs only in certain contexts.   For instance, it is particularly common in the United States Marines, 
where humor, especially homoerotic humor of both a threatening and self-deprecating sort, is extremely 
common.  Although no academic studies have explored this, it has been remarked upon in film and print.  
See Evan Wright’s Generation Kill, turned into a seven part HBO miniseries by David Simon, in which one 
Marine proclaims “Man! We Marines are so homoerotic. That's all we talk about! You ever realize how 
homoerotic this whole thing is?”  The book and the series were the result of Wright’s time spent embedded 
with a platoon of Reconnaissance Marines, commanded by, incidentally, a Classics graduate, Nathaniel 
Fick, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  For more on this phenomenon in the Israeli military, see Kaplan 
2005: 571-595. 
38 12.14-16: nam sudaria Saetaba ex Hiberis miserunt mihi muneri Fabullus et Veranius 
39 13.1: cenabis bene, mi Fabulle, apud me… 
40 9.1-2. 




cock” (nihilo minore verpa farti estis).”  By employing the double negative here, 
Catullus implies that his friends suffered worse than he did – they “were fucked by an 
even bigger tool.”  Thus Catullus comes off as the most fortunate of the three.  The 
question, however, is why does the poet admit to having been orally raped?  Is it to 
temper the insult of his friends that he is about to voice a few lines down in the poem or 
is there something else going on here? 
 Many have seen in this admission of the poet a controversial embrace of 
effeminacy by dint of the poet’s candor in confessing that he played the passive role.42  I 
find this to be unlikely and follow Adams in taking irrumare, and indeed all of the abuse 
in the poem, as metaphorical.43  The question still remains, however.  Even if Catullus is 
speaking metaphorically, why does he include himself as a recipient of abuse?  One 
possible explanation is that this poem is in response to a letter sent by Fabullus or 
Vatinius in which it is insinuated that Catullus was “screwed” and this is the poet’s 
response to that accusation.  Rather than deny the charge made by his friends and thus 
look like he is hiding something, he admits to it, but then goes on to say, “yeah but you 
got screwed worse.”  This is of course an argument ex silentio, but it explains why the 
poet would refer to himself in terms that he usually reserves for his enemies.44 
                                                
42 Fitzgerald 1995 and Nappa 2001 both suggest this.  Nappa states that in the poem the “irrumatus is not 
the victim of rape so much as a willing pathicus” (96).   He goes on to say “the sexual mistreatment 
envisioned does not appear to wound or even seriously offend Catullus and his friends.  The tone…reflects 
bitterness only at the men’s lack of financial success; the elaborate descriptions of pathic sex involve no 
mention of shame, hatred, or disgust” (99-100).  Likewise, although Fitzgerald does not believe that any 
sexual act took place, he says that “this passage need not be describing a real sexual act for irrumasti to 
retain something of a literal force.  The graphic detail in these lines cannot simply be reduced to emphasis” 
(68).  He concludes that “the leisurely irrumatio causes the language of aggression to teeter over into the 
language of pleasure, so that the usual distribution of roles is smudged as the poet speaks the aggressor’s 
pleasure” (69).  Amy Richlin (1981: XXX) says of irrumare that it is always literal. 
43 Adams 1982: 127. 
44 There exists also the possibility that this poem is more socially empathetic.  In such a reading, the 
message is not that Catullus fared better but that he sees his friends fared as badly as he did.  Thus the 
message is “Welcome to the Club! I suffered much myself!”  Thanks to Josh Smith for this reading. 
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Furthermore, it makes sense in the context of other poems in the corpus where there is 
explicit mention made of Catullus engaged in trading insults with friends by poetry or 
missive.  Let us turn to a few. 
12 
Marrucine Asini, manu sinistra 
non belle uteris in ioco atque uino: 
tollis lintea neglegentiorum. 
hoc salsum esse putas? fugit te, inepte! 
quamuis sordida res et inuenusta est 
non credis mihi? crede Pollioni 
fratri, qui tua furta uel talento 
mutari uelit; est enim leporum 
disertus puer ac facetiarum. 
quare aut hendecasyllabos trecentos 
exspecta, aut mihi linteum remitte, 
quod me non mouet aestimatione, 
uerum est mnemosynum mei sodalis. 
nam sudaria Saetaba ex Hiberis 
miserunt mihi muneri Fabullus 
et Ueranius: haec amem necesse est 
et Ueraniolum meum et Fabullum. 
 
Marrucinus Asinius, you do not use your  
left hand nicely amid the jests and wine:  
you make off with the napkins of the careless.  
Do you think this is witty? It escapes you, fool,  
how coarse a thing and unbecoming it is!  
Don't you believe me? Believe your brother Pollio  
who would willingly give a talent to divert you  
from your thefts: for he is a lad skilled in pleasantries  
and clever talk. Therefore, either expect  
three hundred hendecasyllables, or return me  
my napkin which I esteem, not for its value but  
as a pledge of remembrance from my comrade.  
For Fabullus and Veranius sent me napkins  
as a gift from Iberian Saetabis; these I must  
love even as I do Veraniolus and Fabullus.45 
 
This poem has recently been seen as emblematic of the elegance and urbanity that seem 
to characterize so much of the Catullan corpus.46  In the context of in ioco atque vino we 
                                                
45 Smithers, C. 1894. 
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see the words belle, salsus, lepor, disertus, and facetia.  Likewise, the opposite of these 
words appear: ineptus and inuenustus.  It is easy to imagine the Greek-influenced 
convivium setting from which such a poem could have arisen.47  Nevertheless, as William 
Fitzgerald has pointed out, this poem does not present the poet as the consummate lector. 
This poem is a response to an act that was made in an attempt to be witty.  To be sure, the 
poet does call this act inuenustus, but it is important to note that he does not say why.48 
 In all probability, Asinius’ theft was somewhat witty.  It seems rather unlikely 
that one of the Catullus’s friends would be so poor that he had to steal napkins to supply 
his own domus.  Catullus even admits that it is a joke by calling it inuenustus.  He is 
simply trying to save face by twisting the pilfering of a napkin into something sordid.  He 
is, in other words, competing for the upper hand in wit with Asinius, and having lost one 
round, changes the nature of the contest to one of urbanity and sophistication, so that it 
looks like Asinius has forfeited or committed some sort of foul.  We thus have in poem 
12 two individuals competing for eminence.  Both are trying to shift the contest to terms 
that are the most favorable to them and it should come as no surprise that the terms of 
Catullus are poetic.  There are no fixed rules of behavior laid out here.  Catullus is not 
saying that theft is always “loutish” but he is trying to make it out as such in this 
instance.49  Fitzgerald observes that this competition is indicative of the importance at the 
                                                                                                                                            
46 It has also been read as a reflection of the tension over gift giving, along with 13 and 14.  See McMaster 
2010: 355-379.  Nappa (1998: 385-397) sees in the same vein as Krostenko’s analysis, that the poem serves 
to demonsrate Catullus’ elegentia. 
47 For the development of these words in the first century B.C.E., see Krostenko 2001, who argues that they 
were taken from the vocabulary of traditional Roman mores and reapplied to a world that had been changed 
by all the luxury pouring in from the Greek East. 
48 Fitzgerald remarks on the furtum inuenustum: “by the end of the poem we are none the wiser as to why it 
isn’t [witty], nor as to what distinguishes it from his brother’s lepores and facetiae, or the company’s ioci; 
instead we have witnessed a dazzling series of maneuvers that have shut Asinius out of the elegant world it 
has created” (95-96).  Fitzgerald further notes that making a fuss about a napkin is “hardly urbane” (94). 
49 Fitzgerald 1995: 96. 
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time placed upon individuality.50  Neither Asinius nor Catullus (although we only have 
one side in poem 12) are charging the other with a violation of some fixed rule of 
behavior.  They are simply jostling for position in terms of status.  This is indicative of 
the same social forces that we see at play in the verbal contests of 1960s Harlem and 
1970s Honduras, where the primary motivation for participation in it is to stake out one’s 
indentity.51 
Uarus me meus ad suos amores 
uisum duxerat e foro otiosum, 
scortillum, ut mihi tum repente uisumst, 
non sane illepidum neque inuenustum. 
huc ut uenimus, incidere nobis 
sermones uarii, in quibus, quid esset 
iam Bithynia, quo modo se haberet, 
ecquonam mihi profuisset aere. 
respondi, id quod erat, nihil neque ipsis 
nunc praetoribus esse nec cohorti, 
cur quisquam caput unctius referret, 
praesertim quibus esset irrumator 
praetor, nec faceret pili cohortem. 
'at certe tamen,' inquiunt 'quod illic 
natum dicitur esse, comparasti  
ad lecticam homines.' ego, ut puellae 
unum me facerem beatiorem, 
'non' inquam 'mihi tam fuit maligne, 
ut, prouincia quod mala incidisset, 
non possem octo homines parare rectos.' 
at mi nullus erat nec hic neque illic, 
fractum qui ueteris pedem grabati 
in collo sibi collocare posset. 
hic illa, ut decuit cinaediorem, 
'quaeso,' inquit mihi 'mi Catulle, paulum 
istos commoda! nam uolo ad Serapim 
deferri.' 'mane,' inquii puellae, 
'istud quod modo dixeram me habere, 
fugit me ratio: meus sodalis, 
Cinnast Gaius, is sibi parauit. 
uerum, utrum illius an mei, quid ad me? 
                                                
50 Ibid: 97. 
51 Parks 1985: 440.  See the ethnographies at the end of chapter two as well as my conclusion at the end of 
chapter five for more. 
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utor tam bene quam mihi paratis. 
sed tu insulsa male et molesta uivis, 
per quam non licet esse neglegentem.'52   
 
Varus had led me from the forum where 
I was relaxing to see his love, 
a whore or so it seemed at first 
not without charm or grace;  
we came to talk about this and that, 
how things in Bithynia were, 
whether I profited there and 
I answered as it was, that neither 
the praetors nor their staff returned 
any wealthier than when they left, 
especially when they had an 
irrumator for a praetor, who didn’t 
give a lick about his men. 
“But surely you must have got 
some slaves for your chair for 
I hear this is where they’re from. 
I act as though I was lucky and 
did well and say “it didn’t go so 
badly that I was not able to get 
eight, straight-backed men from 
the province which fell to me.” 
But I didn’t have one, here or there, 
able to lift the foot of a broken sofa 
onto his shoulder.  She says, as befits 
a catamite, “Please do lend me some, 
my Catullus, for I want to go to the 
temple of Serapis.  “Wait” I say to  
the Girl, “what I just said, that was 
a slipup.  A buddy of mine, Gaius 
Cinna, he bought them.  But whether 
they’re mine or his, what difference is it? 
I use them as though they were mine; 
but you are an annoying little tart 
around whom one must be on guard. 
 
As was the case in Poem 28, the subject here is how well Catullus did while in Bithynia.  
Just as he admits to doing as poorly there as Veranius and Fabullus, here he grudgingly 
                                                
52 Cat. 10. 
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admits to a girl that he might not have come back as well off as he initially claimed.53  
However, unlike poem 28, there is no accusation in this poem.  The girl never challenges 
him.  Rather, the poet gets trapped in his own lies, and his initial solution to that is to try 
to talk his way out of it and claim that the slaves are as good as his.  Why then does he 
immediately switch gears and call her a mouthy irritation?  By stating that one has to be 
on guard around her (per quam non licet esse neglegentem), he clearly implies that he 
was lying.  The answer lies in the power of admission.  Were the poet to walk away after 
such an exchange, he would have lost faith.  The girl must have known, though she is 
depicted as rather clueless, that he was lying once he started backtracking.  Although 
insulting her reveals Catullus’ lack of slaves, it also allows him to maintain face.  The 
second half of the poem is about the poet’s positive face, the way he wants to be 
perceived – namely, as having profited from his service abroad.  However, the girl’s 
request threatens this face and his only response is to challenge her face, even if that 
means revealing he lied. 
 These three poems of Catullus, and others, suggest that the poet was engaged in 
verbal contests with his friends, colleagues, and even women on the street, and that there 
were stakes to the outcome of those contests.  Catullus’ face is challenged in all three 
poems.  In the Bithynia poems the challenge involves wealth, while in the convivium 
poem it involves the poet’s claim to his own property.  And in all three he responds with 
an admission and a counterattack.  In poem 10 he replies “yes I got fucked but you got 
fucked harder;” in poem 12 his retort is “yes, you stole my napkins but if you don’t give 
                                                
53 Quinn (1972: 224) has argued that there is no reason to doubt that this was a real experience of Catullus.  
Given the similar context between this poem and 28 it makes sense to me that it would have been inspired 
by an actual encounter.  Skinner (1989: 19) sees this poem as Catullus’ attempt to criticize the status quo of 
the Roman social system.  It seems to me that such a reading takes away from the poem more than it gives: 
if we are to interpret the poem as a complaint, the self-deprecating humor of it is lessened.  
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them back I’ll attack you in verse;” and in poem 10 he responds by saying “okay, so I 
was lying but you’re an impudent little girl.” 
 
5.6 Plutarch’s Apophthegmata 
 There is a vast difference between the Apophthegmata Romana attributed to 
Romans prior to Cicero’s time and those roughly contemporary with him or later.  
Consider the following saying attributed to the elder Scipio: 
Πετιλλίου δὲ καὶ Κοΐντου πολλὰ πρὸς τὸν δῆµον αὐτοῦ κατηγορησάντων, εἰπὼν 
ὅτι τῇ σήµερον ἡµέρᾳ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Ἀννίβαν ἐνίκησεν, αὐτὸς µὲν ἔφη 
στεφανωσάµενος ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὸ Καπετώλιον θύσων, τὸν δὲ βουλόµενον τὴν 
ψῆφον ἐκέλευσε φέρειν περὶ αὐτοῦ· | καὶ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνέβαινεν, ὁ δὲ δῆµος 
ἐπηκολούθησε τοὺς κατηγόρους ἀπολιπὼν λέγοντας.54 
 
When Petillius and Quintus brought before the people many accusations against 
him, he remarked that on this very day he had conquered the Carthaginians and 
Hannibal, and he said that he himself, with a garland on, was on his way up to the 
Capitol to offer sacrifice, and he bade anyone who so wished to give in his vote 
about him. With these words he went his way, and the people followed after, 
leaving behind his accusers still speaking. 
 
This is not the kind of retort we find in Cicero.  While we don’t know what the 
accusations were and thus cannot be certain whether his response is denial or evasion – 
though it’s a reasonable assumption to think it was regarding Hannibal and thus a denial.  
Scipio doesn’t employ any humor or attempt to turn the criticism back on the accusers.  
His response isn’t lighthearted but rather an assertion of his worthiness as a general and 
citizen.  His response is to suggest that the accusations against him are petty and that 
everyone agrees with him. 
 The majority of Roman sayings prior to Cicero are either challenges to someone’s 
character or assertions about one’s own character; they are not responses to accusations 
                                                
54 196F-197A.  Cf. Mor. 540F; Plut. Cat. Mai. 15, Polyb. 23.14, Livy 38.50-51, Gell. 4.18. 
 
 187 
that call into question character.55  One exception is a retort of the younger Scipio.  When 
a rival for the censorship claimed that Scipio only knew the names of the people he 
claimed to know, he responded “You are right, for I’ve not tried to know many but to be 
unknown by no one,” ἀληθῆ λέγεις’ εἶπεν· ‘ἐµοὶ γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι πολλοὺς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ 
µηδενὸς ἀγνοεῖσθαι µεµέληκεν.56  This is the classic Ciceronian script, greatly approved 
by Quintilian: an apparent admission but in fact a misinterpretation of the accusation that 
suggests some fault on the accuser’s part.  In this case, the accusation is that Scipio isn’t 
really a friend of those whom he claims as supporters.  However, the response, that he 
had tried not to be unknown, assumes that the accusation was that he was too illustrious.  
The retort is akin to saying “I can’t help it if I’m famous” and is successful for the very 
reasons discussed in chapters three and four: it avoids denial – which makes one look 
guilty – and it shifts the ground to one upon which its utterer has an advantage, in this 
case Scipio’s fame.  It is noteworthy that this retort of Scipio’s took place within the 
context of a competition for office.  Competition creates a set of social rules that can be 
manipulated through humor.  Without competition, humor is no less abundant but it is 
rarely used to challenge another’s authority. 
 It is not until Cicero that we begin to see Plutarch citing an increasing number of 
jests made in retort.  His fourth through sixth sayings of Cicero are all responses to 
criticism: 
3.) Οὐέρρου δὲ υἱὸν ἔχοντος οὐκ εὖ κεχρηµένον ἐφ' ὥρᾳ τῷ σώµατι, τὸν δὲ 
Κικέρωνα λοιδοροῦντος εἰς µαλακίαν καὶ κίναιδον ἀποκαλοῦντος, ‘ἀγνοεῖς’ εἶπεν 
‘ὅτι προσήκει τοῖς τέκνοις ἐντὸς θυρῶν λοιδορεῖσθαι’. 
 
                                                
55 Wortley (2011: 223-239) also notes that in the Apophthegmata Plutarch has an overwhelming interest in 
stories of relaxation, hospitality, and entertainment.  Perhaps it is not surprising that Plutarch would be less 
interested in political or personal barbs given that the rest of the Plutarch corpus is nearly devoid of it. 
56 Mor. 200D. 
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When the son of Verres who had been far from wholesome as a boy, [publically] 
chastised Cicero for weakness and called him a catamite, Cicero said “don’t you 
know that it is fitting for children to be scolded behind closed doors?” 
 
4.) Μετέλλου δὲ Νέπωτος εἰπόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι ’πλείονας µαρτυρῶν 
ἀπέκτονας ἢ συνηγορῶν σέσωκας ’καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν’ ἔφη ‘πλεῖον ἐµοὶ πίστεως ἢ 
λογιότητος’. 
 
When Metellos Nepos said that he had killed more men in his testimony than 
saved by his advocacy, Cicero said “true, for I have more credibility than 
eloquence.” 
 
5.) Ἐρωτῶντος δὲ τοῦ Μετέλλου τίς αὐτοῦ πατήρ ἐστι,’ταύτην’ ἔφη ‘τὴν 
ἀπόκρισιν χαλεπωτέραν σοὶ ἡ µήτηρ πεποίηκεν.’ ἦν γὰρ ἡ τοῦ Μετέλλου 
ἀκόλαστος. 
 
When Metellus was asking him who his father was, Cicero said, “your mother has 
made that answer difficult [for you].”  For his mother was not blameless.  
 
Although these are the only humorous retorts out of twenty-one sayings reported by 
Plutarch, this is more than 200 percent greater in frequency than any other individual 
quoted – the Scipio retort was out of twenty-three total of his sayings.  Despite Caesar’s 
quip about Semiramis, Plutarch reports no riposte of his, nor does he for Augustus.  The 
lack of argument-based humor in the empire is something that Brian Krostenko has 
remarked upon.57 
 Outside the sayings of the Romans but elsewhere in Plutarch’s Apophthegmata, 
we find the same lack of character-based humor.  The only exception is a saying 
attributed to Alcibiades.  Plutarch claims, as he does in his life of Alcibiades,58 that when 
as a young man he was pinned down in a wrestling hold Alcibiades bit his competitor in 
the arm.  Upon escaping the boy told him he bit like women and Alcibiades said “not 
                                                
57 Krostkenko 2001: 296-303. 
58 Plut. Alc. 2.2. 
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really, more like a lion.”59  First of all, what sets this retort apart from the rest of Greek 
sayings listed by Plutarch is that it is in response to a moral condemnation.  In all of the 
other examples we see, outside the Roman ones, there is no response.  Those sayings that 
are condemning in nature are spoken by individuals to whom one couldn’t respond – 
kings, military commanders, and despots.  It would be dangerous and self-damaging to 
challenge such individuals.  The fact that we have two peers arguing over a much desired 
cultural trait, physical strength, makes this situation stand out from the contexts of all the 
other sayings in Plutarch.  And while it lacks the language of an admission – it says οὐ 
µὲν οὖν not just οὖν – it comes close in that Alcibiades compares himself to something so 
outrageous as to be unbelievable.  If his wrestling companion thought Alcibiades bites 
like a woman, the logical response would for him to say he bites like a man.  In such a 
scenario we could envision a fight, verbal or physical, to follow.  However, to say that he 
bites like a lion could not have been met with anything other than laughter.  It’s hard to 
imagine his fellow wrestler pressing the issue or saying anything in response other than 
“keep telling yourself that.”  As such, Alcibiades’ response does what a lot of Ciceronian 
and Quintilianic examples that we have been discussing do: it shuts down the debate.  By 
taking it to the level of the absurd Alcibiades disarms a possible confrontation. 
 
5.7 Concluding Remarks on Roman Verbal Competitions 
 Nearly all of our evidence for the strategies we have been discussing comes from 
the first century BCE.  The retorts of Romans from earlier times that have been handed 
down to us are decidedly different than they are.  While Cicero and Catullus were skilled 
                                                
59 86D1-3: Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔτι παῖς ὢν ἐλήφθη λαβὴν ἐν παλαίστρᾳ· καὶ µὴ δυνάµενος διαφυγεῖν ἔδακε τὴν 




verbal competitors who occasionally made admissions or claims to behavior outside 
normally deemed acceptable, judging by the Apophthegamata, the early Cornelii, 
Aemilii, and Fabii seem to have responded to criticism by asserting their adherence to 
acceptable behavior.  What’s more, the retorts of Cicero and Catullus often are concerned 
with style.  Piso insults Cicero’s hubris for writing poetry to himself and Cicero responds 
with stylistic criticism of Piso’s argument.  The girlfriend of Varus challenges Catullus 
on his possession of slaves and Catullus responds by suggesting that the girl was acting in 
a manner that befitted a catamite and calling her annoying.  In constrast, when the elder 
Scipio is accused, he reminds the audience that he had conquered the Carthaginians and 
Hannibal.  While it is true that Cicero often reminded juries and his fellow senators of his 
past service to the state, he rarely stopped there.  Why did the elder Scipio?  While there 
is absolutely no reason to assume that earlier Romans were less oratorically gifted, there 
is reason to assume that aristocratic competition was less intense at his time and earlier.  
The Marian reforms in 107, which allowed a wider range of citizens to enlist, caused the 
army to swell and thereby gave more power to generals with imperium than had 
previously been the case, in addition to solidifying loyalty among the troops.  As a result, 
those who succeeded in their military careers gained more clients and became more 
powerful.  The stakes were raised and the attraction of political office became more 
intense.  It seems a safe assumption that the more competitive an environment was, the 
more invective one would find therein.  Moreover, as the amount of invective rises, so 
too would the diversity in responses to that invective.  What’s more, the population of 
city alone more than doubled over the last two centuries of the Republic.60  This 
dissertation has argued that it is the attitude of audiences, and their tendency to be 
                                                
60 Storey 1997: 996-997. 
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influenced by humor, that determines verbal competitions.  The audiences of judicial and 
senatorial debate in the mid first century were undoubtedly more diverse than they were 
one hundred years earlier.  Such increased diversity would no doubt create a more 
permissive environment for new and increasingly sophisticated reponses to denigration. 
 
Conclusion 
 I have tried to demonstrate that in verbal contests, which exist in all societies but 
particularly in highly competitive ones, one tactic is prized and privileged above the rest:  
avoiding denial and responding to accusations with counteraccusations, ideally relating to 
something said in the original accusation.  Essentially I am arguing that, in verbal 
contests, style surpasses content in strategic importance.  However, it is worth noting that 
not all arguments are verbal contests.  We define verbal argument as a verbal competition 
between two or more participants with at least one audience member witnessing, and 
where the stakes are significant.   Many arguments are not of great significance for the 
participants.  Academic arguments, for example, are rarely zero-sum games.  While an 
academic argument successfully made may result in greater influence and increased 
financial support, it is rarely at the expense of someone else.  Likewise, an argument over 
the best restaurant in a particular region is unlikely to affect social standings.  It could 
have this effect if the two persons arguing were restaurateurs, critics, or individuals who 
defined themselves by their culinary tastes.  But, for most, such an argument has little 
effect upon face.  If there is an appeal to an audience and a winner is recognized, the 
benefits in such situations are slight, as is the harm to the recognized loser.  Countless 
additional examples of relatively inconsequential arguments exist but we need not list 
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them. We only need state that we are concerned with arguments that involve great 
potential losses and gains.  Criminal cases and competitions over face where there is a 
clear winner and a clear loser are perfect examples.  And unlike regular arguments, it is 
worth listing other verbal contests that carry high social stakes. 
 After judicial cases, the verbal contest with the greatest stakes would likely 
concern political power.  Thus political debates, responses to attack ads, or simple 
interaction in the case of non-democratic societies would all fall into that category.61   
After contests over political power we might place competition between firms for a 
lucrative contract.  In exchanges between the two competing firms and the deciding entity 
there exists great potential for not only financial loss but face loss as well.62  After 
political and financial power, the only remaining place where power may be negotiated is 
reputation.  Verbal contests over reputation could take place in any number of contexts 
but one of the most common in the West would have to be in the arts.  Thus a rap, 
singing, dancing, or modeling contest could, if won, ensure or hinder a future career.63  
However, given that rap is the only format where accusations and counter accusations are 
exchanged between participants, it is the only genre where truly verbal contests could 
exist with language similar to Cicero or Catullus.  Consider the “rap battle” in the film 8 
                                                
61 Regarding non-democratic societies, or more specifically totalitarian societies, it is difficult to predict 
where verbal contests should take place.  It might be in party meetings, social situations, or professional 
interaction.  This has been discussed by Syme (1939: 505) in the Roman world.  See also Roller (2011: 
202-219) who convincingly argues that as the opportunity to make a name for oneself through oration in 
the quaestiones diminished, aristocrats turned to recitation.   Aristocratic competition and promotion in 
authoritarian regimes has also been discussed in the modern world where the same forces push competition 
to take place in increasingly private contexts.  Such systems of government are examples of what Weber 
called “charismatic bureaucracies.”  See Constas 1958: 400-401. 
62 For instance, if one firm’s performance were so poor it would likely hurt future opportunities. 
63 It is likely that the popularity of such competitions in reality television is due to audience recognition of 
their stakes.  The audience does not watch such competitions for the enjoyment of the performances, 
though this may certainly occur.  It watches to observe the social drama unfold.  For more on the dynamics 
of competition in reality television, see Barton 2007. 
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Mile where the white rapper Eminem is mocked by his opponent on account of 
background.  His response is familiar to us by now: 
This guy ain't no mother-fuckin MC 
I know everything he's got to say against me 
I am white, I am a fuckin bum, I do live in a trailer with my mom 
 
My boy Future is an Uncle Tom 
I do got a dumb friend named cheddar bob who shoots 
Himself in the leg with his own gun 
I did get jumped by all 6 of you chumps 
And Wink did fuck my girl 
I'm still standin here screamin "FUCK THE FREE WORLD!" 
And never try and judge me dude 
You don't know what the fuck i've been through 
 
But I know something about you 
You went to CRANBROOK, that’s a private school 
Whats the matter dawg, you embarrased? 
This guy's a gangsta? 
His real name's Clarence 
 
And Clarence lives at home with both parents 
And Clarence's parents have a real good marriage 
This guy dont wanna battle, he's shook 
Cause ain't no such thing as halfway crooks! 
He's scared to death 
He's scared to look in his fuckin yearbook, fuck CRANBROOK 
 
Fuck a beat I go accapella 
Fuck a papa doc, fuck a clock, fuck a trailer, fuck everybody 
Fuck y'all if you doubt me 
I'm a piece of fuckin white trash I say it proudly 
Fuck this battle I don't wanna win, I'm outtie.64 
 
We see here a very Ciceronian and Catulluan response to insult.  Rather than challenge 
the notion that he is “white trash,” the rapper accuses his opponent of something related 
that he thinks the crowd will consider even worse: inauthenticity.  Eminem not only 
                                                
64 Eminem.  Shady Records/Interscope.  2002.  The similarities between the competitiveness of ancient 
poets and contemporary rappers have been noticed by others.  See Eideneier 1999. 
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admits to being a “bum…in a trailer with my mom,” he revels in it by stating that anyone 
who doubts him can “fuck a papa doc, fuck a clock, fuck a trailer, fuck everybody.”  
 What does Eminem have to do with Cicero and Catullus, aside from the 
occasional similar response to abuse?  What are the similarities between the verbal 
contests of boys in 1960s Harlem, and 1970s Honduras and Turkey, as discussed in 
chapter 2 above?  The only discernable commonality is that they each stood slightly in 
opposition to what we consider typical Roman values.  Cicero eschewed the military, 
citing his oratory and statesmanship rather than citing martial triumphs as justification for 
political prominence; the persona of Catullus also rejected the military, pursuing instead 
literary delights with his “trivial soft poetry,” versiculi molliculi.65  Eminem challenged 
the view that rap and hip-hop were exclusively black forms of expression.  The Black 
youths of 1960s Harlem and the Hondurans of the 1970s were denied opportunities due to 
a variety of reasons ranging from racism to poverty and drugs, yet found a way to stake a 
claim towards recognition through verbal dexterity.66  Likewise, Turkish boys’ 
“extremely low status in the men’s society is essentially equivalent or analogous to the 
low status of women.”67   
 There are two more commonalities among the cultures studied by sociolinguists 
that have the verbal contests we have been discussing: they are all cultures that esteem 
masculinity.68  What’s more, all of the cultures studied were in the midst of volatile 
                                                
65 Cat. 16. 
66 Not enough is known about the participants in study of Turkish boys.  We are told by the study’s authors 
that they were eight to twelve years old and from all over the country, including Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, 
Erzurum, and Izmir, but their socioeconomic status and other pertinent demographic data are omitted. 
67 Dundes, Leach and Özkök 1970: 345. 
68 For Harlem, see Doss 1998 who argues that the Black Panthers tried to appeal to African American 
men’s conceptions of themselves as potent and physically resisting an oppressive government.  Regarding 
Honduras, machismo has long been studied in Latin America but it has been investigated in connection 
with gang violence and the illegal drug trade by Brenneman 2009.  As for Turkey, Dundes, Leach and 
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change.  Labov started his fieldwork in Harlem in 1965, the same year as Johnson’s 
Voting Rights Act and a time of rent strikes and race riots.69  In fact, in 1964 Harlem saw 
a riot that injured 118 people and went on for six nights in a row.  The New York Police 
Department took the riot so seriously that it called up “five hundred policemen, including 
the tactical patrol force, of which all members were trained in judo, under age thirty, and 
over six feet tall.”70  Honduras in 1977 was similarly tumultuous.  Eight years earlier El 
Salvador had invaded in what became known as the “Football War.”  In 1972 the elected 
President was overthrown in a coup by Osvaldo Lopez Arellano, the second military coup 
in the previous fourteen years.  Less than three years later, in 1975, Alberto Melgar 
Castro overthrew Arellano.  Although Castro’s junta was largely progressive in its 
ideology, its agricultural reforms broke down completely and his administration was 
rocked by drug and bribery scandals.71  In the early 1970s, Turkey was also going 
through a turbulent period.  The struggle over Cyprus was about to boil over, culminating 
in the 1974 Turkish invasion.  Meanwhile, since the end of World War II, millions of 
peasants had left the country to find little work in the cities and settled in gecekondou,72 
temporary settlements similar to the favelas of Brazil. 
 Let us return to the anecdote involving Julius Caesar with which we began this 
study.  If we are to believe Plutarch, Caesar was accustomed to dealing with insults about 
                                                                                                                                            
Özkök (1970: 344) argue that hyper-masculinity is one of the primary motivations behind the game.  They 
say “Turkish psychology or personality concerns an apparent paradox.  On the one hand, Turkish world 
view is said to be fatalistic, so that individuals are almost totally dependent upon the wishes and whims of a 
higher power, for example, the Will of Allah and the inevitability of Kismet (fate). On the other hand, there 
appears to be a very positive attitude toward aggression.  Courage and strength are highly valued male 
ideals.  One of the most popular national sports is wrestling, and military deeds are greatly esteemed. Many 
Turkish boys look forward with great anticipation to their military service.”  It is also worth considering the 
military history of the Turkish people whose conquests sweeping down from the steppes of Central Asia 
merit deeming them aggressive. 
69 Labov 1972: xiv. 
70 Encyclopedia of American Race Riots s.v. New York City Riot of 1964: p. 479. 
71 See Pozas & Del Cid 1980: 645. 
72 See Avci 2012. 
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his manhood.  His loose belt, scrupulous grooming, and tendency to scratch his head with 
one finger all opened him up to criticism, chiefly that of softness (mollitia).73  As such, 
there is little Caesar could have said to deny any accusation that he was effeminate.  
There was simply too much evidence that could be thrown at him to the contrary.  As a 
man, his only viable options upon having had his manhood challenged were to 
demonstrate his manhood by deed (literally jump on the head of someone, for example) 
or to admit to the accusation in some manner.   However, as a politician, only the latter 
option was feasible lest he incur greater resistance.  Furthermore, apparent admission is a 
more effective way to maintain face than attempting to prove the opposite of an 
accusation.  As we have attempted to demonstrate, an admission shuts down debate.  
And, coupled with a retort that puts a twist on the original accusation, such as noting that 
Semiramis and Amazons once ruled Asia, it completely disarms the accuser.  In 
Quintilian, this tactic is referred to as wit (urbanitas or dicacitas).  The fact that such a 
tactic works says much less about the person who employs it than it does about the 
audience who hears it.  It suggests that that audience has either a relativistic outlook, in 
which the simple binaries of man versus woman or good versus evil break down, or an 
unusually high regard for wit.  Wit and humor not only dispel emotions,74 they inspire 
affection and can supplant reasoned argument when employed at the right time.  
  
                                                
73 For his grooming habits and dress, see Plut. Caes. 45.2.  For more on the meaning of scratching one’s 
head with one finger, see Lucilius 882-4; Sen. Ep. 52.12; Juv. 9.133. 
74 The classic example being from the Homeric Hymn to Demeter.   After Persephone has been taken to 
Hades, Iambe cheers up the grieving Demeter with a vulgar joke.  Hymn 6.202-205: πρίν γ᾽ ὅτε δὴ χλεύῃς 
µιν Ἰάµβη κέδν᾽ εἰδυῖα / πολλὰ παρασκώπτουσ᾽ ἐτρέψατο πότνιαν ἁγνήν, / µειδῆσαι γελάσαι τε καὶ ἵλαον 
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  Spring	  2009.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  
Instructor.	  “Intermediate	  Latin.”	  Fall	  2008.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  
Instructor.	  “Elementary	  Greek.”	  2007-­‐2008.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  
Teaching	  Assistant.	  “The	  World	  of	  Homer.”	  Spring	  2007.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  
Instructor.	  “Intermediate	  Latin.”	  Fall	  2006.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  
Instructor.	  “Greek	  Mythology.”	  Summer	  2006.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  	  
Instructor.	  “Elementary	  Latin.”	  2005-­‐2006.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  
Instructor.	  “Elementary	  Latin.”	  2002-­‐2003.	  University	  of	  Oregon.	  
	  
Fellowships	  and	  Awards	  
Selected	  by	  Freshman	  Class	  for	  “High	  Table”	  Tradition.	  Spring	  2015.	  Johns	  
Hopkins	  University.	  
Deans	  Teaching	  Fellowship.	  Spring	  2010.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  
Hodson	  Fellow.	  Spring	  2007.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  
Second	  Year	  Fellowship.	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Department	  of	  Classics.	  
2004-­‐2005.	  
Summer	  Research	  Fellowship.	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Department	  of	  
Classics.	  Summer	  2004.	  
First	  Year	  Fellowship.	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Department	  of	  Classics.	  2003-­‐
2004.	  





“Smut	  in	  Latin	  Poetry.”	  Towson	  University.	  	  Fall	  2010.	  
	  
Professional	  Experience	  
Conference	  Organizer	  and	  Respondent.	  “Imaginary	  Landscapes:	  Spaces	  and	  
Places	  of	  the	  Imaginary”	  Johns	  Hopkins	  Graduate	  Student	  Conference.	  Fall	  
2005.	  	  
Lecture	  Organizer.	  James	  Poultney	  Memorial	  Lecture,	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University.	  	  
Spring	  2005.	  
